The "Green = Peril": Creating the Islamic Fundamentalist Threat

February 13, 2007

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Cato Policy Analysis No. 177

August 27, = 1992

3D"Policy

The "Green Peril":
Creating the Islamic = Fundamentalist=20 Threat

by Leon T. Hadar

Leon T. Hadar, a former bureau chief for the Jerusalem = Post, is=20 an adjunct scholar of the Cato Institute.

Executive Summary

Now that the Cold War is becoming a memory, America's foreign policy=20 establishment has begun searching for new enemies. Possible new villains = include=20 "instability" in Europe --ranging from German resurgence to new Russian=20 imperialism-- the "vanishing" ozone layer, nuclear proliferation, and=20 narcoterrorism. Topping the list of potential new global bogeymen, = however, are=20 the Yellow Peril, the alleged threat to American economic security = emanating=20 from East Asia, and the so-called Green Peril (green is the color of = Islam).=20 That peril is symbolized by the Middle Eastern Moslem = fundamentalist--the=20 "Fundie," to use a term coined by The Economist(1)--a Khomeini-like = creature,=20 armed with a radical ideology, equipped with nuclear weapons, and intent = on=20 launching a violent jihad against Western civilization.

George Will even suggested that the 1,000-year battle between = Christendom and=20 Islam might be breaking out once more when he asked, "Could it be that = 20 years=20 from now we will be saying, not that they're at the gates of Vienna = again, but=20 that, in fact, the birth of Mohammed is at least as important as the = birth of=20 Christ, that Islamic vitality could be one of the big stories of the = next=20 generations?"(2)

A New Cold War?

Indeed, "a new specter is haunting America, one that some Americans = consider=20 more sinister than Marxism-Leninism," according to Douglas E. Streusand. = "That=20 specter is Islam."(3) The rise of political Islam in North Africa, = especially=20 the recent electoral strength of anti-liberal Islamic fundamentalist = groups in=20 Algeria; the birth of several independent Moslem republics in Central = Asia whose=20 political orientation is unclear; and the regional and international = ties=20 fostered by Islamic governments in Iran and Sudan are all producing, as=20 Washington Post columnist Jim Hoagland put it, an "urge to identify = Islam as an=20 inherently anti-democratic force that is America's new global enemy now = that the=20 Cold War is over."(4)

"Islamic fundamentalism is an aggressive revolutionary movement as = militant=20 and violent as the Bolshevik, Fascist, and Nazi movements of the past,"=20 according to Amos Perlmutter. It is "authoritarian, anti-democratic,=20 anti-secular," and cannot be reconciled with the "Christian-secular = universe"=20 and its goal is the establishment of a "totalitarian Islamic state" in = the=20 Middle East, he argued, suggesting that the United States should make = sure the=20 movement is "stifled at birth."(5)

The Islam vs. West paradigm, reflected in such observations, is = beginning to=20 infect Washington. That development recalls the efforts by some of = Washington's=20 iron triangles as well as by foreign players during the months leading = up to the=20 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis. Their use of the media succeeded in = building up=20 Saddam Hussein as the "most dangerous man in the world"(6) and as one of = America's first new post-Cold War bogeymen. Those efforts, including = allegations=20 that Iraq had plans to dominate the Middle East, helped to condition the = American public and elites for the U.S. intervention in the gulf.(7)

There is a major difference between the Saddam-the- bogeyman = caricature and=20 the Green Peril. Notwithstanding the Saddam-is-Hitler rhetoric, the = Iraqi leader=20 was perceived as merely a dangerous "thug" who broke the rules of the = game and=20 whom Washington could suppress by military force. Saddam's Iraq was a = threat to=20 a regional balance of power, not to the American way of life.

The alleged threat from Iran and militant Islam is different. The = struggle=20 between that force and the West is portrayed as a zero-sum game that can = end=20 only in the defeat of one of the sides. The Iranian ayatollahs and their = allies--"revolutionary," "fanatic," and "suicidal" people that they = are--cannot=20 be co-opted into balance-of-power arrangements by rewards and are even = seen as=20 immune to military and diplomatic threats. One can reach a tactical = compromise=20 with them--such as the agreement with Lebanese Shi'ite groups to release = the=20 American hostages--but on the strate gic level the expectation is for a = long,=20 drawn-out battle.

Indeed, like the Red Menace of the Cold War era, the Green Peril is = perceived=20 as a cancer spreading around the globe, undermining the legitimacy of = Western=20 values and political systems. The cosmic importance of the confrontation = would=20 make it necessary for Washington to adopt a longterm diplomatic and = military=20 strategy; to forge new and solid alliances; to prepare the American = people for a=20 neverending struggle that will test their resolve; and to develop new=20 containment policies, new doctrines, and a new foreign policy elite with = its=20 "wise men" and "experts."

There are dangerous signs that the process of creating a monolithic = threat=20 out of isolated events and trends in the Moslem world is already = beginning. The=20 Green Peril thesis is now being used to explain diverse and unrelated = events in=20 that region, with Tehran replacing Moscow as the center of ideological=20 subversion and military expansionism and Islam substituting for the = spiritual=20 energy of communism.

Islam does seem to fit the bill as the ideal post-Cold War villain. = "It's=20 big; it's scary; it's anti-Western; it feeds on poverty and discontent," = wrote=20 David Ignatius, adding that Islam "spreads across vast swaths of the = globe that=20 can be colored green on the television maps in the same way that = communist=20 countries used to be colored red."(8)

Foreign policy experts are already using the familiar Cold War jargon = to=20 describe the coming struggle with Islam. There is talk about the need to = "contain" Iranian influence around the globe, especially in Central = Asia, which=20 seemed to be the main reason for Secretary of State James A. Baker III's = February stop in that region.(9) Strategists are beginning to draw a = "red line"=20 for the fundamentalist leaders of Sudan, as evidenced by a U.S. = diplomat's=20 statement last November warning Khartoum to refrain from "exporting" = revolution=20 and terrorism.(10) Washington's policymakers even applauded the January = 1992=20 Algerian "iron fist" military coup that prevented an Islamic group from = winning=20 the elections. The notion that we have to stop the fundamentalists = somewhere=20 echoes the Cold War's domino theory.

"Geopolitically, Iran's targets are four--the Central Asian = republics, the=20 Maghreb or North Africa, Egypt and other neighboring Arab countries, and = the=20 Persian Gulf states," explained Hoover Institution senior fellow Arnold=20 Beichman, who is raising the Moslem alarm. Beichman suggested that "the = first=20 major target" for radical Iran and its militant strategy would be = "oil-rich,=20 militarily weak Saudi Arabia, keeper of Islam's holy places and OPEC's=20 decisionmaker on world oil prices."(11) If the West does not meet that=20 challenge, a Green Curtain will be drawn across the crescent of = instability, and=20 "the Middle East and the once Soviet Central Asian republics could = become in a=20 few years the cultural and political dependencies of the most = expansionist=20 militarized regime in the world today, a regime for which terrorism is a = governing norm," he warned.(12)

The Making of a "Peril"

The Islamic threat argument is becoming increasingly popular with = some=20 segments of the American foreign policy establishment. They are = encouraged by=20 foreign governments who, for reasons of self-interest, want to see = Washington=20 embroiled in the coming West vs. Islam confrontation. The result is the=20 construction of the new peril, a process that does not reflect any grand = conspiracy but that nevertheless has its own logic, rules and = timetables.

The creation of a peril usually starts with mysterious "sources" and = unnamed=20 officials who leak information, float trial balloons, and warn about the = coming=20 threat. Those sources reflect debates and discussions taking place = within=20 government. Their information is then augmented by colorful intelligence = reports=20 that finger exotic and conspiratorial terrorists and military advisers.=20 Journalists then search for the named and other villains. The media end = up=20 finding corroboration from foreign sources who form an informal = coalition with=20 the sources in the U.S. government and help the press uncover further=20 information substantiating the threat coming from the new bad guys.

In addition, think tanks studies and op-ed pieces add momentum to the = official spin. Their publication is followed by congressional hearings, = policy=20 conferences, and public press briefings. A governmental policy debate = ensues,=20 producing studies, working papers, and eventually doctrines and policies = that=20 become part of the media's spin. The new villain is now ready to be = integrated=20 into the popular culture to help to mobilize public support for a new = crusade.=20 In the case of the Green Peril, that process has been under way for = several=20 months.(13)

A series of leaks, signals, and trial balloons is already beginning = to shape=20 U.S. agenda and policy. Congress is about to conduct several hearings on = the=20 global threat of Islamic fundamentalism.(14) The Bush administration has = been=20 trying to devise policies and establish new alliances to counter Iranian = influence: building up Islamic but secular and pro-Western Turkey as a=20 countervailing force in Central Asia, expanding U.S. commitments to = Saudi=20 Arabia, warning Sudan that it faces grave consequences as a result of = its=20 policies, and even shoring up a socialist military dictatorship in = Algeria.

Regional Powers Exploit U.S. Fears

Not surprisingly, foreign governments, including those of Turkey, = Saudi=20 Arabia, Egypt, Israel, India, and Pakistan, have reacted to the evidence = of U.S.=20 fear. With the end of the Cold War they are concerned about a continued = U.S.=20 commitment to them and are trying to exploit the menace of Islamic=20 fundamentalism to secure military support, economic aid, and political = backing=20 from Washington as well as to advance their own domestic and regional = agendas.=20 The Gulf War has already provided the Turks, Saudis, Egyptians, and = Israelis=20 with an opportunity to revive the American engagement in the Middle East = and=20 their own roles as Washington's regional surrogates. Now that the Iraqi = danger=20 has been diminished, the Islamic fundamentalist threat is a new vehicle = for=20 achieving those goals.

Pakistan, which lost its strategic value to the United States as a = conduit of=20 military aid to the guerrillas in Afghanistan, and India, whose Cold War = Soviet=20 ally has disintegrated, are both competing for American favors by using = the=20 Islamic card in their struggle for power in Southwest Asia. That = struggle=20 involves such issues as the Kashmir problem and an accelerating nuclear = arms=20 race.(15)

Even such disparate entities as Australia and the Iranian Mojahedin=20 opposition forces are conducting public relations and lobbying efforts = in the=20 United States based on the Islamic fundamentalist threat. Colin = Rubenstein=20 recently discussed the need to maintain an American military presence in = Asia to=20 contain the power of the Moslem government in Malaysia, which according = to him=20 has adopted increasingly repressive measures at home and has been = developing=20 military ties with Libya as part of a strategy to spread its radical = Islamic=20 message in Asia. If Washington refuses to project its diplomatic and = military=20 power to contain the Malaysian-produced Islamic threat in Asia, there is = a=20 danger that the United States and Australia will soon face anti-American = and=20 anti-Israeli blocs, Rubenstein insisted.(16)

The Iranian opposition group, which in the past has subscribed to = socialist=20 and anti-American positions, is now interested in maintaining U.S. = pressure on=20 the government of President Hashemi Rafsanjani and in winning Western = public=20 support. To achieve those goals it is playing up the possi bility of a=20 Tehran-led political terrorist campaign aimed at creating an "Islamic = bloc" in=20 Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa and suggesting that to = avoid=20 such a campaign Washington should back the Mojahedin in Tehran.(17)

Even Washington's long-time nemesis--the hard-core Marxist and former = Soviet=20 ally, former president Mohammad Najibullah of Afghanistan, against whom = the=20 United States helped sponsor Pakistani-directed guerrilla warfare--a few = days=20 before his ouster from power offered his services in the new struggle = against=20 the radical Islamic threat. "We have a common task, Afghanistan, the = United=20 States of America, and the civilized world, to launch a joint struggle = against=20 fundamentalism," he explained. Najibullah warned Washington that unless = he was=20 kept in power, Islamic fundamentalists would take over Afghanistan and = turn it=20 into a "center of world smuggling for narcotic drugs" and a "center for=20 terrorism."(18)

The Beneficiaries and Their Motives

Growing American fears about the Green Peril are playing into the = hands of=20 governments and groups who, interestingly enough, tend to regard the = Islamic=20 threat as exaggerated. The behavior of those groups and governments = recalls the=20 way Third World countries exploited the U.S. obsession with the Red = Menace=20 during the Cold War despite their own skepticism about its long-term = power.

Pakistani officials, for example, reportedly "regard with some = amusement=20 Washington's seeming frenzied concern about the spread of fundamentalism = in=20 Central Asia, fears they hope to exploit by presenting themselves as = sober=20 pragmatists who happen to be Muslims." Indeed, the Pakistani government, = like=20 the Turkish government, has expressed the hope that Washington will = adopt it as=20 a new strategic ally and is encouraging Washington "to regard Islamabad = as a=20 partner in the Central Asian republics, and in the process [limit] the = influence=20 of Iran."(19)

Similarly, India, with its growing Hindu nationalist elements, its = continuing=20 conflict with Pakistan, and its foreign policy disorientation at the end = of the=20 Cold War, has begun to present itself as the countervailing force to the = Islamic=20 menace in Asia and Pakistan.(20)

The Israeli government and its supporters in Washington are also = trying to=20 play the Islamic card. The specter of Central Asian republics and Iran = equipped=20 with nuclear weapons helps Israel to reduce any potential international = pressure=20 on it to place its own nuclear capabilities and strategy on the = negotiating=20 table. More important, perhaps, the Green Peril could revive, in the = long run,=20 Israel's role as America's strategic asset, which was eroded as a result = of the=20 end of the Cold War and was seriously questioned during the Gulf = War.(21)

Israel could become the contemporary crusader nation, a bastion of = the West=20 in the struggle against the new transnational enemy, Islamic = fundamentalism.=20 According to Daniel Doron, "With the momentous upheavals rocking the = Muslim=20 World, the Arab-Israeli conflict is a sideshow with little geopolitical=20 significance." It is a derivative conflict in which Israel is "the = target of=20 convenience for Islam's great sense of hurt and obsessive hostility = towards the=20 West."(22)

The operational message is that the United States "must refocus its = policy on=20 the basic problems facing the Islamic world rather than only the = Arab-Israeli=20 conflict."(23) Jerusalem's attempts to turn that conflict into a = Jewish-Moslem=20 confrontation and to place America on its side to help contain radical = Moslem=20 forces in the region may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The result = is likely=20 to be strengthened anti-American feelings in the Middle East and = anti-American=20 terrorist acts, which, in turn, will invite a new round of American = military=20 intervention.

Egypt's role in the Gulf War has produced some economic benefits, = including=20 forgiveness of its $7 billion debt to the United States, and its = agreement with=20 Israel has improved Cairo's position as a mediator in the peace process. = However, Washington's post-Desert Storm expectation that Cairo would = play an=20 active role in the new security arrangement in the gulf has proven = unrealistic.=20 Saudi Arabia and other conservative gulf monarchies have been less than=20 enthusiastic about Egypt's playing a military role in the region. Since = it=20 cannot become a U.S. surrogate in the gulf, Cairo is focusing on its = neighbor,=20 Sudan, as a new bogeyman, or radical threat, in the Middle East and = sub-Saharan=20 Africa. Presumably, Cairo hopes thereby to gain new significance in the = American=20 global perspective. Exaggerating the threat also gives Cairo an = environment=20 conducive to military action against Sudan that could fulfill the = historical=20 Egyptian goal of turning that country into a protectorate of Cairo.

Sudan: A New Scapegoat

The danger of Sudan's becoming a center of subversion is greatly = exaggerated.=20 It is true that Khartoum is ruled today by a military government = controlled by=20 the National Islamic Front whose leader, Hassan el-Turabi, wishes to = spread his=20 version of fundamentalist Islam in Africa and the Middle East.(24) It is = also=20 possible that some Palestinian and Lebanese terrorists visit or even = reside in=20 Sudan.(25) But American and Egyptian denunciation of Sudan's "harboring=20 terrorists" is hypocritical considering Washington's ties with its Gulf = War=20 "ally" Syria, home to several terrorist groups, and Cairo's current = diplomatic=20 romance with Libya, another center of international terrorism.

Iranian officials, including President Rafsanjani, did visit Sudan = several=20 times as part of Tehran's efforts to break the diplomatic isolation = imposed on=20 it by Washington. That is hardly evidence of a Khartoum-Tehran political = axis,=20 however. The Sudanese seem interested mainly in Iranian economic aid, = including=20 subsidized oil. It is not clear that the two countries have common = political=20 objectives or that either regime's goals are consistently hostile to = U.S.=20 interests. During the gulf crisis, the Iranians tried to convince the = leaders in=20 Khartoum to join them in isolating Saddam--not an "anti-American" = move--but the=20 Sudanese declined. In contrast to Tehran, Khartoum supports the = Palestine=20 Liberation Organization and the U.S.-brokered Middle East peace process. = The=20 Sudanese also supported the Washington-backed rebel groups that came to = power in=20 Ethiopia and Eritrea.(26)

Moreover, Sudan is one of the world's most miserable economic basket = cases.=20 It has a relatively weak military that is no match for the Egyptian army = and is=20 embroiled in suppressing a bloody civil war in the south. The notion = that Sudan=20 has the power to destabilize the countries of Africa and the Middle East = is=20 far-fetched.

An "Iranian Scenario" in Saudi Arabia?

As has that of Egypt and Israel, Saudi Arabia's use of the Green = Peril to=20 mobilize U.S. support has been characterized by confusion, ironies, and=20 paradoxes, the most dramatic of which has been the kingdom's own = commitment to=20 Islamic fundamentalism. With the elimination of Iraq as a regional = military=20 power, the Saudi royal family, worried about the rise of Tehran as a = hegemonic=20 player in the gulf, has been fanning the anti-fundamentalist and = anti-Iranian=20 mood in Washington. The Saudis have indicated that they are interested = in=20 countering Iranian influence in Central Asia. Ironically, they are doing = what=20 they accuse Tehran of-- spending lavishly to establish political and = religious=20 influence. Riyadh has spent more than $1 billion to promote the Saudi = brand of=20 Islam.(27) Along with Egypt, Saudi Arabia has also been supporting the = Somali=20 president against a faction, supported by Iran, that is trying to = overthrow=20 him.(28)

The Saudi Propaganda Campaign

A series of reports about resurgent militant Islamic forces in Saudi = Arabia=20 (which also portrayed the royal family as a politically reformist regime = and=20 active supporter of the U.S.-led peace process) has been used to try to = mobilize=20 American support for the Saudis as a "moderate pillar" and = anti-fundamentalist=20 force in the gulf, the Middle East, and Central Asia.(29)

The problem with that campaign is that the legitimacy of the Saudi = regime is=20 based on its own Islamic fundamentalist principles. The Saudi government = is=20 actually more rigid in its application of Islamic law and more = repressive in=20 many respects than the one in Tehran. For example, Saudi Arabia has no = form of=20 popular representation, and political rights are totally denied women = and=20 non-Moslems. The Saudi regime has been able to stay in power largely = because it=20 has had both direct and indirect American military support, most = recently during=20 the Gulf War. To paraphrase President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Saudis = are=20 Islamic fundamentalists--but they are our Islamic = fundamentalists.(30)

The recent celebrated Saudi foreign policy "assertiveness" and = domestic=20 "moderation" are little more than public relations gimmicks orchestrated = by=20 Riyadh's flamboyant ambassador to Washington and supported by King Fahd. = They=20 are intended to win brownie points with the American public. The Saudi = interest=20 in signing huge arms deals with U.S. companies, for example, could help = to=20 secure the survival of the dwindling American defense industry and = provide=20 "jobs, jobs, jobs." The administration has abetted that strategy. In = spite of=20 Bush's post-Gulf War rhetoric, the administration has announced that it = is=20 providing arms packages to the Middle East totaling $4 billion, of which = close=20 to $1 billion in aircraft-delivered bombs, cluster bombs, air-to-air = missiles,=20 and military vehicles is destined for Saudi Arabia.(31)

The participation of the Saudis in the Madrid peace conference, = although it=20 had a very marginal effect on the outcome of the negotiations, helped to = strengthen Bush's political popularity at home by suggesting that the = Gulf War=20 did achieve "something." The recent meetings between Saudi officials and = American Jewish leaders, including the invitation extended leaders of = American=20 Jewish organizations to travel to Saudi Arabia, must be viewed in that = context.=20 Such conciliatory gestures can also be seen as part of an effort to = neutralize=20 the Israeli lobby's Capitol Hill opposition to arms sales to the=20 kingdom.(32)

Prerevolutionary Conditions in Saudi Arabia

There are clear indications of continuing domestic opposition to the = Saudi=20 royal family. The House of Saud has resisted any move toward serious = political=20 and economic reforms proposed by Westernized Saudi elites. That = intransigence=20 reflects a catch-22 dilemma facing the House of Saud, which was = accentuated by=20 the American military intervention in the gulf. On the one hand, the = regime's=20 raison d'=E0tre is its commitment to strict, anti-Western Islamic = tenets,=20 including support for Islamic fundamentalist groups in the Third World. = On the=20 other hand, to survive, the House of Saud needs the support of the = West's prime=20 power, the United States, which invites criticism from the conservative = elements=20 in the kingdom.

With Westernized opposition silenced, the only viable opposition to = the royal=20 family tends to be found in religious elements who enjoy relative = autonomy in=20 the Saudi system and focus on the discrepancy between the Saudi regime's = Islamic=20 pretensions and its ties with America. The numbers of fundamentalists in = Saudi=20 Arabia have grown considerably since the Persian Gulf crisis and, = according to=20 one observer, "are now estimated to include tens of thousands of younger = radical=20 religious leaders, Islamic university teachers and students."(33) Those = leaders=20 criticized the arrival of the American troops during the Gulf War and = have=20 attacked Saudi support for the Arab-Israeli peace process as well as the = political and personal conduct of the Saudi leadership.

Washington, through its public rhetoric during the Gulf War, = heightened=20 expectations for democratic reforms in the Arab states of the gulf, only = to=20 collaborate later with the Saudis in stifling any possible moves in that = direction. The Bush administration and the Saudis helped to restore the = emir of=20 Kuwait, whose government immediately resumed its harassment of = proponents of=20 democracy and launched a campaign of repression against and expulsion of = the=20 Palestinians living there. The Saudis were also apparently behind the = American=20 effort to prevent the weakening of the central government in Baghdad and = the=20 possible emergence of a Kurdish state or Iraqi Shi'ite autonomy.(34)

Washington should, therefore, not be surprised if, as the provider of = the=20 main mercenary forces for the Saudi regime and its interests in the = region, it=20 ends up being the focus of hostility for the opposition groups in Saudi = Arabia=20 and the Arab gulf states.

The cosmetic political reforms announced in early March 1991, = including the=20 creation of a Consultive Council (to be chosen by the king himself), = were=20 portrayed in the American press as signs of a Saudi version of = perestroika. In=20 reality, the new measures do not introduce any elements of Western-style = democracy; they are more akin to streamlining voting procedures in the = Communist=20 party in the Soviet Union in the 1950s. They are certainly not going to = solve=20 the regime's legitimacy problem.(35)

Article 19, a London-based freedom-of-expression watchdog group, = reported=20 recently that since the Gulf War there has been no lessening of the = Saudi=20 government's control over all aspects of life. What is permissible in = Saudi=20 Arabia is synonymous with the wishes of the current ruler, King Fahd, = and=20 "anything contradicting the origins or the jurisdiction of Islam, = undermining=20 the sanctity of Islam . . . or harming public morality" is subject to=20 censorship. Artistic and academic freedoms, for example, are severely = limited or=20 nonexistent, and the media are under total government control.(36)

Dangers to the United States

It is not the Green Peril that the United States is facing in the = gulf but=20 the peril embodied in its own policies. The pre-Gulf War Saudi debility = stemmed=20 from a willingness to secure the kingdom's interests through the = preservation of=20 an inter-Arab diplomatic framework for solving regional problems and the = maintenance of a regional military balance of power. The American = intervention=20 in the gulf completely destroyed those two mechanisms. It led to the = collapse of=20 the Arab diplomatic order as a mechanism for dealing with crises and to = the=20 destruction of the balance of power in the gulf. It turned Washington = into a=20 local diplomatic hegemonic power and military "balancer." Those = developments=20 have made the Saudis not more "assertive" but more dependent for their = survival,=20 domestically and regionally, on American power. The fact that Saudi = Arabia is=20 for all practical purposes an American dependent today is perhaps one of = the=20 most dramatic results of the war. The perceived Saudi willingness to = take=20 "risks," such as attending the Madrid peace conference and refusing to = subsidize=20 the PLO, is largely based on the expectation that Washington will secure = Saudi=20 interests by, for example, "delivering" Israel to the negotiating table = or=20 deterring potential anti-Saudi Palestinian terrorism.

The current American-Saudi relationship resembles the U.S.-Iranian=20 relationship during the shah's rule. In exchange for granting access to = oil=20 supplies and military installations and showing a willingness to make = the=20 politically correct moves on Israel, the Saudi regime receives security=20 protection masquerading as an "alliance" with Washington. That = arrangement,=20 however, lacks the clear definitions of obligations and rules of the = game that=20 characterize formal alliances.

Indeed, the "alliance" seems to involve an open-ended commitment on = the part=20 of Washington to continue supporting the Saudis, without a clear quid = pro quo on=20 their part. As was the case with the shah's Iran (and Israel today), = Saudi=20 Arabia's chief perquisite of being America's client state is the = "freedom of=20 enjoying a commitment without paying a penalty of being an = ally."(37)

The U.S.-Saudi relationship produces destructive domestic political=20 consequences for both countries. Washington is tying its interests to = the=20 survival of the repressive Saudi regime, while allowing the = latter--through the=20 control of oil prices, the buying of American military equipment, and=20 cooperation in U.S. covert operations--to exert leverage on American = policy and=20 politics.

The specter of Iran does hang over Saudi Arabia, but not the way = Riyadh is=20 framing it, that is, as a consequence of subversive activity by an = external=20 power. The original revolution in Tehran, which was the first mass urban = uprising in the Middle East and led to the establishment of = Western-derived=20 political institutions, was very much a product of American policies. If = a=20 revolutionary regime comes to power in Saudi Arabia and subordinates its = institutions and mechanics to an anti-Western theocratic expression of=20 nationalist ideology, U.S. policy, not the "exporting of radical Islam" = from=20 Iran, will be the culprit.

Iran

The foreign policy that has been pursued since the end of the = Iran-Iraq War=20 by the leadership in Tehran, headed by the reform-minded President = Rafsanjani=20 and the so-called "pragmatic group of revolutionary clerics,"(38) has = reflected=20 an effort to advance Iranian national interest more by regaining that = state's=20 traditional role as a gulf power and strengthening its economy than by=20 orchestrating a regional or global messianic crusade. Iranian policies = have=20 stressed diplomatic pragmatism and military caution coupled with an = effort to=20 liberalize and privatize Iran's centralized economy, expand its trade=20 relationships, alleviate its huge foreign debt problems, and satisfy its = need=20 for infrastructure.

Signs of Moderation

While the Saudi regime has pursued very superficial political and = economic=20 reforms, the government in Tehran has removed many of the religious=20 restrictions, especially those on women, and helped to reinvigorate a = quite=20 lively parliamentary and political debate, which culminated in the = critical=20 parliamentary election in April 1992. Iran, according to Eric Hooglund,=20 "compared to its Arab neighbors, does appear to have some political=20 characteristics typical of democratic governments."(39)

Rafsanjani, himself from a wealthy pistachio-growing family, has = sided with=20 the wealthy merchants who ran Iran's economy in the years before the = revolution=20 brought nationalization and state control. He has welcomed foreign = investment=20 and called on Iranian expatriates to return and invest in the = country.(40)

Iran's economy after the war with Iraq was depressed and contorted by = artificial controls. Since then, the government has launched a major = program to=20 demilitarize the economy. "Fortunately, we don't have any serious = military=20 threat," explained the governor of Iran's central bank. "The threat we = do have=20 is economic," he argued. "If you don't have enough food, even if you = have the=20 most sophisticated tank, how are you going to use it?"(41)

A Conventional Foreign Policy

Iran's policies during the gulf crisis and the war that followed were = an=20 example of textbook realpolitik diplomacy. The Iranian leadership was = able to=20 separate its ideological and historical baggage, including its = resentment of=20 both Washington and Baghdad--after all, Saddam invaded Iran in 1979 with = a green=20 light from the United States and the United Nations--from its vital, = hard-core=20 national interests.

Criticizing Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and rejecting the permanent = presence of=20 U.S. military forces in the gulf, Tehran remained neutral during the = crisis and=20 the war that ensued. It took advantage of the developments in the gulf = to sign a=20 peace agreement with Iraq; to reestablish diplomatic relations with the = Arab=20 countries in the allied camp, above all with Saudi Arabia; and to = improve its=20 relations with countries that supported Iraq, especially Sudan.(42)

However, during the crisis Iran refrained from exploiting the = weakness of the=20 central government in Baghdad, except in the most cautious fashion. Its = support=20 for efforts to oust Saddam among Iraq's Shi'ite majority remained = surprisingly=20 limited. Similarly, Tehran did not take advantage of the anti-American = feeling=20 in the region to incite the Moslem world against the U.S. presence in = the gulf.=20 Rafsanjani's government even offered its services as a mediator between = the=20 United States and Iraq. Iran supported American, Saudi, and Turkish = policies=20 intended to replace Saddam with a more benign Iraqi leader and, like = those=20 states, expressed its interest in preventing the disintegration of Iraq = after=20 Operation Desert Storm.

Despite its anti-Israeli rhetoric, Iran supported the U.S. position = that the=20 Palestinian-Israeli problem and gulf security issues, including the = invasion of=20 Kuwait, should not be linked (as Saddam had demanded). In addition, = after years=20 of boycotting the UN Security Council, Tehran expressed an interest in = becoming=20 a member. It also reestablished diplomatic relations with Great Britain = and=20 expanded relations with other Western countries.(43) All of those = actions were=20 consistent with a conventional state's advancing its foreign policy = interests,=20 not a messianic state's seeking to foment revolution.

Postwar Initiatives

In the aftermath of the war, Iran has played a stabilizing role in = the Middle=20 East. Tehran pressured radical Shi'ite groups to release U.S. hostages = in=20 Lebanon, dispatched diplomats to mend its relationship with Saudi = Arabia, and=20 even sent fire fighters to the oil fields of Kuwait. More significant, = perhaps,=20 Iran launched plans for reintegrating itself into the gulf security = system, a=20 move intended to strengthen its own interests while providing the Arab = gulf=20 states with a countervailing force against a future threat from Iraq. = Iranian=20 spokesmen stated the need to replace "ideological radicalism" with = "pragmatic=20 politics" and argued that the fragile balance of power in the gulf, = which was=20 responsible for the outbreak of both the Iran-Iraq war and the Persian = Gulf War,=20 should be replaced with "clear lines and frameworks for a new approach = to=20 security issues of the region."(44) The Iranians presented a = far-reaching plan=20 for a regional collective security arrangement based on cooperation = between the=20 members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), noninterference of = regional=20 countries in each other's internal affairs, confidence-building = measures, arms=20 control structures, and economic reconstruction programs.(45)

Notwithstanding alarming U.S. intelligence reports, Iranian policy = toward the=20 Central Asian and Caucacus republics has been confined to efforts to = gradually=20 establish diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties with some of the newly = independent states, especially with those, such as Azerbaijan, that have = large=20 Shi'ite populations. There are no indications that Tehran is engaged in=20 political and religious "subversion" of the region, unless one considers = helping=20 set up mosques or religious schools subversive.(46)

While proposing ideas for regional security and trade cooperation, = Iran has=20 rejected efforts to exclude it from post-Desert Storm security = arrangements=20 through the creation of an exclusive Arab-dominated system there and, on = a more=20 general level, has expressed its opposition to a Pax Americana in the = region.=20 The latter is seen by Iranians as anachronistic at a time when the = Soviet threat=20 has disappeared. They believe that regional threats can be contained by = regional=20 powers and that foreign intervention is destabilizing.

Indeed, Iran's message to the Saudis and the six-member GCC has been = simple=20 and straightforward. Iran is willing to play a positive role in the = security of=20 the gulf but will reject "extraregional arrangements" involving nongulf = Arab=20 states, such as Egypt, or the continuing presence of Western, especially = American, military forces in the region.(47)

Iran's position was one factor in Saudi Arabia's decision to reject a = U.S.-supported proposal embodied in the so-called Damascus Declaration = of early=20 1991. That declaration proposed that Saudi Arabia and the other GCC = states base=20 their security on the continuing presence of an Arab regional defense = force led=20 by Egypt and Syria. Tehran made it clear that it regarded such an = arrangement as=20 a hostile Pan-Arabist move.(48) The Iranian objective appears to be a = Middle=20 Eastern security system that would not be exclusively Arab but would = include=20 Pakistan and Turkey.

An Inconsistent U.S. Policy

Although Washington has never made clear its vision of a gulf = security=20 arrangement--it has supported such diverse ideas as a "Middle Eastern = NATO" as=20 well as the Damascus Declaration--its policy and statements suggest that = it sees=20 its interests in the region secured through a "strategic consensus" = involving=20 four pillars--Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and Israel. An "occasional = United=20 States presence" would supplement their efforts and ensure that the oil=20 resources of the region would "not be controlled by somebody = fundamentally=20 hostile to our interests."(49) It is not surprising that, from their = vantage=20 point, the Iranian leadership perceives those American plans and the = continued=20 U.S. military presence in the region as directed against them.

Washington has responded to the positive signals coming from Iran = with mixed=20 messages. On the one hand, the U.S. government is gradually trying to = take=20 advantage of Rafsanjani's moves toward a free-market economy and to = expand=20 economic relations with Tehran. Initially, the Bush administration had=20 restricted U.S. trade with Iran and had even tried to keep other = countries from=20 investing in that country. It was only last year that the administration = removed=20 some trade restrictions. The result was that trade between Iran and the = United=20 States leaped 300 percent as the United States became the sixth-largest = exporter=20 to Iran, with more than $5 million in exports. Moreover, the = administration=20 recently withdrew its objections to the sale of European-made Airbus = passenger=20 jets, which use U.S.-made engines, to Iran.(50)

On the other hand, when it comes to the diplomatic and military = arenas,=20 Washington seems to be intent on treating Iran as a pariah state, a = "strategic=20 enemy," as Patrick Clawson put it.(51) The Bush administration has = rejected=20 Iran's reintegration into the gulf security system and has denounced = alleged=20 Iranian pursuit of a nuclear military path.

The Issue of Nuclear Weapons

Washington's reports about Iranian attempts to acquire nuclear = capability are=20 denied by Tehran, and the evidence is ambiguous. Even if Iran does have = nuclear=20 ambitions, such Iranian moves are not necessarily a reflection of = "radical"=20 foreign policy goals. Avner Yaniv, an Israeli military analyst, = suggested=20 recently that "as the leaders in Tehran see it, since Pakistan for all = practical=20 purposes is a nuclear military power and Iraq, notwithstanding U.S. = efforts, is=20 moving in that direction--and the main target of Saddam's nuclear = efforts is=20 Tehran--Iran is now surrounded by a circle of nuclear threats." = Rafsanjani's=20 attempt to acquire nuclear capability is defensive in nature, and "any = other=20 regime in Tehran would have taken similar steps," concluded Yaniv = (indeed, it=20 was America's friend the shah who initiated Iran's nuclear arms = program).

Yaniv raised another interesting point. Some observers expressed = concern that=20 Iran's overtures to Kazakhstan might be part of an effort to try to take = advantage of that Moslem state's nuclear military capability. He argued = that, if=20 anything, a nuclear Kazakhstan--which with 1,500 nuclear warheads has a = larger=20 arsenal than France--is actually perceived by Iran as a major threat to = its=20 security, not as a source of support for its own nuclear = program.(52)

Certainly, American efforts to isolate Iran only strengthen its sense = of=20 insecurity and may accelerate its nuclear drive. At the same time, = Iran's ideas=20 for regional security arrangements--rejected by Washington--have at = least the=20 potential for creating some mechanism for controlling arms, including = nuclear=20 arms.

Moreover, by continuing to try to isolate Iran, Washington is = weakening the=20 forces of Rafsanjani and the more pragmatic wing of the current Iranian = regime=20 that won a massive victory in the parliamentary elections on April 10, = 1992.=20 Without a large flow of foreign investment and in a continuing hostile=20 diplomatic environment, Rafsanjani and his allies in the parliament will = find it=20 difficult to continue their efforts to demilitarize and reform the = economy and=20 to pursue a moderate diplomatic path.

American hostility toward Iran is understandable given the = anti-Western=20 nature of the Iranian revolution, the 1979 seizure of the American = embassy in=20 Tehran, the threat to assassinate author Salman Rushdie, and the ties = between=20 Iran and radical Moslem groups.

However, Iranian behavior should be seen in its historical context. = The=20 legacy of U.S. intervention in Iran after World War II, especially = Washington's=20 support for the repressive regime of the shah, left a residue of = hostility=20 toward American policy, not only among Islamic radicals, but also among = more=20 secular and Westernized Iranians. That hostility was only strengthened = after=20 what was seen in Iran as U.S. support for the Iraqi invasion of Iran and = American efforts to prevent an Iranian victory in the war with = Baghdad.

Constraints on Iranian Power

The image of Iran as the new regional bogeyman is exaggerated. = Iranian=20 foreign policy seems to project a pragmatic understanding of world and = regional=20 politics and a careful application of diplomatic and military means. = Even if one=20 assumes that Iran is intent in spreading Islamic radicalism and creating = a huge=20 monolithic bloc stretching from North Africa to India, it is obvious = that Tehran=20 does not have the power to achieve that goal and will be prevented from = doing so=20 by such powerful states as Russia, Pakistan, Israel, and Egypt, even = without=20 American prodding.

In addition to the constraints placed on potential Iranian = expansionism by=20 its powerful neighbors, Iran lacks the capabilities to carry out such = ambitious=20 game plans. The condition of Iran today resembles that of the Soviet = Union at=20 the beginning of its decline: a bankrupt economy, a dissatisfied = population,=20 ethnic rivalries, and an official ideology that does not respond to the = needs of=20 the citizens. Iran cannot serve as a "model" for other Moslem societies = or as a=20 "magnet" for Shi'ite groups in the region. There are major questions = about=20 whether it will even survive in its current condition.

Indeed, Iran, a large country with a population of more than 55 = million, is=20 itself a miniempire where a small Persian majority (a little more than = 50=20 percent of the population) controls several ethnic and religious groups, = including Arabs and Kurds who have strong ties to other states and = groups in the=20 region. Hence, the possibility of the political disintegration of = Central Asia=20 and the Caucacus into different states and nationalities may pose a = danger to=20 Iran's identity and stability.

For example, 20 million Azeris live in Iran and only 7 million in = Azerbaijan=20 itself. One Azeri faction calls for secession from Iran and the = establishment of=20 a united republic (a Soviet-sponsored independent republic that existed = 45 years=20 ago proclaimed that large areas of northern Iran were part of its = homeland).=20 Therefore, it is not surprising that the governments in Tehran and in = Baku have=20 a common interest in preserving current borders. That is also a common = interest=20 of Turkey and Iran. Both are opposed to the creation of an independent = Kurdish=20 state that would serve as a magnet for their own large Kurdish = minorities.(53)=20

Tajikistan, whose language is close to Persian, seems to be the only = Central=20 Asian state where some sympathy for Iran's political model exists. = There, the=20 Islamic Renaissance party, banned in other republics, operates openly = and claims=20 20,000 members. As were those of the anti-communist struggle of the = Catholic=20 church in Poland, Iranian efforts in Tajikistan have been directed = mainly at=20 weakening the Tajik Communist party. Last September, for example, Tehran = covertly supported a peaceful uprising against a communist power grab in = Tajikistan, allegedly paying demonstrators 100 rubles a day to lead = Moslem=20 prayers and demand the resignation of the Tajik communist = leadership.(54)

In any case, Iran's Shi'ite religion is not shared by the majority of = the 60=20 million Moslems in Central Asia (most of whom are Sunnis--with the = notable=20 exception of Shi'ite Azeris) and the Middle East. That presents a major = obstacle=20 to Iran's alleged ability to export its religious influence. = Notwithstanding=20 expectations after the revolution in Iran that a wave of pro-Iranian = Islamic=20 fundamentalism would engulf the Arab world, support for Khomeini and = revolution=20 remained limited and confined to Shi'ite communities.

Moreover, even Shi'ite groups in the region have been resistant to = Iranian=20 overtures. Shi'ite identity does not guarantee allegiance to Tehran and = is in=20 most cases weaker than national or ethnic identity. Indeed, despite the=20 religious affinity between Iranian Shi'ites and the Shi'ite majority in = Iraq,=20 the latter fought on the side of other Iraqi Arabs during the war with = Iran and=20 rejected Iranian calls to secede from Iraq and join the fight against=20 Saddam.(55)

The Need for a Conciliatory U.S. Approach

Iran's cautious foreign policy reflects a recognition among its = leaders of=20 the major weakness and fragility of their political rule, economy, and = the state=20 structure itself. Instead of trying to isolate Iran, Washington should = take=20 advantage of that country's need for economic investment and diplomatic=20 acceptance and the existence of islands of free enterprise and = pro-American=20 sentiment (as opposed to pro-U.S. government policies) among some of the = political and intellectual elite.

The United States could encourage Tehran's drive for integration into = a gulf=20 security structure. As Shireen Hunter explained, "Any security scheme = must=20 recognize the Gulf region's unique ethnic, religious, and cultural=20 characteristics" and "its dual Arab and Iranian character." An attempt = to=20 exclude or isolate any country dooms any arrangement there. Hence, "any = security=20 framework that portrays Iran as the regional bully and aims to exclude = it would=20 be self-defeating" and "would be a sure recipe for pushing Iran toward=20 extremism."(56)

However, American policy in the Middle East in general, and in the = gulf in=20 particular, is still motivated by a drive for hegemony in the region and = attempts to build new "regional pillars" to support that goal. U.S. = leaders seem=20 unwilling to accept Iran's idea of an independent regional security = system.=20 Instead, Washington is trying to turn Iran into the new bogeyman whose = alleged=20 ideological and military threat necessitates American intervention in = the region=20 and the establishment of new "pillars." That policy is detri- mental to = the=20 interests of the states in the region as well as to the long-term goals = of the=20 United States.

Return of the Great Game in Central Asia

One of the pillars Washington hopes to rely on is Turkey. The = perceived=20 rising Islamic threat in the Central Asian republics has given rise to=20 suggestions on the part of officials in Ankara that America use Turkey = as a new=20 pillar to contain Iranian expansionism. Those proposals, which range = from having=20 Turkey serve as a cultural and political- economic "model" for the new = Moslem=20 republics to having Turkey play a more active political and military = role in the=20 Middle East and Central Asia, have come at a time of growing Turkish=20 apprehension about the future of NATO, the U.S. security role in Europe, = and=20 Turkey's value to the Western alliance.

Turkish Losses from the Gulf War

Turkish president Turgut Ozal's strategy of close cooperation with = the United=20 States during the Gulf War was intended to reaffirm Ankara's commitment = to=20 U.S.-Turkish bilateral relations and to highlight Turkey's importance to = U.S.=20 strategic interests and concerns in the Middle East. By promptly = terminating the=20 flow of petroleum from the Iraqi pipelines, Turkey made a major = contribution to=20 the effective implementation of the UN-authorized sanctions against = Iraq. During=20 Operation Desert Storm, Ankara played a key role in the coalition's war = effort=20 by permitting U.S. military aircraft access to the Incirlik air base for = strikes=20 against Iraq and by deploying near the Iraqi border 100,000 Turkish = troops who=20 pinned down an equal number of Iraqi airmen.

Notwithstanding Washington's efforts in the aftermath of Operation = Desert=20 Storm to provide Turkey with increased security assistance and new trade = benefits, Ankara's involvement in the Gulf War has not produced the "new = strategic relationship" that Ozal expected. Nor were Turkey's NATO = allies=20 appreciative enough of Turkey's contribution to the war to give Ankara a = more=20 favorable hearing on its ap- plication for admission to the European = Community.=20 (NATO's members, especially Germany, were also opposed to what seemed to = be=20 Turkish, and by extension U.S., efforts to extend, through the defense = of=20 Turkey, the organization's out-of-area military role.)

Moreover, the Gulf War embroiled Turkey in the regional politics of = the=20 Middle East, a dramatic departure from the European orientation of the = Turkish=20 republic's founder, Kemal Ataturk. The fact that, contrary to Ozal's=20 expectations, Saddam has remained in power has left Turkey with a major = security=20 threat on its southern border.

The war also vastly complicated Turkey's Kurdish problem. A = significant=20 percentage of Turkey's population is Kurdish, and many Turks are of = Kurdish=20 origin. Turkey shared Saudi Arabia's opposition to the disintegration of = Iraq,=20 fearing that it would lead to the establishment of an independent = Kurdish state.=20 U.S. efforts to aid the Kurds in northern Iraq via Turkey through = Operation=20 Provide Comfort allowed Kurdish guerrillas to increase their operations = from=20 Iraq against Turkey.(57)

When both violence on the part of separatist Kurdish guerrillas in=20 southeastern Turkey and repressive measures taken against them by = Turkish=20 military forces grew, the German government imposed an arms embargo = against=20 Ankara in March 1992 and accused it of using German weapons to put down = the=20 Kurds.(58)

A U.S. Surrogate

Ozal's efforts, with U.S. support, to establish political ties with = the=20 nearly 45 million Turkic people in Azerbaijan and the former Soviet = Central=20 Asian republics can be seen as a way of countering the negative = repercussions of=20 the Gulf War by trying to find new foreign policy outlets for Turkey and = revive=20 its strategic importance to the West, especially the United States.

However, overtures to the new Moslem republics also went against = another=20 Kemalist principle: noninterference in the affairs of neighboring states = on=20 behalf of Turkic minorities. Ankara's efforts have already kindled fears = of a=20 rise of Pan-Turkism and a revival of centuries-old ambitions to = establish a=20 Greater Turkistan.

With the decline and eventual collapse of Moscow's central authority, = Ankara=20 began to expand its political and economic ties with Azerbaijan, = Kazakhstan,=20 Kirghizia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. A flurry of diplomatic visits = has been=20 accompanied by the signing of an economic and commercial agreement as = well as=20 cultural exchanges.(59)

Ozal and his aides did not hide their hope that Turkey would achieve = a=20 stronger regional and global status as a result of its new penetration = into=20 Central Asia. That new foreign policy orientation, which sparked = interest in=20 post- Gulf War Washington and was encouraged by the Bush administration, = assumed=20 that Turkey, together with Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, would become = the=20 four pillars of American hegemony in the region.

Under that strategy, Turkey and the other American surrogates that = help the=20 United States to control the strategic centers and oil resources of the = Middle=20 East are viewed as instruments to contain the radical Islamic forces = that are=20 supposedly led by Iran.

Islam's Limited Influence in Central Asia

Contrary to the Green Peril paradigm, Central Asia does not seem to = be in=20 danger of turning, under Iranian influence, into a monolithic "Islamic=20 crescent." Visitors to the region find instead a complex mixture of = national,=20 ethnic, and religious groups and political and economic interests. Ties = to=20 outside nations are clearly being sought for economic deliverance rather = than as=20 a religious and cultural denominator.

Although it sometimes worked with democratic forces to undermine the = old=20 communist regimes, Islam has remained a marginal political force in = Central=20 Asia. The popular nationalist movements in those states reflect secular=20 identities with a populist anti-Russian bent, and the more liberal ones = attempt=20 to foster coexistence among the different religious and ethnic = groups.(60)

Although some of the Moslem republics established diplomatic, = cultural, and=20 economic ties with Iran, none of them appear interested in imitating the = Iranian=20 political and economic model. Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Turkmenistan, and = most other=20 republics favor Western-oriented models of development. "Iran would take = us back=20 to the Middle Ages," argued an adviser to the Azerbaijani president. = Instead,=20 "the prevailing vision seems to be economic progress in a secular = society," with=20 Turkey serving as a secular free-market model for modernization.(61)

Dangers of an Anti-Turkish Backlash

In trying to gain economic influence in the region, however, Turkey = faces=20 dilemmas similar to those Germany and Japan face in their trading zones. = Any=20 effort on Turkey's part to play a political-military role in the area as = a=20 counterweight to Iran--as part of the American strategy to become the = hegemonic=20 power in the region--could produce a backlash and reduce Ankara's = influence and=20 ability to succeed as a trading state.

Turkey has strong cultural ties to Central Asia whose people, with = the=20 exception of the Tajikistanis, speak variants of Turkish. To strengthen = those=20 ties, Turkey helped the Central Asian republic of Azerbaijan to change = from the=20 Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet, which has been used in Turkey since the = 1920s,=20 and which Azerbaijan formally adopted in January 1992.(62)

Although they welcome Turkey's playing a cultural role, the Central = Asians=20 are concerned that a Turkish expansionist policy in the region could = easily be=20 converted into Pan-Turkism, which has had a nonsecular Islamic = character. That=20 development could frighten non-Turkic peoples, such as the Kurds and the = Armenians, and create pro-Iranian movements among the Persian-speaking=20 population in such states as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Pan-Turkism could also produce a backlash from the Arab states, = Pakistan,=20 India, and even China. Seventy years of socialist state and nation = building have=20 produced separate notions of identity in the various Turkic-speaking = republics,=20 and it is unlikely that they will gravitate toward unity or accept = Turkey as a=20 dominating and unifying regional power. The player that would be most = opposed to=20 Turkey's assuming a leading role in the region would be Iran. An = American effort=20 to groom Turkey as the policeman of Central Asia could, therefore, have = the same=20 disastrous consequences that U.S. attempts to make Iran the gendarme of = the gulf=20 had in the 1970s or its support for Iraq as a countervailing force to = Iran had=20 in the 1980s. Turning Ankara into a strategic pillar in Central Asia = could also=20 weaken the Turkish economy, increase the political power of the = military, and=20 contribute to a growing Turkish-Iranian rift that could escalate into = war.

Turkey's Resistance to Washington's Strategy

Indeed, in November 1991 Turkish voters, concerned about the domestic = and=20 regional costs involved in being Washington's cop in the Middle East and = Central=20 Asia--the economic and military burden, the erosion of Turkey's European = orientation, the reentry into the dangerous politics of the Middle=20 East--defeated Ozal's governing Motherland party and brought the Social=20 Democratic party, with Suleyman Demirel as prime minister, to = power.(63)

Demirel's policies seem to reflect the current Turkish foreign policy = consensus. He is interested in strengthening Ankara's economic ties with = the=20 Central Asian republics and seems to envision Turkey as the democratic, = secular,=20 free- market-oriented "Shining City on the Hill" of the Moslem world. = During his=20 recent visit to Washington, he tried to downplay the notion of a = spreading=20 Islamic menace and rejected the idea that Ankara would play a = pro-American=20 political-military role in Central Asia. He made it clear that he is = determined=20 not to be perceived as "an American poodle."(64)

Despite the setbacks of recent years, Ankara still hopes that Turkey = will=20 eventually be invited to join the European Community. Hence, Turkish=20 policymakers are concerned that the limited prestige Turkey gained in = Washington=20 and the West as a result of Ankara's involvement in the Gulf War is = being=20 outweighed by the possibility of military entanglement with Iraq and = Kurdish=20 groups. Along with the unresolved Cyprus problem, those difficulties = complicate=20 ankara's ties with the community.

In addition, Turkey could be drawn into regional conflicts, such as = that=20 between Christian Armenia and Azerbaijan. And certainly Turkey would = gain no=20 benefit by creating tensions with Iran. "Turkey is determined to keep = good=20 relations with Iran and knows its own economic limitations in meeting = the=20 expectations of its Central Asian cousins," insisted one Turkish=20 official.(65)

Like those of Iran, Turkey's ties to the ethnic and religious mosaic = of=20 Central Asia and the Caucacus could create long-term problems. Indeed, = the=20 continued bloodshed in the Caucacus has demonstrated Turkey's limited = ability to=20 shape events in the region and highlighted the costs that efforts to do = so=20 involve.

The Myth of a Central Asian Islamic Bloc

Developments in Central Asia suggest that the region is not turning = into a=20 Tehran-run Islamic monolith against which Ankara should be established = as a=20 bastion. Instead, Central Asia is reemerging as the geopolitical and = economic=20 chess board it was during the 19th century--a chessboard on which = regional and=20 external powers vie for the traditional prizes of access to markets and = natural=20 resources as well as political influence.

However, that rivalry has more of the flavor of a balance-of-power = game and=20 trade competition than of the kind of religious military struggle that=20 Washington initially envisioned. The model that Washington should use as = it=20 studies the future of the Central Asia region, as well as that of the = emerging=20 new Middle East, is not that of a new Moslem empire but that of a = multinational=20 and multiethnic mosaic, in which political, military, and economic = cooperation=20 will coexist with chaotic ethnic and religious rivalries, not = necessarily=20 between Christians and Moslems and certainly not as a result of = religious=20 subversion by one player, such as Iran.

Limits to U.S. Influence

With Russia ceasing to regard the region as a center for global = political and=20 ideological competition with the West, Washington, while attempting to = penetrate=20 the large markets of Central Asia, should remain on the sidelines of the = political changes and the regional competition that can be expected to = develop,=20 not try to pick the winners or losers. Washington, after opening = diplomatic=20 missions and establishing trade ties with the new Central Asian = republics, can=20 only hope that Turkey's democratic free-market model will be = imitated.

The United States should also encourage a stable balance of power as = well as=20 the cooperative economic systems that are already emerging. The = administration=20 should understand that any time it attempts to intervene directly or = indirectly=20 through surrogates it creates disincentives for the creation of a = balance of=20 power.

Any efforts to mediate local conflicts such as the one over = Nagorno-Karabakh=20 have little chance of succeeding; any mediation should be left to = regional=20 powers, such as Russia, Turkey, or even Iran, all of whom have a major = stake in=20 the outcome of that and other potential regional conflicts.

The United States should also reject all proposals for a grand = Marshall Plan=20 for Central Asia. Economically backward when they were brought into the = Soviet=20 empire, the Central Asian republics enjoyed some limited modernization. = However,=20 those republics became a net burden on Moscow's budget. As the Soviet = government=20 collapsed, their living standards fell more rapidly than those of the = Slavic=20 states. The republics of Central Asian are now dependent on Russia and = the other=20 more industrialized regions of the former Soviet Union for manufactured=20 goods.

The idea that Washington could replace Moscow as the region's source = of=20 financial aid makes no economic or political sense. Currently, most of = the=20 governments of the newly independent states of Central Asia are in the = hands of=20 former communist officials who have very little understanding of and = experience=20 with free-market economics. Washington should refrain from creating = expectations=20 that it will deliver economic prosperity.

Unfortunately, any inclination to adopt a low-key American approach = to the=20 region could easily be undermined by an exaggerated fear of Islam that = continues=20 to distort Washington's view of the Central Asian republics' ethnic, = cultural,=20 and historical realities. Fear of the Islamic bogeyman has already = resulted in=20 the destructive idea of turning Turkey into an anti-Iranian pillar and = led to an=20 equally dangerous American policy in North Africa.

Algeria: Joining the Jackals

Many analysts used terms like "irony" and "paradox" in referring to = the Bush=20 administration's decision to support the military takeover and = cancellation of=20 democratic elections in Algeria in January 1992. At a time when = Washington was=20 calling for the establishment of a new world order and the spread of = democracy=20 and free-market economies, the Bush administration embraced a Marxist = military=20 dictatorship.

While the French government, whose stakes in the outcome of the = elections=20 were higher, remained initially silent when the Algerian army stepped in = to=20 cancel the election that would probably have brought to power the = Islamic=20 Salvation Front (FIS), Washington was quick to describe the move as in=20 accordance with the Algerian constitution. A day later the State = Department=20 backpedaled and said it had "no opinion" on the army's action.(66) That = reaction=20 stands in stark contrast to Washington's angry reaction to the recent = Haitian=20 military coup that overthrew a populist, socialist- oriented = president.

U.S. Support for Democracy: The Middle East = Exception

The discrepancy between the Bush administration's global democracy = rhetoric=20 and its reaction to the events in Algeria may have confused some = observers, but=20 Washington's response was consist with long-standing U.S. strategy. The = same=20 approach led to the 1953 U.S. intervention in Iran, which led to the = ouster of a=20 democratically elected leader and the restoration of the shah; the 1957 = American=20 pressure on King Hussein to abolish a popularly elected regime in = Jordan; and=20 the current U.S. support for the Arab monarchies of the gulf.

Indeed, the Bush administration's response to the Algerian coup is = only the=20 most recent manifestation of a policy that subordinates the political = will of=20 Middle Eastern populations to the preservation of a profoundly = undemocratic=20 status quo. In the name of combating the elusive threat of Islamic=20 fundamentalism, which has emerged as one of the most important engines = of change=20 in the region, the United States allies itself with some of the most=20 anti-democratic forces there.

The administration finds it convenient to promote elections from = Moscow to=20 Nicaragua to Kampuchea to Kenya--even though in many cases the = democratic=20 process strengthens or brings to power such unsavory players as the Pol = Pot=20 murderers of Kampuchea and pseudodemocratic groups in sub-Saharan = Africa.

However, when it comes to free elections in the Moslem Middle = East--Algeria=20 being the most dramatic example--officials in Washington suddenly begin = to=20 lament the "dilemmas" and "Hobson's choices" they would face if = political=20 freedom were to sweep the region. As Gerald F. Seib argues, "Democracy = could=20 produce some messy problems for the United States and its friends."(67)=20 Furthermore, suggests Jim Hoagland, democratic practices there might = bring=20 "anti-democratic forces to the threshold of power."(68)

Though the Bush administration intrudes on every aspect of internal = Iraqi=20 affairs, it is reluctant to demand internationally supervised elections = in=20 Algeria. Despite the administration's and Congress's vocal denunciations = of=20 human rights abuses, including massacres of demonstrators in the streets = of=20 Beijing, no displeasure is expressed when the regimes in Algeria and = Tunisia=20 take similar, if not harsher, steps against their citizens. Instead, = those=20 demonstrators are demonized as "fundamentalists" and "radicals" who = supposedly=20 deserve such treatment.

Washington's concern about the rise of democracy in the Middle East = stems=20 from the fear that free elections in Iraq, the Arab gulf states, Jordan, = and=20 North Africa will threaten the Arab regimes that help maintain strategic = interests of the United States and its access to oil in the region as = well as=20 endanger American support for Israel.

The events in Algeria were quite understandable. After close to two = decades=20 of bureaucratic mismanagement, political repression, and corruption by = the=20 governing National Front (FLN), Algeria was saddled with more than $25 = billion=20 in foreign debt, and nearly 30 percent of its population was unemployed. = Meanwhile, members of the elite, who continued to mouth slogans about=20 egalitarianism, socialism, and Arab nationalism, were perpetuating their = own=20 privileges, enjoying such benefits as tax-free imports, preferential = housing,=20 and special rights to travel.(69)

The socialist leadership refused to sell its government-controlled = industries=20 and continued to impose heavy restrictions on foreign investment. In = addition,=20 worldwide recession had been depressing hard-currency earnings of = Algerian=20 tourism and petroleum exports, which magnified the economic crisis and = increased=20 unemployment.

The economic problems, including a rise in prices, led in 1988 to = bloody=20 riots, some led by Islamic fundamentalist leaders, that spread through = Algeria.=20 Soldiers gunned down hundreds of unarmed civilians. The crisis resulted = in the=20 decision by the FLN government, controlled by elderly socialist military = men led=20 by President Chadli Benjedid, to begin ambitious political reforms, = including=20 promising to legalize opposition parties and to end the political = monopoly of=20 the FLN. That decision was also spurred by the collapse of the communist = regimes=20 in Eastern Europe and subtle pressure from Paris.

However, years of authoritarian rule and the emigration of many=20 Western-educated technocrats and intellectuals to Europe had left = Algeria with=20 no alternative political outlets for expression and organization. As was = the=20 case in other parts of the Moslem World (and for that matter in Eastern = Europe=20 under communist rule), traditional and religious institutions emerged as = important centers of political opposition, especially for the majority = of poor=20 and uneducated Algerians. By 1991 the FIS controlled 8,000 of Algeria's = 10,000=20 mosques whose five daily prayers provided 40,000 daily relays for its = views,=20 which traveled by fax, word of mouth, telephone, and cassette. Moreover, = during=20 election campaigns the party was able to present a well- educated field = of=20 high-quality candidates.

"Islam has always been a key unifying factor among the Maghreb = countries of=20 North Africa," according to analyst Allan Thompson, who added that it = "now is a=20 potent political force as well--not because Arabs in those states want = to live=20 in Islamic republics like Iran, but because the existing political order = has=20 failed them."(70)

Islam in Algeria, as in other parts of the Middle East, has often = thrived on=20 the martyrdom of political oppression. One reporter noted, "When = populations are=20 fed up with a variety of elitist single-party authoritarian structures = over many=20 decades, it's not surprising that Islam should serve as a powerful = vehicle of=20 protest."(71) Although the democratic process launched by the government = unleashed close to 60 parties and political associations, only the FIS = was able=20 to mobilize massive public support and translate it into election = victories. It=20 won 55 percent of the posts that were filled by gubernatorial and local=20 elections in May 1990, which gave it control of everything from street = sweeping=20 to voter registration. That victory was followed by attempts to = gerrymander=20 constituency boundaries to favor the FLN. Those attempts led to new = violent=20 confrontations between the government and supporters of the FIS, = including the=20 jailing of a prominent FIS leader, Abbasi Madani.

However, attempts to repress the FIS only increased its popularity, = and it=20 scored a major victory in the first round of parliamentary elections on = December=20 26, 1991, by winning 3 million votes (5 million other voters split their = ballots=20 among 20 parties), which made it almost certain that it would win a = majority of=20 the votes in the second round. That would have given the FIS a powerful = claim to=20 the right to form a government and also an excellent chance of winning = the=20 Algerian presidential election. Concern about that possibility led to = the=20 military intervention in January and to the cancellation of the runoff = vote. The=20 military also ousted President Benjedid, who apparently was willing to = accept an=20 FIS victory; postponed the elections indefinitely; declared a state of=20 emergency; and imposed a military- controlled High Security Council on = the=20 country.(72)

Western Democratic Hypocrisy

Those moves were explicitly backed by most of the rulers in the = Middle East,=20 including the military rulers of Tunisia and Libya, who face similar = opposition=20 from Islamic fundamentalist forces, and at least implicitly by France = and the=20 United States. "By neither criticizing nor approving the Algerian army's = action,=20 Western countries cloak their real attitude--that democracy is fine, up = to a=20 certain point--in necessary ambiguity," noted Jim Hoagland.(73)

American intellectuals--including many who advocate a Wilsonian = global=20 democracy crusade--exhibit a peculiar lack of enthusiasm for democratic=20 objectives when it comes to the Middle East. There, to secure American = hegemonic=20 power, they typically support a "realist" approach that includes a U.S. = military=20 alliance with, and support for, authoritarian Arab regimes. When U.S. = policies=20 incite popular demand for change and reform, the neoconservatives solve = their=20 cognitive dissonance by proclaiming that the demonstrators in the = streets=20 represent the forces of reaction, the Green Peril, and that the spread = of=20 democracy would be served by containing that threat.(74)

The events in Algeria highlight the weakness of the global democracy = crusade=20 and suggest that it might be nothing more than a way to rationalize, in = the eyes=20 of Americans and international opinion makers, policies that are really = based on=20 cold, calculated realpolitik considerations. To put it another way, = behind the=20 mask of the American global missionary is the American global = policeman.

Washington's approach means that the United States ends up backing = ruling=20 authoritarian elites and thereby incurring a backlash from popular = opposition=20 forces that resent its interventionist policies. Those policies = inherently erode=20 America's power as a role model. The search for imaginary Jeffersonian = democrats=20 ends up as a search for enemies, and the Islamic fundamentalists are the = latest=20 candidates.

Islam and Democracy

The sense of confusion and arrogance that lies at the root of the = global=20 democracy paradigm was exposed by the U.S. reaction to the events in = Algeria.=20 The United States could have pursued a detached policy toward Algeria, = where=20 U.S. interests could have been affected only minimally, and could have=20 encouraged France and the southern European states to take the lead. = Washington=20 could have recognized the complexity of the situation, which does not = involve=20 just good guys vs. bad guys, and welcomed the gradual moves toward = political=20 freedom. Instead, the application of the Green Peril frame resulted in a = destructive knee-jerk reaction.

U.S. policies also reflected the fallacies behind the Islamic = fundamentalist=20 scare and America's image of political Islam as a monolithic = anti-Western=20 movement that will return the Middle East to the dark ages. Islamic=20 fundamentalism, which serves as an umbrella for many variants of a = number of=20 political ideologies, has in recent years eroded the power of = centralized and=20 authoritarian political systems in the Middle East. According to Graham = E.=20 Fuller, it is a "movement that is both historically inevitable and = politically=20 `tamable,'" and "over the long run it even represents ultimate political = progress toward greater democracy and popular government."(75)

Some aspects of the FIS understandably concern the United States and = other=20 Western countries. Many of the leaders are devout Moslems who seek an=20 Iranian-style Islamic republic, and the party's program calls for the=20 establishment of Shari'a--the rule of Islamic law. Strictly interpreted, = that=20 would require the complete segregation of the sexes outside the home; = the=20 banning of alcohol and music in public; and the introduction of stoning, = flogging, and amputation as legal punishments. The possibility of the = FIS's=20 coming to power has therefore raised fears among secular Algerians, = especially=20 among educated and professional women.(76)

However, behind the slogans and the rhetoric of the FIS lies a more = pragmatic=20 approach. Many of the FIS leaders, who are more Westernized than the = Iranian=20 ayatollahs, actually have marketable skills. One of the party's leaders, = Abdel=20 Kader Hachani, who is now in jail, was an engineer for the same state = oil=20 company that the current prime minister, Sid Ahmed Ghozali, used to = manage.=20 Hachani represents a different breed of mullah. He is 35 years old, the = son of a=20 middle-class businessman, and fluent in French and English although in = public he=20 uses only English.(77)

Hachani and many of the other FIS leaders, unlike the Iranian = ayatollahs, do=20 not oppose "Western devils." They advocate deregulation of public = corporations,=20 lowering taxes, and freeing independent small businesses from state = control.

Even the Wall Street Journal had to acknowledge that "some of the FIS = ideas,=20 such as support for a more open economy, could benefit the country if = actually=20 implemented by an Islamic government."(78) (Ironically, the most = militant and=20 violent of the Islamic groups are the so-called Afghans, Algerians who = were=20 trained in Peshawar to fight the Soviet army in Afghanistan through a = CIA-funded=20 program.)(79)

Constraints on Fundamentalist Excesses

More important, the FIS leaders who would have come to power through=20 democratic elections could not have overlooked the fact that many of = those who=20 voted for Islam did so out of spite--primarily to get rid of the FLN, = not to=20 establish a theocracy in Algeria. The majority of the 26 million = Algerians,=20 including those who supported the FIS, speak French, watch French = television,=20 and read French newspapers. Many Algerians have relatives among the 4 = million or=20 so Algerians who live in France, Spain, and Italy and travel back and = forth to=20 Algeria. Algeria is also economically dependent on trade with and aid = from=20 France and other southern European countries.

Therefore, any attempt by the FIS to impose a xenophobic anti-Western = theocracy on Algeria would have produced a major backlash. The prospect = of a=20 fundamentalist regime, which appeared imminent after the December vote, = had=20 already awakened many of the 5 million Algerians who had not bothered to = cast a=20 vote in the first electoral round and brought out hundreds of thousands = of=20 modern Algerians for mass rallies. Some even speculated that, as a = result of the=20 growing unity of secular Algerians, it was by no means certain the FIS = would=20 emerge from the second round as powerful as the military feared.

Hence, the combination of a strong presidency, military support for = the=20 Algerian constitution, and resistance by a large proportion of the = population,=20 including the large Berber-speaking population, would have acted as a = strong=20 check on Islamic radicalism even if the FIS had managed to form a = government.=20 Moreover, "the chances are that electoral politics will profoundly = moderate=20 those absolutist tendencies latent in almost any kind of religious=20 fundamentalism."(80) For example, in the last Jordanian elections, the=20 fundamentalists had to temper their rhetoric on women's role in society = in order=20 to make the gains in the polls that they did.(81)

Those objective constraints would have strengthened the hands of = leaders like=20 Hachani who were interested in building up the FIS as a pragmatic and = reformist=20 political movement that could succeed in transforming the economy and = creating a=20 popular base of support for the party. Hachani and his colleagues know = that by=20 advancing a dogmatic religious agenda they would severely tarnish their = future=20 electoral prospects as well as those of other Islamic groups.

Once in power, the FIS, like any other political party, would have = been=20 judged by its ability to "deliver the goods," mainly economic = opportunities for=20 the growing number of young citizens. Religion, as King Hassan of = Morocco put=20 it, is after all not enough to run a country. "Had the Algerian = elections been=20 allowed to proceed, we would have seen [the FIS] at work," he = said.(82)

Most of the Islamic groups that operate more or less freely, and run=20 candidates in elections, in the relatively open systems of Egypt and = Jordan or=20 in the more democratic systems of Turkey and Pakistan have successfully = adapted=20 to the rules of the democratic game. Those who have resorted to violence = have=20 suffered the consequences. Not only have "Islamic intellectuals and = activists=20 tried to come to terms with the democratic ideas and process," but to = implement=20 their programs, in recent years Islamic movements in Egypt, Jordan, = Pakistan,=20 Sudan, and Tunisia "have seen the utility of working within the = political=20 system. In so doing, they have successfully contested parliamentary = seats and=20 held cabinet positions."(83)

Moreover, once they became part of the democratic process, many of = those=20 groups moderated their positions in order to expand their electoral base = and be=20 able to form coalitions with secular groups. For example, in Egypt = during the=20 1984 election, the Muslim Brotherhood concluded an alliance with the = secular and=20 liberal New World party and won 12 seats. In 1987 the brotherhood formed = an=20 "Islamic alliance" with the Socialist Labor party and the Liberal party = and=20 increased its parliamentary strength to 32 seats.(84)

Without the romantic image of martyrdom, and lacking any serious = policy=20 programs, Islamic parties have actually begun to lose public support. = For=20 example, the militant Moslem parties are a very marginal force in = Turkish=20 politics.

Recognizing the precarious position of the FIS, even before its = possible=20 victory in the second round, some politicians proposed a power-sharing=20 arrangement that would have given the FIS control of the parliament and = left=20 Benjedid in the presidency. "The idea was to avoid interfering with the=20 country's new democracy and at the same time to give the FIS enough rope = to=20 prove itself incapable of coping with the crippled economy."(85) What = spoiled=20 that plan and forced the army's hand was a meeting between Benjedid and = Hachani=20 at which the president agreed to purge some corrupt officers and = officials. That=20 was too much for the old FLN politicians and military people to = swallow.

"By canceling the elections, the military has invited Algerians to = settle=20 their differences in the streets," suggested the Wall Street = Journal.(86) The=20 country is gradually moving toward civil war with potentially tragic=20 consequences in Algeria itself and serious repercussions in Europe, = especially=20 in France where 800,000 Algerian immigrants live. It is tragic that = Washington=20 has endorsed the strategy of repression.-

Conclusion: Is Political Islam a Threat?

There is no easy answer to the question of whether Islam and = democracy are=20 compatible. As John L. Esposito and James P. Piscatori put it, "History = has=20 shown that nations and religious traditions are capable of having = multiple and=20 major ideological interpretations or reorientations."(87) The = transformation of=20 European principalities, whose rule was justified by divine right, into = modern=20 Western democratic states was accompanied by religious reform. Christian = tradition, which once supported political absolutism, was reinterpreted = to=20 accept the democratic ideal.

Islam also lends itself to various interpretations and has been used = to=20 support democracy, dictatorship, republicanism, and monarchy. Some = leaders of=20 Islamic movements have adopted a negative attitude toward democracy as = an=20 expression of their rejection of European colonial influence and, more = recently,=20 of U.S. intervention in the Middle East.

Islamic fundamentalism should not be considered "a disease that = spreads=20 willy-nilly to infect whole populations." Like Protestant = fundamentalism, argues=20 David Ignatius, it is a "religious response to the confusion and = contradictions=20 of the modern world."(88) It is not inconceivable that the new Islamic = force=20 will play the same constructive political role that the Protestant = reformation=20 played in Europe.

In most Middle Eastern countries, including Algeria and Iran, Islamic = fundamentalism is already sweeping away the corrupt old political order = of the=20 Arab world. Indeed, "support for the fundamentalists in Algeria, as in = Iran, has=20 come in part from the bazaar, from the merchants and small businessmen = who have=20 been ignited by the statist regime."(89)

One question that troubles many analysts is whether the Islamic = movement will=20 tolerate diversity when in power or try to impose an intolerant = monolithic order=20 on society. The record of the Islamic experiments in Iran, Pakistan, and = Sudan=20 is mixed. Those governments have used power to discriminate against = minorities=20 and women and to repress dissidents. But their record has not been = worse--and in=20 some cases it has been better--than that of secular regimes or more = traditional=20 monarchies.

"Based on the record thus far," wrote Esposito and Piscatori, "one = can expect=20 that where Islamic movements come to power in the Middle East, they will = have=20 problems similar to those of secular governments in the region." That is = especially true where democratic institutions are weak and political = pluralism=20 and human rights remain sources of tension and conflict.(90)

The danger for the Western nations, in particular the United States, = is that=20 misperceptions will cloud their judgment of and produce = counterproductive=20 policies toward Islam and the Middle East. Instead of viewing Islam as a = monolithic force, Western analysts and policymakers should recognize = that it is=20 a diverse civilization, divided along cultural, ideological, religious, = ethnic,=20 and national lines. Even the term "Islamic fundamentalism" should = perhaps be=20 modified to reflect the different movements and groups that are lumped = into that=20 category.

Moreover, neither Islam nor Islamic fundamentalism is by definition=20 "anti-Western." As noted, the anti-American attitudes of Islamic groups = and=20 movements in the Middle East are not directed against Christianity or = Western=20 civilization per se. They are instead a reaction to U.S. policies, = especially=20 Washington's support for authoritarian regimes and the long history of = U.S.=20 military intervention.

American policies that stem from political, economic, and military = interests=20 are bound to lead to more incidents that pit the United States against = the=20 forces of political and economic change in the Middle East. Political = players in=20 both the United States and the Middle East fan the fear of the Green = Peril as a=20 way of maintaining public support for policies that serve their = self-interest.=20 The interests of the iron triangles are, however, not necessarily = synonymous=20 with those of the American nation.

Although it is not in America's interest to launch a crusade for = democracy,=20 neither is it in her interest to be perceived as the guarantor of the = status quo=20 and the major obstacle to reform. Now that the Cold War is over, = Washington=20 should not be searching for a new enemy; instead, it should view = regional=20 conflicts with detachment, realizing that they will rarely pose a danger = to=20 America's security.

Notes

(1) "Fear of Fundies," The Economist, February 15, 1992, pp. = 4546.

(2) "This Week with David Brinkley," ABC News, December 29, 1991, = transcript=20 prepared by Graphic Journal, p. 6.

(3) Douglas E. Streusand, "Abraham's Other Children: Is Islam an = Enemy of the=20 West?" Policy Review 50 (Fall 1989). See also exchange of letters titled = "Is=20 Islamic Fundamentalism a New Red Scare?" New York Times, January 29, = 1992.

(4) Jim Hoagland, "Washington's Algerian Dilemma," Washing ton Post, = February=20 6, 1992.

(5) Amos Perlmutter, "Wishful Thinking about Islamic Funda = mentalism,"=20 Washington Post, January 19, 1992.

(6) Brian Duffy et al., "Saddam: The Most Dangerous Man in the = World," U.S.=20 News & World Report, June 4, 1990, pp. 38-51.

(7) See "Gulf War Coverage: A One Note Chorus," Extra 4, no. 3 (May=20 1991).

(8) David Ignatius, "Islam in the West's Sights: The Wrong Crusade?" = Outlook=20 Section, Washington Post, March 8, 1992.

(9) Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S. to Counter Iran in Central Asia," New = York=20 Times, February 6, 1992; Thomas L. Friedman, "Baker's Trip to Nations = Unready=20 for Independence," February 16, 1992; and Robert S. Greenberger, "Baker = Is=20 Wooing Cen tral Asian Republics, Wall Street Journal, February 14, = 1992.

(10) The diplomat, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African = Affairs=20 Robert Houdek, warned the Sudanese that they would face "grave" = consequences if=20 an international terror ist act could be traced to Sudan. See Jane = Perlez,=20 "Sudan Is Seen as Safe Base for Mideast Terror Groups," New York Times, = January=20 26, 1992.

(11) Arnold Beichman, "Iran's Covetous Glances," Washington Times, = February=20 28, 1992.

(12) Ibid.

(13) See, for example, Barbara Crossette, "U.S. Aide Calls Muslim = Militants=20 Big Concern," New York Times, January 1, 1992; David Ignatius, "U.S. = Fears Sudan=20 Becoming Terrorists' 'New Lebanon,'" Washington Post, January 31, 1992; = Perlez,=20 "Sudan Seen as Safe Base for Mideast Terror Groups"; and Robert S. = Greenberger,=20 "Islamic Fundamentalism's Rise in Sudan Sparks Concern over Movement's = Spread,"=20 Wall Street Journal, March 16, 1992; Jennifer Parmelee, "Sudan Denies=20 'Khartoum-Tehran Axis' to Promote Islamic Regimes in Africa," Washington = Post,=20 March 12, 1992; John J. Fialka, "For mer Soviet Republics of = South-Central Asia=20 Have Nuclear Arms, Links with Volatile Lands," Wall Street Journal, = October 9,=20 1991; Craig Forman, "Islamic Resurgence Sweeps Soviet South," Wall = Street=20 Journal, October 9, 1991; Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Ignoring = Tehran's=20 Threat," Washington Post, March 2, 1992; Elaine Sciolino, "Iraqis Could = Pose a=20 Threat Soon, CIA Chief Says," New York Times, January 16, 1992; and = Gerald F.=20 Seib, "The New Order: Iran Is Re-emerging as a Mideast Power as Iraqi = Threat=20 Fades," Wall Street Journal, March 18, 1992.

(14) Crossette, "U.S. Aide Calls Muslim Militants Big Concern."

(15) See Edward A. Gargan, "The Chastened Pakistanis: Peace with U.S. = Is=20 Aim," New York Times, February 19, 1992; and M. M. Ali, "Soviet Empire's = Disintegration Alters the Face of Asia and the Middle East," Washington = Report=20 on Middle East Affairs 10, no. 8 (March 1992): 49-50.

(16) Colin Rubenstein, Address before the Asian Studies Center, = Heritage=20 Foundation, February 10, 1992. Rubenstein is a lecturer at Monash = University,=20 Australia, and the editor of the Australia-Israel Review.

(17) Mohammad Mohaddesin, director of international relations of the = People's=20 Mojahedin of Iran in a briefing at the Cato Institute, March 3, = 1992.

(18) Edward A. Gargan, "Afghan President Says U.S. Should See Him as = Ally=20 against Militant Islam," New York Times, March 10, 1992.

(19) Gargan, "The Chastened Pakistanis." On Pakistani strategy, also = see=20 Edward A. Gargan, "Fiscal Political Forces Move Pakistan to Seek Afghan = Peace,"=20 New York Times, Febru ary 16, 1992; Edward A. Gargan, "Islam Challenges = Pakistan=20 Economy," New York Times, February 23, 1992; and Steve Coll, "Pakistan = Struggles=20 to Incorporate Both Muslim, Western Outlooks," Washington Post, February = 18,=20 1992.

(20) A. M. Ali, "Soviet Empire's Disintegration Alters the Face of = Asia and=20 the Middle East"; and Edward A. Gargan, "Airlifted Hindu Nationalists = Fly=20 India's Flag in Kashmir," New York Times, January 27, 1992.

(21) See Leon T. Hadar, Quagmire: America in the Middle East = (Washington:=20 Cato Institute, 1992).

(22) Daniel Doron, "The Mideast's Real Troubles Aren't Arab Israeli," = Wall=20 Street Journal, October 3, 1991. Also see Joel Himmelfarb, "Islamic = Republics:=20 Danger for Israel," Near East Report, January 27, 1992, for an example = of=20 AIPAC's efforts to use the Islamic threat in the Moslem republics to = gain=20 sympathy for Israel.

(23) Doron, "The Mideast's Real Troubles Aren't Arab-Israeli."

(24) Jane Perlez, "A Fundamentalist Finds a Fulcrum in Sudan," New = York=20 Times, January 29, 1992.

(25) Parmelee, "Sudan Denies 'KhartoumTehran Axis' to Promote Islamic = Regimes=20 in Africa."

(26) Ibid.

(27) Tom Post and Melinda Liu, "The Great Game, Chapter Two," = Newsweek,=20 February 3, 1992, p. 29. On Saudi concern about the rise of Islamic=20 fundamentalism and Iran, see Youssef M. Ibrahim, "The Saudis Are = Fearful, Too,=20 As Islam's Militant Tide Rises," New York Times, December 31, 1991.

(28) Parmelee, "Sudan Denies 'Khartoum-Tehran Axis' to Pro mote = Islamic=20 Regimes in Africa."

(29) See, for example, Gerald F. Seib, "Saudis, Shedding Usual = Caution, Play=20 Bold Role in Peace Talks, Hope to Win Over U.S. Critics," Wall Street = Journal,=20 November 11, 1991.

(30) On the history and political system of Saudi Arabia, see Robert = Lacey,=20 The Kingdom: Arabia and the House of Saud (New York: Harcourt, Brace,=20 Jovanovich, 1981).

(31) Added Dawisha, "The United States in the Middle East: The Gulf = War and=20 Its Aftermath," Current History 91, no. 561 (January 1992): 4.

(32) On Saudi overtures to the American Jewish community, see "The = Jewish=20 World," in Long Island Jewish World 20, no. 43 (November 22, 1991): 2; = and "Jews=20 and Saudis Hold First Talks in Saudi Arabia," New York Times, January = 22,=20 1992.

(33) Ibrahim, "The Saudis Are Fearful, Too."

(34) Laurie Mylroie, "Led Astray by the Saudis in Iraq," Wall Street = Journal,=20 April 10, 1991, p. A22.

(35) Indeed, in a March interview with a Kuwaiti newspaper, King Fahd = made it=20 clear that his reforms are not going to produce a democratic system in = the=20 country." The system of free elections is not part of Islamic ideology," = he=20 stated. "Democracies in the West might be good in those countries, but = this=20 [does not] suit all the people of the world." Quoted in "No Democracy = for=20 Saudis," Near East Report, April 20, 1992, p. 1.

(36) Ezra Olman, "Saudi Rights Abuses Increase," Near East Report, = March 2,=20 1992.

(37) Moshe Efrat and Jacob Bercovitch, Superpowers and Client States = in the=20 Middle East (New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 51.

(38) Patrick E. Tyler, "Hostage Issue: Test for Iran's Presi dent," = New York=20 Times, September 13, 1991.

(39) Eric Hooglund, "Iranian Populism and Political Change in the = Gulf,"=20 Middle East Report 174 (January-February 1992): 20.

(40) On liberalization efforts, see Elaine Sciolino, "Iran's Urge to = Prosper=20 Overtaking Its Islamic Zeal," Week in Review, New York Times, June 2, = 1991;=20 Youssef Ibrahim, "Iran Gingerly Tries a Bit of Pragmatism," Week in = Review, New=20 York Times, June 9, 1991; and Katayon Ghazi, "Iran Calls on Expatriate = Investors=20 to Return," New York Times, June 2, 1991.

(41) Geraldine Brooks, "Veiled Capitalists: The New Revolu tion in = Iran Is=20 Taking Place on an Economic Front," Wall Street Journal, September 16, = 1991.

(42) On Iran's diplomatic overtures during and after the gulf crisis, = see=20 Shahrough Akhavi, "Iran's Comeback in the Gulf," New York Times, March = 10, 1991;=20 and "An Exclusive Interview with Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati," Middle East = Insight 7,=20 no. 5 (1991): 6-9.

(43) Alan Cowell, "Tehran Courting Western Europe," New York Times, = May 7,=20 1991.

(44) Mohammad Jafar Mahallati, "The New Persian Gulf Security = Arrangement and=20 the Relevant Factors," Middle East Insight 8, no. 1 (July/August 1991): = 2224.=20 For the Iranian posi tion, see also "Interview with Kamal Kharrazi, = Iranian Am=20 bassador to the U.N.," Middle East Insight 8, no. 3 (January/February = 1992):=20 6-9.

(45) Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Iran's Leaders Ask Wide Cooperation and = Ties to=20 West, Also Call for Gulf Amity," New York Times, May 28, 1991.

(46) Post and Liu, p. 29.

(47) Mahallati, "The New Persian Gulf Security Arrangement and the = Relevant=20 Factors," p. 23.

(48) Peter Ford, "Egyptians Exert Leverage on Gulf Security Issues,"=20 Christian Science Monitor, May 24, 1991.

(49) Quoted in The Soref Symposium: American Strategy after the Gulf = War=20 (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1991), p. = 53.

(50) Caryle Murphy, "U.S-Iranian Ties Mending," Washington Post, = April 20,=20 1992.

(51) Patrick Clawson, "Iran's Rafsanjani, the New Mideast 'Darling,'" = Wall=20 Street Journal, April 22, 1992.

(52) Avner Yaniv, "The End of Moderate Facade," Ha'aretz, February = 16,=20 1992.

(53) Most reports in the American press such as William Drozdiak, = "Iran and=20 Turkey Vie for Political, Economic In fluence in Soviet Muslim States,"=20 Washington Post, November 24, 1991, and David Hoffman, "Power = Competition in=20 Central Asia," Washington Post, February 14, 1992, have focused on the=20 competitive nature of the two nations' involvement in the region, while = totally=20 ignoring their common interests there. In many ways, the = competitive-cooperative=20 relations of Iran and Turkey in Central Asia resemble those of Germany = and=20 Russia in Eastern Europe.

(54) Post and Liu, p. 29.

(55) On the Iraqi-Shi'ite reaction, see Elaine Sciolino, The Outlaw = State:=20 Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis (New York: John = Wiley &=20 Sons, 1991), pp. 79-121.

(56) Shireen Hunter, "The PostWar Middle East: The Flaws in U.S. = Thinking,"=20 Middle East International 393 (February 8, 1991): 23. On U.S. reaction = to Iran's=20 attempts to improve ties and Washington's continued efforts to isolate = Iran, see=20 also Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Responds Coolly to Overture from Iran," New = York=20 Times, May 29, 1991; and R. K. Ramazani, "Future Security in the Persian = Gulf:=20 America's Role," Mid dle East Insight 8, no. 1 (July/August 1991): = 25-30. For an=20 exampl

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