U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee

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Publications	Issue List	Vote Analysis	Main Page
March 31, = 1999

The Kosovo Liberation Army: Does Clinton Policy Support Group = with=20 Terror, Drug Ties?
From = 'Terrorists' to=20 'Partners'

On March 24, 1999, NATO initiated air attacks on Yugoslavia (a = federation=20 of two republics, Serbia and Montenegro) in order to impose a peace = agreement=20 in the Serbian province of Kosovo, which has an ethnic Albanian = majority. The=20 Clinton Administration has not formally withdrawn its standing = insistence that=20 Belgrade sign the peace agreement, which would entail the deployment = in Kosovo=20 of some 28,000 NATO ground troops -- including 4,000 Americans -- to = police=20 the settlement. But in recent days the Clinton public line has shifted = to a=20 demand that Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic halt the offensive = he has=20 launched in Kosovo, which has led to a growing humanitarian crisis in = the=20 region, before there can be a stop to the bombing campaign.=20
One week into the bombing campaign, there is widespread discussion = of=20 options for further actions. One option includes forging a closer = relationship=20 between the United States and a controversial group, the Kosovo = Liberation=20 Army (KLA), a group which has been cited in unofficial reports for = alleged=20 ties to drug cartels and Islamic terrorist organizations. This paper = will=20 examine those allegations in the context of the currently unfolding = air=20 campaign.=20
Results of Week One=20
The air assault is a product of a Clinton policy, which for months = has been=20 directed toward intervention in Kosovo, in either the form of the use = of air=20 power or of the introduction of a peacekeeping ground force -- or of = air power=20 followed by a ground force. [For details on the turbulent history of = Kosovo=20 and of the direction of Clinton policy leading to the current air = campaign,=20 see: RPC's "Senate = to Vote=20 Today on Preventing Funding of Military Operations in Kosovo: = Airstrikes=20 Likely This Week," 3/23/99; "Bombing, = or=20 Ground Troops -- or Both: Clinton Kosovo Intervention Appears = Imminent,"=20 2/22/99; and "Bosnia=20 II: The Clinton Administration Sets Course for NATO Intervention in=20 Kosovo," 8/12/98.] Just hours before the first bombs fell, the = Senate=20 voted 58 to 41 (with 38 Republicans voting in the negative) to = authorize air=20 and missile strikes against Yugoslavia (S. Con. Res. 21). The Senate = then=20 approved by voice vote a second resolution expressing support for = members of=20 the U.S. Armed Forces engaged in military operations against = Yugoslavia (S.=20 Res. 74).=20
Prior to the air campaign, the stated goal of Clinton policy, as = noted=20 above, was Belgrade's acceptance of the peace agreement signed by the = Kosovo=20 Albanian delegation (which included representatives of the KLA) on = March 17.=20 Now, more than a week into the air campaign, that goal appears even = more=20 elusive as the NATO attack has rallied Serbian resistance to what they = see as=20 an unjustified foreign aggression.=20
Since the NATO bombing campaign began, Serbian security forces also = have=20 intensified an offensive in Kosovo that began as the airstrikes = appeared=20 inevitable. According to numerous media reports, tens of thousands of=20 Albanians are fleeing the Serb army, and police forces and = paramilitary groups=20 that, based on credible allegations, are committing widespread = atrocities,=20 including summary executions, burnings of Albanian villages, and = assassination=20 of human rights activists and community leaders. Allied officials have = denounced the apparently deliberate forced exodus of Albanian = civilians as=20 ethnic cleansing and even genocide. But according to some refugee = accounts,=20 the NATO bombing is also a factor in the exodus: "[M]ost residents of = the=20 provincial capital say they are leaving of their own accord and are = not being=20 forced out at gunpoint, as residents of several western cities and = villages in=20 Kosovo say has been happening to them. . . . Pristina residents who = made it to=20 Macedonia said their city is still largely intact, despite the = targeting of=20 ethnic Albanian businesses by Serbian gangs and several direct hits = from NATO=20 air strikes in the city center" ["Cause of Kosovar Exodus from = Pristina=20 Disputed: Serbs Are Forcing Exit, Some Claim; Others Go on Own,"=20 Washington Times, 3/31/99].=20
At the same time, the Clinton Administration, consistent with its = track=20 record on Kosovo, has ignored credible but unconfirmed evidence from = sources=20 not connected to Milosevic's Serbian government that the NATO campaign = has=20 resulted in far more civilian damage than has been acknowledged.=20
Making Things Worse?=20
The Clinton Administration and NATO officials flatly reject any = suggestion=20 that their policy has exacerbated an already bad situation on the = ground in=20 Kosovo. With neighboring Albania and Macedonia in danger of being = destabilized=20 by a flood of refugees, questions are being raised about NATO's = ability to=20 continue the campaign unless positive results are evident soon:=20

"With critics arguing that the NATO campaign has made things = worse, the=20 alliance must slow the Serbs' onslaught or watch public support and = alliance=20 unity unravel. U.S. and NATO officials angrily rebutted the critics, = arguing=20 that Mr. Milosevic, the Serbian leader, and his forces were already = on the=20 rampage before NATO strikes began." ["NATO Is Set to Target Sites in = Belgrade," Wall Street Journal, 3/29/99]

If the immediate NATO goal has now shifted to stopping the Serb = offensive=20 in Kosovo, observers point to three likely options [WSJ, = 3/29/99]:=20
"Option One is to continue the air campaign, increasingly = targeting=20 Serb frontline troops [in Kosovo], but it could be days = before the=20 onslaught is really slowed." This option, which NATO has already begun = to=20 implement, is likely to entail greater risk to NATO aircraft and = crews, due to=20 the lower and slower flightpaths needed to deliver tactical strikes. = Still,=20 most observers doubt the offensive can be halted with air power alone. = Late=20 reports indicate increased bombing of targets in Belgrade, the capital = of both=20 the Yugoslav federation and the Serbian republic.=20
"Option Two is to start considering intervening on the=20 ground." In recent days, the Clinton Administration has begun = to=20 shift its position on NATO ground troops from a categorical assurance = that=20 ground troops would go in only to police a peace settlement = to hints=20 that they might, depending on some unspecified "conditions," be = introduced=20 into a combat environment. For example, in comments on March 28, = Chairman of=20 the Joint Chiefs General Henry Shelton suggested that certain = "assessments"=20 had been made, but that there was as yet no political agreement on = ground=20 troops:=20

"There have been assessments made, but those assessments were = based on=20 varying conditions that existed in Kosovo... At this point in time, = there=20 are no plans per se to introduce ground troops." = [NBC's=20 "Meet the Press," 3/28/99]

"Option Three: arming the separatist Kosovo Liberation=20 Army to carry the war on the ground while NATO continues it = from the=20 air." This option, which would make NATO the overt air force of the = KLA, would=20 also dash any possibility of a solution that would not result in a = change in=20 Balkan borders, perhaps setting off a round of widespread regional=20 instability. Clinton Administrations officials have begun to suggest = that=20 independence may now be justified in view of the Serb offensive. The = KLA has=20 been explicit in its determination to not only achieve an independent = Kosovo=20 but to "liberate" Albanian-inhabited areas of Montenegro (including = the=20 Montenegrin capital, Podgorica), Macedonia (including the Macedonian = capital,=20 Skopje), and parts of northern Greece; most of these areas were in = fact=20 annexed to Albania under Axis occupation during World War II. (For a = visual=20 representation of the areas claimed by the KLA, see the map at the = website of=20 the pro-KLA Albanian-American Civic League at http://www.aacl.com/=20
Note that arming and training the KLA, as called for in Option = Three, would=20 highlight serious questions about the nature of the KLA and of the = Clinton=20 Administration's relationship with it.=20
The KLA: from 'Terrorists' to=20 'Partners'=20
The Kosovo Liberation Army "began on the radical fringe of Kosovar = Albanian=20 politics, originally made up of diehard Marxist-Leninists (who were = bankrolled=20 in the old days by the Stalinist dictatorship next door in Albania) as = well as=20 by descendants of the fascist militias raised by the Italians in World = War II"=20 ["Fog of War -- Coping With the Truth About Friend and Foe: Victims = Not Quite=20 Innocent," New York Times, 3/28/99]. The KLA made its = military debut=20 in February 1996 with the bombing of several camps housing Serbian = refugees=20 from wars in Croatia and Bosnia [Jane's Intelligence Review,=20 10/1/96]. The KLA (again according to the highly regarded = Jane's,)=20 "does not take into consideration the political or economic importance = of its=20 victims, nor does it seem at all capable of seriously hurting its = enemy, the=20 Serbian police and army. Instead, the group has attacked Serbian = police and=20 civilians arbitrarily at their weakest points. It has not come close = to=20 challenging the region's balance of military power" [Jane's,=20 10/1/96].=20
The group expanded its operations with numerous attacks through = 1996 but=20 was given a major boost with the collapse into chaos of neighboring = Albania in=20 1997, which afforded unlimited opportunities for the introduction of = arms into=20 Kosovo from adjoining areas of northern Albania, which are effectively = out of=20 the control of the Albanian government in Tirana. From its inception, = the KLA=20 has targeted not only Serbian security forces, who may be seen as = legitimate=20 targets for a guerrilla insurgency, but Serbian and Albanian civilians = as=20 well.=20
In view of such tactics, the Clinton Administration's then-special = envoy=20 for Kosovo, Robert Gelbard, had little difficulty in condemning the = KLA (also=20 known by its Albanian initials, UCK) in terms comparable to those he = used for=20 Serbian police repression:=20

" 'The violence we have seen growing is incredibly dangerous,' = Gelbard=20 said. He criticized violence 'promulgated by the (Serb) police' and=20 condemned the actions of an ethnic Albanian underground group Kosovo = Liberation Army (UCK) which has claimed responsibility for a series = of=20 attacks on Serb targets. 'We condemn very strongly terrorist actions = in=20 Kosovo. The UCK is, without any questions, a terrorist group,' = Gelbard=20 said." [Agence France Presse, 2/23/98]

Mr. Gelbard's remarks came just before a KLA attack on a Serbian = police=20 station led to a retaliation that left dozens of Albanians dead, = leading in=20 turn to a rapid escalation of the cycle of violence. Responding to = criticism=20 that his earlier remarks might have been seen as Washington's "green = light" to=20 Belgrade that a crack-down on the KLA would be acceptable, Mr. Gelbard = offered=20 to clarify to the House Committee on International Relations:=20

"Questioned by lawmakers today on whether he still considered the = group a=20 terrorist organization, Mr. Gelbard said that while it has committed = 'terrorist acts,' it has 'not been classified legally by the U.S. = Government=20 as a terrorist organization.' " [New York Times, 3/13/98]=20

The situation in Kosovo has since been transformed: what were once = sporadic=20 cases of KLA attacks and often heavy-handed and indiscriminate Serbian = responses has now become a full-scale guerrilla war. That development = appeared=20 to be a vindication of what may have been the KLA's strategy of = escalating the=20 level of violence to the point where outside intervention would become = a=20 distinct possibility. Given the military imbalance, there is reason to = believe=20 the KLA -- which is now calling for the introduction of NATO ground = troops=20 into Kosovo [Associated Press, 3/27/99] -- may have always = expected=20 to achieve its goals less because of the group's own prospects for = military=20 success than because of a hoped-for outside intervention: As one = fighter put=20 it, "We hope that NATO will intervene, like it did in Bosnia, to save = us"=20 ["Both Sides in the Kosovo Conflict Seem Determined to Ignore = Reality,"=20 New York Times, 6/22/98].=20
By early 1999, the Clinton Administration had completely staked the = success=20 of its Kosovo policy on either the acceptance by both sides of a = pre-drafted=20 peace agreement that would entail a NATO ground occupation of Kosovo, = or, if=20 the Albanians signed the agreement while Belgrade refused, bombing of = the=20 Serbs. By committing itself so tightly to those two alternatives, the = Clinton=20 Administration left itself with as little flexibility as it had = offered the=20 Albanians and the Serbs.=20
At that point for the Administration, cultivating the goodwill of = the KLA=20 -- as the most extreme element on the Albanian side, and the element = which had=20 the weapons capable of sinking any diplomatic initiative -- became an = absolute=20 imperative:=20

"In order to get the Albanians'... acceptance [of the peace = plan], Ms.=20 Albright offered incentives intended to show that Washington is a = friend of=20 Kosovo...Officers in the Kosovo Liberation Army would . . . be sent = to the=20 United States for training in transforming themselves from a = guerrilla group=20 into a police force or a political entity, much like the African = National=20 Congress did in South Africa." [New York Times, 2/24/99]=20

The Times' comparison of treatment of the KLA with that of = the=20 African National Congress (ANC) -- a group with its own history of = terror=20 attacks on political opponents, including members of the ethnic group = it=20 claims to represent -- is a telling one. In fact, it points to the = seemingly=20 consistent Clinton policy of cultivating relationships with groups = known for=20 terrorist violence -- not only the ANC, but the Palestine Liberation=20 Organization (PLO) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) -- in what may = be a=20 strategy of attempting to wean away a group from its penchant for = violence by=20 adopting its cause as an element of U.S. policy.=20
By the time the NATO airstrikes began, the Clinton Administration's = partnership with the KLA was unambiguous:=20

"With ethnic Albanian Kosovars poised to sign a peace accord = later=20 Thursday, the United States is moving quickly to help transform the = Kosovo=20 Liberation Army from a rag-tag band of guerrilla fighters into a = political=20 force. . . . Washington clearly sees it as a main hope for the = troubled=20 province's future. 'We want to develop a good relationship with them = as they=20 transform themselves into a politically-oriented organization,' = deputy State=20 Department spokesman James Foley said. 'We want to develop closer = and better=20 ties with this organization.'=20
"A strong signal of this is the deference with which U.S. = Secretary of=20 State Madeleine Albright treats the Kosovar Albanians' chief = negotiator=20 Hashim Thaci, a 30-year-old KLA commander. Albright dispatched her = top aide=20 and spokesman James Rubin to Paris earlier this week to meet with = Thaci and=20 personally deliver to him an invitation for members of his = delegation to=20 visit the United States. Rubin, who will attend the ceremony at = which the=20 Kosovar Albanians will sign the accord, is expected to then return = to=20 Washington with five members of the delegation, including Thaci. = Thaci and=20 Rubin have developed a 'good rapport' during the Kosovo crisis, = according to=20 U.S. officials who note that Thaci was the main delegate they = convinced to=20 sign the agreement even though the Serbs have refused to do so. [ . = . . ]=20
" '[W]e believe that we have a lot of advice and a lot of help = that we=20 can provide to them if they become precisely the kind of political = actor we=20 would like to see them become.' Foley stressed that the KLA would = not be=20 allowed to continue as a military force but would have the chance to = move=20 forward in their quest for self government under a 'different = context.' 'If=20 we can help them and they want us to help them in that effort of=20 transformation, I think it's nothing that anybody can argue with.' " =

Such an effusive embrace by top Clinton Administration officials of = an=20 organization that only a year ago one of its own top officials labeled = as=20 "terrorist" is, to say the least, a startling development.=20
Even more importantly, the new Clinton/KLA partnership may obscure=20 troubling allegations about the KLA that the Clinton Administration = has thus=20 far neglected to address.=20
Charges of Drugs, Islamic Terror -- and a = Note on=20 Sources=20
No observer doubts that the large majority of fighters that have = flocked to=20 the KLA during the past year or so (since it began large-scale = military=20 operations) are ordinary Kosovo Albanians who desire what they see as = the=20 liberation of their homeland from foreign rule. But that fact -- which = amounts=20 to a claim of innocence by association -- does not fully explain the = KLA's=20 uncertain origins, political program, sources of funding, or political = alliances.=20
Among the most troubling aspects of the Clinton Administration's = effective=20 alliance with the KLA are numerous reports from reputable unofficial = sources=20 -- including the highly respected Jane's publications -- that = the KLA=20 is closely involved with:=20

The extensive Albanian crime network that extends throughout = Europe and=20 into North America, including allegations that a major portion of = the KLA=20 finances are derived from that network, mainly proceeds from drug=20 trafficking; and=20

Terrorist organizations motivated by the ideology of radical = Islam,=20 including assets of Iran and of the notorious Osama bin-Ladin -- who = has=20 vowed a global terrorist war against Americans and American = interests.=20

The final two sections of this paper give samples of these reports. = (Many=20 of these reports are available in full at www.siri-us.com, the website = of an=20 independent think tank called the Strategic Issues Research Institute = of the=20 United States, under "Background Issues".) In presenting samples of = such=20 reports for the consideration of Republican Senators and staff, RPC = does not=20 claim that these reports constitute conclusive evidence of the KLA's = drug or=20 terror ties. Nor are these reports necessarily conclusive as to the = policy=20 advisability of the Clinton Administration's support for that = organization.=20 They do, however, raise serious questions about the context in which = decisions=20 regarding American policy in the Balkans are being made by the Clinton = Administration.=20
All of these sources are unclassified and unconnected to official = agencies=20 of the U.S. government, although some quote sources in intelligence = agencies.=20 Possible objections could be raised that the relevant U.S. government = agencies=20 may not have made available similar reports concerning the KLA. While = it is=20 not possible to discuss, in the context of this paper, what = information is or=20 is not available from classified sources, the author of this paper = offers what=20 he regards as two helpful observations. First, one should recognize = that the=20 absence of reporting on a given topic may indicate that the = information has=20 not been obtained, assembled, or disseminated by the agencies in = question, but=20 not necessarily that it does not exist. That is, silence by official = sources=20 does not constitute disproof of unofficial sources. The second and = more=20 troubling observation is that the Clinton Administration has = demonstrated, to=20 an unprecedented degree, an unfortunate tendency -- in some cases = possibly=20 involving an improper politicization of traditionally non-political = government=20 agencies -- to manage or conceal inconvenient information that might = call into=20 question some of its policies. Examples of this tendency include:=20
China espionage: Numerous critics have faulted the = Clinton=20 Administration's less-than-forthcoming attitude towards the = investigation of=20 possible negligence regarding Chinese theft of U.S. nuclear secrets;=20 obstruction efforts may have included misuse of the classification = process.=20 [For details, see RPC's "Contradictions Abound: Did the Administration = Respond=20 'Vigorously' to Chinese Nuclear Espionage?" 3/24/99; "The Public = Record:=20 China's Theft of U.S. Nuclear Secrets," 3/12/99; and "Commentators Hit = Clinton=20 Administration on Nuclear Technology Theft and Suspicious China Ties," = 3/12/99.] The effectiveness of the current Kosovo crisis in getting = the China=20 espionage scandal off Page 1 has not gone unnoticed: "In the days = leading up=20 to the initiation of hostilities with Serbia, it had become = increasingly=20 apparent that the usual administration damage control techniques = (official=20 denials, misleading statements, obstruction of inquiries, attacks on = the=20 accusers, etc.) were not working in the face of cascading revelations = that the=20 Clinton team had abysmally failed to address [Chinese] penetration of=20 America's nuclear weapons laboratories.... The only option: change the = subject, regardless of the cost in American lives, national treasure, = and=20 long-term interests" [Frank Gaffney, Jr., Center for Security Policy, = "Hidden=20 Trigger on Guns of Intervention?" Washington Times, 3/30/99]. =
Mexico drug certification: The Clinton = Administration has=20 consistently certified that Mexican authorities are cooperating with = U.S.=20 anti-drug efforts -- despite strong evidence to the contrary. [See, = for=20 example, Los Angeles Times, 3/25/99; Milwaukee Journal=20 Sentinel, 2/27/99; and The San Francisco Chronicle, = 2/26/99].=20
Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia: The Clinton=20 Administration concealed its active cooperation with the Iranians for = arms=20 shipments to the Muslim fundamentalist regime of Alija Izetbegovic in = Bosnia=20 in violation of the United Nations arms embargo on the former = Yugoslavia. [For=20 details on the Clinton Administration's active connivance with the = Iranians,=20 see RPC's "Clinton-Approved Iranian Arms Transfers Help Turn Bosnia = into=20 Militant Islamic Base," 1/16/97.] This track record undermines the = Clinton=20 Administration's insistence that Russia, as a permanent member of the = U.N.=20 Security Council, is obligated to observe the same embargo with = respect to=20 Serbia [as stated by State Department spokesman James Rubin, daily = briefing,=20 March 24, 1999].=20
Eradication of the Serbs in Krajina: The Clinton=20 Administration has stalled efforts to investigate what has been called = the=20 "biggest ethnic cleansing" of the Balkan wars, one which the Clinton=20 Administration may itself have helped to facilitate:=20

"Investigators at the international war crimes tribunal in The = Hague have=20 concluded that the Croatian Army carried out summary executions,=20 indiscriminate shelling of civilian populations and 'ethnic = cleansing'=20 during a 1995 assault that was a turning point in the Balkan wars, = according=20 to tribunal documents. The investigators have recommended that three = Croatian generals be indicted, and an American official said this = week that=20 the indictments could come within a few weeks. . . . Any indictment = of=20 Croatian Army generals could prove politically troublesome for the = Clinton=20 Administration, which has a delicate relationship with Croatia, an = American=20 ally in preserving the peace in Bosnia with a poor human rights = record. The=20 August 1995 Croatian offensive, which drove some 100,000 Serbs from = a large=20 swath of Croatia over four days, was carried out with the tacit = blessing of=20 the United States by a Croatian Army that had been schooled in part = by a=20 group of retired American military officers. Questions still remain = about=20 the full extent of United States involvement. In the course of the=20 three-year investigation into the assault, the United States has = failed to=20 provide critical evidence requested by the tribunal, according to = tribunal=20 documents and officials, adding to suspicion among some there that=20 Washington is uneasy about the investigation. Two senior Canadian = military=20 officers, for example, who were in Croatia during the offensive, = testified=20 that the assault, in which some 3,000 shells rained down on the city = of Knin=20 over 48 hours, was indiscriminate and targeted civilians. . . . A = section of=20 the tribunal's 150-page report is headed: 'The Indictment. Operation = Storm,=20 A Prima Facie Case.': 'During the course of the military offensive, = the=20 Croatian armed forces and special police committed numerous = violations of=20 international humanitarian law, including but not limited to, = shelling of=20 Knin and other cities,' the report says. 'During, and in the 100 = days=20 following the military offensive, at least 150 Serb civilians were = summarily=20 executed, and many hundreds disappeared.' The crimes also included = looting=20 and burning, the report says." ["War Crimes Panel Finds Croat Troops = 'Cleansed' the Serbs," New York Times, 3/21/99] =

The Krajina episode -- the largest in the recent Yugoslav wars, at = least=20 until this week in Kosovo -- exposes the hypocrisy of the Clinton = claims as to=20 why intervention in Kosovo is a humanitarian imperative:=20

"Within four days, the Croatians drove out 150,000 Serbs, the = largest=20 [until this week] ethnic cleansing of the entire Balkan wars. = Investigators=20 in the Hague have concluded that this campaign was carried out with=20 brutality, wanton murder, and indiscriminate shelling of civilians. = . . .=20 Krajina is Kosovo writ large. And yet, at the same time, the U.S. = did not=20 stop or even protest the Croatian action. The Clinton Administration = tacitly=20 encouraged it." [Charles Krauthammer, "The Clinton Doctrine," = Time=20 magazine, 4/5/99]

In short, the absence of official confirmation of the reports cited = below=20 can hardly be considered the last word in the matter. And given this=20 Administration's record, one might treat with some degree of = skepticism even a=20 flat denial of KLA drug and terror ties -- which thus far has not been = offered. As the Clinton Administration searches for new options in its = Kosovo=20 policy, these reports about KLA should not be lightly dismissed.=20
Reports on KLA Drug and Criminal=20 Links=20
Elements informally known as the "Albanian mafia," composed largely = of=20 ethnic Albanians from Kosovo, have for several years been a feature of = the=20 criminal underworld in a number of cities in Europe and North America; = they=20 have been particularly prominent in the trade in illegal narcotics. = [See, for=20 example,"The Albanian Cartel: Filling the Crime Void," Jane's = Intelligence=20 Review, November 1995.] The cities where the Albanian cartels are = located=20 are also fertile ground for fundraising for support of the Albanian = cause in=20 Kosovo. [See, for example, "Albanians in Exile Send Millions of = Dollars to=20 Support the KLA," BBC, 3/12/99.]=20
The reported link between drug activities and arms purchases for = anti-Serb=20 Albanian forces in Kosovo predates the formation of the KLA, and = indeed, may=20 be seen as a key resource that allowed the KLA to establish itself as = a force=20 in the first place:=20

"Narcotics smuggling has become a prime source of financing for = civil=20 wars already under way -- or rapidly brewing -- in southern Europe = and the=20 eastern Mediterranean, according to a report issued here this week. = The=20 report, by the Paris-based Observatoire Geopolitique des Drogues, or = Geopolitical Observatory of Drugs, identifies belligerents in the = former=20 Yugoslav republics and Turkey as key players in the region's = accelerating=20 drugs-for-arms traffic. Albanian nationalists in ethnically tense = Macedonia=20 and the Serbian province of Kosovo have built a vast heroin network, = leading=20 from the opium fields of Pakistan to black-market arms dealers in=20 Switzerland, which transports up to $2 billion worth of the drug = annually=20 into the heart of Europe, the report says. More than 500 Kosovo or=20 Macedonian Albanians are in prison in Switzerland for drug- or=20 arms-trafficking offenses, and more than 1,000 others are under = indictment.=20 The arms are reportedly stockpiled in Kosovo for eventual use = against the=20 Serbian government in Belgrade, which imposed a violent crackdown on = Albanian autonomy advocates in the province five years ago." = ["Separatists=20 Supporting Themselves with Traffic in Narcotics," San Francisco=20 Chronicle, 6/10/94]

At the same time, many Albanians in the diaspora have made = voluntary=20 contributions to the KLA and are offended at suggestions of drug money = funding=20 of that organization:=20

"Nick Ndrejaj, who retired from the real estate business, lives = on a=20 pension in Daytona Beach, Fla. But the retiree has managed to scrape = up some=20 money to send to the Kosovo Liberation Army, the rebel force that is = opposing Yugoslav strongman Slobodan Milosevic. 'It's hard, but we = have had=20 to do this all our lives,' says the elderly man. Mr. Ndrejaj is one = of many=20 Albanians in America who are sending all they can spare to aid their = beleaguered compatriots in central Europe. The disaster in Kosovo is = uniting=20 the minority into a major fund-raising and congressional lobbying = effort. [=20 . . . ]=20
"Typical of the donors is Agim Jusufi, a building superintendent = on=20 Manhattan's West Side. Mr. Jusufi gets a weekly paycheck. He = describes=20 himself as an ordinary 'working man.' However, he has donated $5,000 = to the=20 KLA. 'It is always stressed that we should donate when we can,' he = says, 'We=20 are in a grave moment, so we are raising money.' Jusufi bridles over = reports=20 that drug money funds the KLA. There has been an Albanian = organized-crime=20 element involved in the drug trade for decades. But, he says, in = this=20 country, the money comes from hard-working immigrants. 'We have = canceled=20 checks to prove it,' he says. " ["Pulling Political and Purse = Strings,"=20 Christian Science Monitor, 3/31/99]

Without access to the KLA's ledgers, it is hard to estimate what = part of=20 the group's funds might come from legitimate sources and what part = from drugs.=20 One unnamed intelligence source puts the percentage of drug money in = the KLA's=20 coffers at one-half ["Drugs Money Linked to the Kosovo Rebels," = The=20 Times (London), 3/24/99]. The following is a sample of the = reports=20 linking the KLA to funding by narcotics-smuggling crime organizations: =

"The Kosovo Liberation Army, which has won the support of = the=20 West for its guerrilla struggle against the heavy armour of the = Serbs, is a=20 Marxist-led force funded by dubious sources, including drug money. = That is=20 the judgment of senior police officers across Europe. An = investigation by=20 The Times has established that police forces in three Western = European=20 countries, together with Europol, the European police authority, are = separately investigating growing evidence that drug money is funding = the=20 KLA's leap from obscurity to power. The financing of the Kosovo = guerrilla=20 war poses critical questions and it sorely tests claims to an = 'ethical'=20 foreign policy. Should the West back a guerrilla army that appears = to be=20 partly financed by organised crime? Could the KLA's need for funds = be=20 fuelling the heroin trade across Europe? . . . As well as diverting=20 charitable donations from exiled Kosovans, some of the KLA money is = thought=20 to come from drug dealing. Sweden is investigating suspicions of a = KLA drug=20 connection. 'We have intelligence leading us to believe that there = could be=20 a connection between drug money and the Kosovo Liberation Army,' = said Walter=20 Kege, head of the drug enforcement unit in the Swedish police = intelligence=20 service. Supporting intelligence has come from other states. 'We = have yet to=20 find direct evidence, but our experience tells us that the channels = for=20 trading hard drugs are also used for weapons,' said one Swiss police = commander. . . . One Western intelligence report quoted by Berliner = Zeitung=20 says that DM900 million has reached Kosovo since the guerrillas = began=20 operations and half the sum is said to be illegal drug money. In = particular,=20 European countries are investigating the Albanian connection: = whether=20 Kosovan Albanians living primarily in Germany and Switzerland are = creaming=20 off the profits from inner-city heroin dealing and sending the cash = to the=20 KLA. Albania -- which plays a key role in channelling money to the = Kosovans=20 -- is at the hub of Europe's drug trade. An intelligence report = which was=20 prepared by Germany's Federal Criminal Agency concluded: 'Ethnic = Albanians=20 are now the most prominent group in the distribution of heroin in = Western=20 consumer countries.' Europol, which is based in The Hague, is = preparing a=20 report for European interior and justice ministers on a connection = between=20 the KLA and Albanian drug gangs. Police in the Czech Republic = recently=20 tracked down a Kosovo Albanian drug dealer named Doboshi who had = escaped=20 from a Norwegian prison where he was serving 12 years for heroin = trading. A=20 raid on Doboshi's apartment turned up documents linking him with = arms=20 purchases for the KLA." ["Drugs Money Linked to the Kosovo = Rebels,"=20 The Times (London), 3/24/99]=20
"Western intelligence agencies believe the UCK=20 [KLA] has been re-arming with the aid of money from = drug-smuggling through Albania, along with donations from the = Albanian=20 diaspora in Western Europe and North America. . . . Albania has = become the=20 crime capital of Europe. The most powerful groups in the country are = organized criminals who use Albania to grow, process, and store a = large=20 percentage of the illegal drugs destined for Western Europe. . . . = Albania's=20 criminal gangs are actively supporting the war in Kosovo. Many of = them have=20 family links to Albanian groups in Kosovo and support them with arms = and=20 other supplies, either out of family solidarity or solely for = profit. These=20 links mean the UCK fighters have a secure base area and reasonably = good=20 lines of communiction to the outside world. Serb troops have tried = to seal=20 the border but with little success." ["Life in the Balkan=20 'Tinderbox' Remains as Dangerous as Ever," Jane's Intelligence=20 Review, 3/1/99]=20
"Drugs traffickers in Italy, in Germany, in Spain, in = France, and=20 in Norway: Kosovo Albanians. The men from the Special Operations = Section=20 [ROS] of the carabinieri [i.e., Italian national = police],=20 under the leadership of General Mario Mori, have succeeded in = neutralizing a=20 fully fledged network of Albanian drugs traffickers. The leader of = this=20 network is a certain Gashi Agim, aged 33, originally from Pristina, = the=20 capital of the small region that is being torn apart by the struggle = between=20 on the one hand the local population, 90 percent of whom are of = Albanian=20 ethnic origin and who are calling for independence from Serbia, and = [the=20 Yugoslav government] on the other . . . Gashi was arrested early = this summer=20 along with 124 drugs traffickers. 'Milan at this juncture has become = a=20 crossroads of interests for many fighting groups,' a detective with = the ROS=20 explained. 'These groups include also the Albanians from Kosovo who = are=20 among the most dangerous traffickers in drugs and in arms. . . . The = war in=20 Kosovo has partly slowed down the criminals' business because many = Albanians=20 have been forced to take care of their families. Some of them are = activists=20 in the armed movement of the KLA fighters and have gone home to = fight. They=20 feel Albanian. They are fighting to achieve annexation to Albania. = And it is=20 precisely there that at least a part of the sea of money that the = Albanian=20 drugs traffickers have amassed is reported to have ended up, to = support the=20 families and to fund both certain political personalities and the = anti-Serb=20 movement. In spring, a number of Albanian drugs traffickers actually = went as=20 far as to take part in the organization of a rally in favor of = independence=20 for Kosovo. . . . Drugs, arms, and the Koran: Could this be the = murderous=20 crime mix of the next few years?" ["Albanian Mafia, This Is = How It=20 Helps The Kosovo Guerrilla Fighters," Corriere della Sera = (Milan,=20 Italy), 10/15/98]=20
"A group of Kosovo Albanians smuggling arms back to their = troubled province were among 100 people arrested in a massive, = countrywide=20 anti-drug operation in Italy, police here said Tuesday. All the 100 = -- 90 of=20 whom were arrested in Italy, the rest in other European countries -- = face=20 weapons charges related to international drug trafficking. = Anti-Mafia=20 prosecutors in Milan, who conducted the operation with paramilitary = police=20 units, identified eight criminal structures active on an = international=20 scale. One hundred kilos (220 pounds) of heroin and cocaine was = seized in=20 the bust across several Italian regions. Investigators said the = groups used=20 Milan as a base, with cafes, restaurants, garages and other firms = acting as=20 fronts. The Kosovar Albanian gang allegedly used drug money to buy = the=20 weapons in Italy, which were then sent to Kosovo where a three-month = conflict is pitting Serbian forces against armed ethnic Albanians = seeking=20 independence. Another separate group of Egyptians with links to = Calabrian=20 and Albanian gangs were arrested on suspicions of laundering money = through=20 Switzerland for use by fundamentalists in Egypt."=20 ["Major Italian Drug Bust Breaks Kosovo Arms = Trafficking,"=20 Agence France-Presse, 6/9/98]=20
"The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) has claimed = responsibility for=20 more than 50 attacks on Serbs and Albanians loyal to the Belgrade=20 government, but little is known about the separatist group. . . . = Details of=20 the KLA, which the United States calls a terrorist organization, are = sketchy=20 at best. Western intelligence sources believe there are no more than = several=20 hundred members under arms with military training. Serbian police = estimate=20 there are at least 2,000 well-armed men. The KLA is said to rely = heavily on=20 a huge network of informers and sympathizers, enabling it to blend = easily=20 among the population. The Western sources also believe the core of = the=20 organization consists of Albanians who fled into exile in the 1970s = and=20 based their operation in Switzerland, where its funding is gathered = from all=20 over the world. 'If the West wants to nip the KLA in the bud, all it = has to=20 do is crack down on its financial nerve center in Switzerland,' one = source=20 said. Part of the funding, this source believes, comes from the = powerful=20 Albanian mafia organizations that deal in narcotics, prostitution = and arms=20 smuggling across Europe. The KLA has admitted having training bases = in=20 northern Albania, which the Albanian government does not condone but = is=20 powerless to stop." ["Speculation Plentiful, Facts Few = About Kosovo=20 Separatist Group," Baltimore Sun, 3/6/98]=20
"The bulk of the financing of the UCK [KLA]=20 seems to originate from two sources: drug-related operations = and=20 Kosovo Albanian emigres in the West. The former Yugoslavia has = always been=20 on the main European drug transit route. With the break-up of that = country,=20 the route has been somewhat modified; West-Europe-bound narcotics = now enter=20 Macedonia and Albania and are then distributed towards Western = Europe=20 through Kosovo, Montenegro, Bosnia, and Croatia."=20 [Jane's Intelligence Review, "Another = Balkans=20 Bloodbath? -- Part One," 2/1/98]=20
"Socially organized in extended families bound together = in clan=20 alliances, Kosovar Albanians dominate the Albanian mafia in the = southern=20 Balkans. Other than Kosovo, the Albanian mafia is also active in = northern=20 Albania and western Macedonia. In this context, the so-called = 'Balkan=20 Medellin' is made up of a number of geographically connected border = towns .=20 . . . If left unchecked, this growing Albanian narco-terrorism could = lead to=20 a Colombian syndrome in the southern Balkans, or the emergence of a=20 situation in which the Albanian mafia becomes powerful enough to = control one=20 or more states in the region. In practical terms, this will involve = either=20 Albania or Macedonia, or both. Politically, this is now being done = by=20 channelling growing foreign exchange (forex) profits from = narco-terrorism=20 into local governments and political parties. In Albania, the ruling = Democratic Party (DP) led by President Sali Berisha is now widely = suspected=20 of tacitly tolerating and even directly profiting from = drug-trafficking for=20 wider politico-economic reasons, namely the financing of = secessionist=20 political parties and other groupings in Kosovo and = Macedonia."=20 ["The Balkan Medellin," Jane's 3/1/95; = Albanian=20 then-president Berisha lost power in 1997 and is now a known KLA = patron in=20 northern Albania.]

Reports on Islamic Terror = Links=20
The KLA's main staging area is in the vicinity of the town of = Tropoje in=20 northern Albania [Jane's International Defense Review, = 2/1/99].=20 Tropoje, the hometown and current base of former Albanian president = Sali=20 Berisha, a major KLA patron, is also a known center for Islamic = terrorists=20 connected with Saudi renegade Osama bin-Ladin. [For a report on the = presence=20 of bin-Ladin assets in Tropoje and connections to anti-American = Islamic=20 terrorism, see "U.S. Blasts' Possible Mideast Ties: Alleged Terrorists = Investigated in Albania, Washington Post, 8/12/98.]=20
The following reports note the presence of foreign = mujahedin=20 (i.e., Islamic holy warriors) in the Kosovo war, some of them = jihad=20 veterans from Bosnia, Chechnya, and Afghanistan. Some of the reports=20 specifically cite assets of Iran or bin-Ladin, or both, in support of = the KLA.=20 To some, "mujahedin" does not necessarily equal "terrorists." But = since the=20 foreign fighters have not been considerate enough to provide an = organizational=20 chart detailing the exact relationship among the various groups, the = reported=20 presence of foreign fighters together with known terrorists in the = KLA's=20 stronghold at least raises serious questions about the implications = for the=20 Clinton Administration's increasingly close ties to the KLA:=20

"Serbian officials say Mujahideen have formed groups that = remained behind in Bosnia. Groups from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and = Chechnya are=20 also involved in Albanian guerrilla operations. A document found on = the body=20 of Alija Rabic, an Albanian UCK member killed in a border crossing = incident=20 last July, indicated he was guiding a 50-man group from Albania into = Kosovo.=20 The group included one Yemeni and 16 Saudis, six of whom bore = passports with=20 Macedonian Albanian names. Other UCK rebels killed crossing the = Albanian=20 frontier have carried Bosnian Muslim Federation papers."=20 [Jane's International Defense Review, "Unhealthy Climate in = Kosovo=20 as Guerrillas Gear Up for a Summer Confrontation," 2/1/99]=20
"Mujahidin fighters have joined the Kosovo Liberation = Army,=20 dimming prospects of a peaceful solution to the conflict and = fuelling fears=20 of heightened violence next spring.. . . . Their arrival in Kosovo = may force=20 Washington to review its policy in the Serbian province and will = deepen=20 Western dismay with the KLA and its tactics. . . . 'Captain Dula', = the local=20 KLA commander, was clearly embarrassed at the unexpected presence of = foreign=20 journalists and said that he had little idea who was sending the = Mujahidin=20 or where they came from; only that it was neither Kosovo nor = Albania. 'I've=20 got no information about them,' Captain Dula said. 'We don't talk = about it.'=20 . . . American diplomats in the region, especially Robert Gelbard, = the=20 special envoy, have often expressed fears of an Islamic hardline=20 infiltration into the Kosovo independence movement. . . . American=20 intelligence has raised the possibility of a link between Osama bin = Laden,=20 the Saudi expatriate blamed for the bombing in August of US = embassies in=20 Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, and the KLA. Several of Bin Laden's = supporters=20 were arrested in Tirana, the Albanian capital, and deported this = summer, and=20 the chaotic conditions in the country have allowed Muslim extremists = to=20 settle there, often under the guise of humanitarian workers. . . . = 'I=20 interviewed one guy from Saudi Arabia who said that it was his = eighth=20 jihad,' a Dutch journalist said." ["U.S. Alarmed as = Mujahidin Join=20 Kosovo Rebels," The Times (London), 11/26/98]=20
"Diplomats in the region say Bosnia was the first bastion = of=20 Islamic power. The autonomous Yugoslav region of Kosovo promises to = be the=20 second. During the current rebellion against the Yugoslav army, the = ethnic=20 Albanians in the province, most of whom are Moslem, have been = provided with=20 financial and military support from Islamic countries. They are = being=20 bolstered by hundreds of Iranian fighters, or Mujahadeen, who = infiltrate=20 from nearby Albania and call themselves the Kosovo Liberation Army. = US=20 defense officials say the support includes that of Osama Bin Laden, = the=20 Saudi terrorist accused of masterminding the bombings of the US = embassies in=20 Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. A Defense Department statement on August = 20 said=20 Bin Laden's Al Qa'ida organization supports Moslem fighters in both = Bosnia=20 and Kosovo. . . . The KLA strength was not the southern Kosovo = region, which=20 over the centuries turned from a majority of Serbs to ethnic = Albanians. The=20 KLA, however, was strong in neighboring Albania, which today has = virtually=20 no central government. The crisis in Albania led Iran to quickly = move in to=20 fill the vacuum. Iranian Revolutionary Guards began to train KLA = members. .=20 . . Selected groups of Albanians were sent to Iran to study that = country's=20 version of militant Islam. So far, Yugoslav officials and Western = diplomats=20 agree that millions of dollars have been funnelled through Bosnia = and=20 Albania to buy arms for the KLA. The money is raised from both = Islamic=20 governments and from Islamic communities in Western Europe, = particularly=20 Germany. . . . 'Iran has been active in helping out the Kosovo = rebels,'=20 Ephraim Kam, deputy director of Tel Aviv University's Jaffee Center = for=20 Strategic Studies, said. 'Iran sees Kosovo and Albania as containing = Moslem=20 communities that require help and Teheran is willing to do it.' But = much of=20 the training of the KLA remains based in Bosnia. Intelligence = sources say=20 mercenaries and volunteers for the separatist movement have been = recruited=20 and paid handsome salaries. . . . The trainers and fighters in the = KLA=20 include many of the Iranians who fought in Bosnia in the early = 1990s.=20 Intelligence sources place their number at 7,000, many of whom have = married=20 Bosnian women. There are also Afghans, Algerians, Chechens, and=20 Egyptians." ["Kosovo Seen as New Islamic Bastion," = Jerusalem=20 Post, 9/14/98]=20
". . . By late 1997, the Tehran-sponsored training and=20 preparations of the Liberation Army of Kosovo (UCK -- Ushtria = Clirimtare e=20 Kosoves -- in Albanian, OVK in Serbian), as well as the transfer of = weapons=20 and experts via Albania, were being increased. Significantly, = Tehran's=20 primary objective in Kosovo has evolved from merely assisting a = Muslim=20 minority in distress to furthering the consolidation of the Islamic=20 strategic axis along the Sarajevo-to-Tirane line. And only by = expanding and=20 escalating subversive and Islamist-political presence can this = objective be=20 attained. . . In the Fall of 1997, the uppermost leadership in = Tehran=20 ordered the IRGC [Revolutionary Guards] High Command to launch a = major=20 program for shipping large quantities of weapons and other military = supplies=20 to the Albanian clandestine organisations in Kosovo. [The supreme = Iranian=20 spiritual leader, the Ayatollah] Khamene'i's instructions = specifically=20 stipulated that the comprehensive military assistance was aimed to = enable=20 the Muslims 'to achieve the independence' of the province of Kosovo. = . . .=20 [B]y early December 1997, Iranian intelligence had already delivered = the=20 first shipments of hand grenades, machine-guns, assault rifles, = night vision=20 equipment, and communications gear from stockpiles in Albania into = Kosovo.=20 The mere fact that the Iranians could despatch the first supplies = within a=20 few days and in absolute secrecy reflect extensive advance = preparations made=20 in Albania in anticipation for such instructions from Tehran. = Moreover, the=20 Iranians began sending promising Albanian and UCK commanders for = advanced=20 military training in al-Quds [special] forces and IRGC camps in = Iran.=20 Meanwhile, weapons shipments continue. Thus, Tehran is well on its = way to=20 establishing a bridgehead in Kosovo. . . The liberation army was to = be only=20 the first phase in building military power. Ultimately, the Kosovo = Albanians=20 must field such heavy weapons as tanks, armoured personnel carriers, = artillery, and rocket launchers, if they hope to evict the Serbian = forces=20 from Kosovo. . . . The spate of UCK terrorism during the Fall of = 1997, . . .=20 should be considered intentional provocations against the Serbian = police=20 aimed to elicit a massive retaliation that would in turn lead to a = popular=20 uprising. Thus, the ongoing terrorism campaign in Kosovo should be=20 considered the initial phases in implementing the call for an = uprising.=20 Iran-sponsored activists have already spread the word through Kosovo = that=20 the liberation war has already broken out. If current trends = prevail, the=20 increasingly Islamist UCK will soon become the main factor in = overturning=20 the long-term status quo in the region. Concurrently, the terrorist=20 activities have become part of everyday life throughout Kosovo. = Given the=20 extent of the propaganda campaign and the assistance provided by = Iran, the=20 spread of terrorism should indeed be considered the beginning of an = armed=20 rebellion that threatens a major escalation." ["Italy = Becomes=20 Iran's New Base for Terrorist Operations," by Yossef Bodansky, = Defense=20 and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy (London), February 1998. = Bodansky=20 is Director of the House Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and=20 Unconventional Warfare. This report was written in late 1997, before = the=20 KLA's offensive in early 1998.]

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