The Silver Bear Cafe

Days of Infamy
The Future Is = Calling (Part=20 Three)
G. Edward Griffin

3DPeriscpoe=20

COLONEL HOUSE

As we re-activate our time machine, we find ourselves in = the=20 presence of one of the most colorful and mysterious figures of = history.=20 His name is Colonel Edward Mandell House. House was never in the = military.=20 The title of Colonel was honorary, granted by the Governor of = Texas in=20 appreciation for political services. He was one of the most = powerful men=20 in American politics and, yet, virtually unknown to most Americans = today.=20 He was the personal advisor to Presidents Wilson and Roosevelt. He = was=20 close to the Morgan banking dynasty and also to the powerful = banking=20 families of Europe. He attended school in England and surrounded = himself=20 with Fabians. His father, Thomas, was an exporter in the Southern = states=20 and also a lending agent for London banks, which preferred to = remain=20 anonymous. It was widely believed that he represented the = Rothschild=20 consortium. Thomas House was one of the few in the South who = emerged from=20 the War Between the States with a great fortune. Colonel House was = what=20 they called a =93king maker=94 in Texas politics. He personally = chose Woodrow=20 Wilson, the most unlikely of all political candidates, and secured = his=20 nomination for President on the Democratic ticket in 1912. It was = House=20 who convinced the Morgan group, and others with power in politics = and=20 media, to throw their support to Wilson, which is what enabled him = to win=20 the election and become the 28^th = President=20 of the United States. House was certainly a member of the Round = Table and=20 possibly a member of its inner circle. He was a founder of the=20 CFR.

In 1912 he wrote a novel, entitled Philip Dru = Administrator. It was=20 intended to popularize the Fabian blueprint for converting America = to=20 collectivism using the Fabian strategy of working slowly as a = turtle and=20 secretly as a wolf in sheep=92s clothing. The hero of his story is = Philip=20 Dru, who is a fictionalized version the author, himself: a quiet,=20 unassuming intellectual, working behind the scenes advising and=20 controlling politicians who are easily purchased and just as = easily=20 discarded. Speaking through Dru, House describes his political = ideal as:=20 =93socialism as dreamed of by Karl Marx.=94^[1]= =20 Dru=92s socialism, of course, was the Fabian version. It was to = have gentle=20 and humane qualities to soften its impact and set it apart from = the=20 Leninist version called Communism.

Like all collectivists, House spoke eloquently about = defending the=20 poor and the downtrodden, but in reality, he had great disdain for = the=20 masses. In his view, they are too stupid and lazy to take an = interest in=20 their own government, so it=92s up to the professionals to do that = for them.=20 Speaking through the fictional character of Senator Selwyn, House=20 says:

The average American citizen refuses to pay attention = to civic=20 affairs, contenting himself with a general growl at the tax = rate, and=20 the character and inefficiency of public officials. He seldom = takes the=20 trouble necessary to form the Government to suit his views. The = truth is=20 he has no cohesive or well-digested views, it being too much = trouble to=20 form them; therefore, some such organization as ours is=20 essential.^[2]=

Philip Dru foments civil war, leads an uprising against = the old=20 order, captures control of the government, becomes a dictator with = the=20 grateful support of the people, is given the title Administrator = of the=20 Republic, scraps all constitutional restrictions against = government power,=20 establishes a progressive income tax, creates a national banking = cartel,=20 ^[3]= =20 annexes Canada, conquers Mexico, invites European nations to = participate=20 in world government, and ushers in a glorious new age of = collectivism.=20 This was not just a fictional story for entertainment. House = described=20 this book as an expression of his own =93ethical and political=20 faith.=94^[4]=

The reason this is important is that the ethical and = political=20 faith of Col. House now is the ethical and political faith of = American=20 leadership =96 and it started with Woodrow Wilson. In his memoirs, = President=20 Wilson said: =93Mr. House is my second personality. He is my = independent=20 self. His thoughts and mine are one.=94^[5]=

George Viereck was an admiring biographer of Colonel = House and=20 approved of almost everything his did. This is what Viereck=20 said:

For seven long years, Colonel House was Woodrow = Wilson=92s other=20 self. For six long years he shared with him everything but the = title of=20 Chief Magistracy of the Republic. For six years, two rooms were = at his=20 disposal in the north wing of the White House. It was House who = made the=20 slate for the Cabinet, formulated the first policies of the=20 Administration, and practically directed the foreign affairs of = the=20 United States. We had, indeed, two presidents for one! =85 He = was the=20 pilot who guided the ship.^[6]=

THE WAR TO MAKE THE WORLD SAFE FOR=20 DEMOCRACY

As we contemplate a member of the Rhodes secret society, = occupying=20 two rooms in the White House, virtually in control of American = foreign=20 policy, our time machine finally brings us to World War I. Since = our main=20 topic today is war, we must prepare now to comprehend the events = we are=20 about to see in terms of the strategy for using war to smash the = world to=20 bits and then remold it closer to the hearts desire.

The sinking of the Lusitania was the event that, = more than=20 any other, motivated the American people to accept the necessity = and the=20 morality of getting into World War I. Prior to that time, there = was great=20 reluctance to participate in a war that had little to do with = American=20 interests. However, when the Lusitania left New York Harbor = on May=20 1, 1915, with 196 Americans on board and was sunk six days later = off the=20 coast of Ireland, it became the cause celebre that moved the = American=20 consciousness into a war mood against Germany. Americans were = outraged at=20 a nation that could viciously and cold-heartedly attack a peaceful = passenger ship.

What is not well known about that piece of history is the = role=20 played by J.P. Morgan. As you recall, the CFR was described by = Professor=20 Quigley as a front for J.P. Morgan and Company. We must remember = that=20 Morgan was, not only a founding member of the CFR, he was also a = member of=20 the Round Table, the inner group directing it, so how does Morgan = fit into=20 this?

During World War I, the Morgan Bank was the subscription = agent for=20 war loans to England and France. These countries had exhausted = their=20 financial resources to continue the war against Germany. So they = came to=20 the United States and asked J.P. Morgan =96 who was culturally = closer to=20 Britain than to America =96 to be their agent for selling war = bonds. The=20 House of Morgan was happy to do that, and it floated approximately = $1.5=20 billion in war bonds on behalf of England and, to a lesser extent, = for=20 France.

Morgan was also the contract agent for these countries = when they=20 purchased materials and supplies from American firms. That means = he had a=20 wonderfully profitable revolving door in which he received a piece = of the=20 action as the money went out of the country as loans and again, = when it=20 came back into the country, for the purchase of=20 materials.

As the war progressed, Britain and France were facing the = increasing possibility of defeat. The Germans had unleashed a = surprise=20 weapon =96 the submarine =96 that was new to warfare in those = days, and they=20 were sinking the ships that carried food and other necessities to = the=20 British Isles. The Germans were literally starving the British = into=20 submission who, by their own estimate, at one point said they had = only=20 about seven weeks of food left.

For the British, there was only one salvation, and that = was to have=20 the Americans come into the war to help them. But on the American = side,=20 there was a different agenda. What would happen to that $1.5 = billion in=20 war loans if Britain and France lost the war? The only time war = loans are=20 repaid is when the nation borrowing the money wins the war. Losers = don=92t=20 pay off their bonds. So Morgan was in a terrible fix. Not only = were his=20 friends in England in dire danger, he and all his investors were = about to=20 lose $1.5 billion! A very serious situation, indeed.

The U.S. Ambassador to England at that time was Walter = Page. Page=20 was more than just an ambassador. Among other things, he was a = trustee to=20 Rockefeller=92s General Education Board. It was in that capacity = that he=20 played a role in shaping educational policies to promote = collectivism in=20 America. Page sent a telegram to the State Department, and this is = what he=20 said,

The pressure of this approaching crisis, I am certain, = has gone=20 beyond the ability of the Morgan financial agency for the = British and=20 French Governments=85. The only way of maintaining our present = preeminent=20 trade position and averting a panic is by declaring war on=20 Germany.^[7]=

Money was not the only motivator for bringing the United = States=20 into war. We must not forget that the Ameican players in this = drama=20 dreamed of world government based on the model of collectivism, = and they=20 saw war as a great motivator to move society in that direction. = They=20 looked forward to the creation of the League of Nations when the = fighting=20 was over and knew that the only way for the United States to play = a=20 dominant role in shaping that world body was to be a combatant. = The only=20 ones who divide the spoils of war are the victors who fight the = war, and=20 it was that reality that fired the imaginations of House, Wilson, = and even=20 J.P. Morgan.

THE STRATEGY TO GET THE U.S. INTO=20 WAR

And so, there were different motivations and different = agendas for=20 pushing the United States into war. Colonel House became the = coordinator=20 for all of them. He went back and forth across the Atlantic and = consulted=20 with the Round Tables in both England and America. He arranged a = secret=20 treaty on behalf of President Wilson to bring the United States = into the=20 War. The reason for secrecy was that the Senate would never have = approved=20 it. There was still strong public opposition to war and, had it = been=20 revealed that Wilson was engaging in a secret =96 and = unconstitutional =96=20 treaty to get the U.S. into war, it would have been politically = disastrous=20 to his Administration.

George Viereck, in his book, The Strangest Friendship = in=20 History =96 Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House, said = this:

Ten months before the election, which returned Wilson = to the=20 White House because he =91kept us out of war,=92 Colonel House = negotiated a=20 secret agreement with England and France on behalf of Wilson, = which=20 pledged the United States to intervene on behalf of the Allies. = If an=20 inkling of the conversation between Colonel House and the = leaders of=20 England and France had reached the American people before the = election,=20 it might have caused incalculable reverberations in public=20 opinion.^[8]=

How did they do it? How did these wolves in sheep=92s = clothing=20 maneuver the United States into war? It was not easy, and it came = about=20 only after extensive planning. The first plan was to offer the = United=20 State as a negotiator between both sides of the conflict. They = would=20 position the U.S. as the great peacemaker. But the goal was just = the=20 opposite of peace. They would make an offer to both sides that = they knew=20 would not be acceptable to Germany. Then, when the Germans = rejected the=20 offer, they would be portrayed in the press as the bad guys, the = ones who=20 wanted to continue the war. This is how the plan was described by=20 Ambassador Page in his memoirs. He said:

Colonel House arrived =85 full of the idea of American=20 intervention. First his plan was that he and I and a group of = the=20 British cabinet =85 should at once work out a minimum programme = of=20 peace=97the least that the Allies would accept, which he = assumed would=20 be unacceptable to the Germans; and that the President would = take=20 this programme and present it to both sides; the side that = declined=20 would be responsible for continuing the war=85. Of course the = fatal moral=20 weakness of the foregoing scheme is that we should plunge into = the War,=20 not on the merits of the cause, but by a carefully sprung=20 trick.^[9]=

AGGRAVATE, INSULATE, = FACILITATE

The trick eventually evolved into something far more = dramatic than=20 peace negotiations. It called for three strategies in one. They = were:=20 aggravate, insulate, and facilitate.

The first stage was to aggravate the Germans into an = attack,=20 literally to goad them until they had no choice but to strike = back. Much=20 of this was implemented from the British side. Churchill = established the=20 policy of ramming German submarines. Prior to that, there was a = code of=20 naval warfare called the Cruiser Rules requiring that, when a = warship=20 challenged an unarmed merchant ship, it would fire a shot across = its bow.=20 The merchant ship would be expected to stop its engines and it = would be=20 given time for the crew to get into lifeboats before the ship was = sunk. It=20 was a small humanitarian gesture in the middle of warfare. That is = the way=20 it was done until Churchill, as Lord of the Admiralty, ordered all = merchant ships, regardless of circumstances, to steam full speed = directly=20 toward German submarines in an attempt to ram and sink them. This=20 eliminated the distinction between merchant ships and war ships. = From then=20 on, all merchant ships had to be considered as war ships, and = Germany=20 abandoned the policy of firing warning shots.

When that happened, those seeking to bring the United = States in the=20 war had a heyday. Editorializing through the British and American = press,=20 they said: =93See how evil these Germans are? They sink unarmed = ships and=20 don=92t even give the crews a chance to get off! It is our moral = duty to=20 fight against such evil.=94

Churchill ordered British ships to remove their names = from the=20 hulls and to fly the flags of neutral nations, especially the = American=20 flag, so the submarine captains couldn=92t tell what nationality = the ships=20 really were. He wanted Germans to torpedo American ships by = accident. It=20 was his strategy to do whatever possible to bring the United = States into=20 war, and the sinking of an American ship would be an excellent way = of=20 doing so.^[10]

There was plenty of goading from the America side as = well. The=20 United States government consistently violated its own neutrality = laws by=20 allowing war materials to be sent to Britain and France. Munitions = and all=20 kinds of military-related supplies were blatantly shipped on a = regular=20 basis. In fact, the Lusitania, on the day it was sunk, was loaded = with=20 military arsenal. The Germans knew all along that this was going = on. The=20 people in Washington knew it as well. By openly violating their = own=20 neutrality laws, they were doing everything possible to aggravate = Germany=20 into an attack.

The second prong of the strategy was to insulate. = That means=20 to insulate the victims from information that would have allowed = them to=20 protect themselves. You can=92t have a surprise attack if you warn = the=20 victims in advance. It was important not to let any of the = Lusitania=20 passengers know that the ship was carrying war materials and was = likely to=20 be sunk. They could not be allowed to know that several of its = decks,=20 normally assigned to passenger quarters, had been cleared out and = loaded=20 with military-related supplies, including ammunition and explosive = primers. They could not be informed that they would be riding on a = floating ammunition depot.

The German embassy tried to warn American civilians not = to book=20 passage on that ship. They placed an advertisement in fifty = newspapers,=20 mostly along the eastern seaboard, warning that the = Lusitania would=20 be in danger, that it was heading into hostile waters, and that = Americans=20 should not be on board. The U.S. State Department contacted all = fifty of=20 those newspapers and ordered them not to publish the ad. They = threatened=20 the publishers that they would be in dire trouble with the = government if=20 they did. There was only one newspaper, in Des Moines Iowa, that = had the=20 guts to go ahead and run the ad anyway =96 which is why we know = about it=20 today. Unfortunately, an ad in Des Moines was of small value to = the people=20 in New York who were actually boarding the ship.

SINK THE LUSITANIA!

The third prong of the strategy was to facilitate. = That=20 means to make it easy for the enemy to strike and be successful. = On the=20 morning of the sinking of the Lusitania, Colonel House was = in=20 Britain and recorded in his diaries that he spoke with Sr. Edward = Gray and=20 King George. They calmly discussed what they thought the reaction = of the=20 American people would be if the Lusitania were to be = =93accidentally=94=20 sunk. This is what Colonel House wrote: =93I told Sir Gray if this = were=20 done, a flame of indignation would sweep America which would in = itself=20 carry us into the war.=94

Four hours after that conversation, the Lusitania = entered=20 the war zone where German submarines were known to be active. = Designed and=20 built by the British to be converted into a ship of war, if = necessary, she=20 had four boilers, was very fast, and could outrun a submarine. = That means=20 she was vulnerable only to subs that were ahead of her path, not = those to=20 the side or behind. This greatly improved her chances for = survival,=20 especially with a military escort running ahead. However, this was = not to=20 be her destiny. On this voyage she had been ordered to turn off = one of her=20 boilers. She was running on three turbines instead of four. At = only 75%=20 speed, she was now vulnerable to attack from all sides.

The Juno was a British destroyer that had been = assigned to=20 escort her through those dangerous waters. At the last minute, the = Juno=20 was called back by the British Admiralty and never made its=20 rendezvous.

Inevitably, the Lusitania, running at reduced = speed, and=20 without protection, pulled into the periscope view of the U-20 = German=20 submarine. One torpedo was fired directly mid center. There was a = mighty=20 explosion. As the Germans were preparing for the second torpedo, = much to=20 their surprise, there was a second explosion, and the whole bottom = of the=20 ship blew out. Exploration of the wreckage in later years shows = that it=20 was an outward explosion. Something inside blew up with a = tremendous=20 force, and the great ship sank in less than eighteen = minutes.

The strategists finally had their cause. This was the = dastardly=20 deed of those warmongering Germans who were sinking passenger = ships with=20 innocent civilians on board.

The flame of indignation was ignited and eventually it = did=20 sweep America into war on April 16, 1917. Eight days later, = Congress=20 authorized $1 billion of taxpayer money to be sent to Britain and = France=20 to assist in the war effort. The next day, the first $200 million = was sent=20 to Britain and immediately applied to the Morgan debt. A few days = later,=20 $100 million was sent to France, and the same thing happened. It = was=20 applied to the Morgan debt. By the end of the war, $9.5 billion = had been=20 sent to the Allies and applied to the Morgan Debt. We must add to = that the=20 infinitely higher cost of American blood sacrificed on the alter = of=20 collectivism in a war supposedly to make the world =93safe for=20 democracy.=94

It=92s a twist of irony that the world really was = made safe=20 for democracy =96 when one realizes that the word democracy is a = synonym for=20 one of the pillars of collectivism. It is the embodiment of the = concept=20 that the group is more important than the individual, and it is = that=20 rationale that allowed Round Table members on both sides of the = Atlantic=20 to plot the death of innocent civilians as a small price to pay = for the=20 greater good of the greater number.

WORLD WAR II

We are back in our time machine now and find ourselves at = the=20 beginning of World War II. The parallels to World War I are = striking.=20 Britain, again, was losing the war with Germany. The president of = the=20 United States, again, was a collectivist surrounded by Fabians and = Leninists. The primary difference was that the center of gravity = in the=20 CFR was swinging away from the Morgan group and toward the = Rockefeller=20 group. Other than that, things were pretty much the same. Colonel = House=20 was still a presidential advisor, but his rooms at the White House = now=20 were occupied by Harry Hopkins. Hopkins was not a collectivist = agent of=20 the Fabians; he was a collectivist agent of the Soviets. The = American=20 people were still opposed to war; and, once again, there were = secret=20 arrangements at the highest levels of government to maneuver the = United=20 States into war without the voters suspecting it. The strategy was = to get=20 the Axis powers to strike first, all the while convincing the = American=20 people that their leaders were opposed to war. It was almost an = exact=20 repeat of the ploy used in World War I.

On October 30, 1941, in a campaign speech in Boston, FDR = made this=20 amazing statement: =93And while I am talking to you mothers and = fathers, I=20 will give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I = shall say=20 it again and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent = into any=20 foreign wars.=94 FDR repeated that pledge many times, all the = while working=20 behind the scenes to get the United States into = war.

The President=92s speechwriter at that time was Robert = Sherwood, who=20 later became a famous author and playwright. On this topic, = Sherwood said:=20 =93Unfortunately for my own conscience, I happened at the time to = be one of=20 those who urged him to go the limit on this, feeling as I did, = that any=20 risk of future embarrassment was negligible as compared to the = risk of=20 losing the election.=94 Sherwood said that, while they were = discussing the=20 contradiction between the President=92s words and his deeds, = Roosevelt=20 replied: =93Of course, we=92ll fight if we=92re attacked. If = someone attacks us,=20 then it isn=92t a foreign war, is it?=94^[11]

As FDR was delivering this calculated deception to the = voters, the=20 American and British military staffs were meeting secretly in = Washington=20 D.C., working out the details of a joint strategy. They planned, = not only=20 how to get the United States into the war, but how to conduct the = war=20 afterward. The resulting agreement was called the ABC-1. It was=20 incorporated into a Navy war plan and given the code name Rainbow = Number=20 Five. We now have a great deal of information on this plan = although, at=20 the time, it was highly secret. The key for getting into the war = was to=20 maneuver the Axis powers to strike first to make it look like the = U.S. was=20 an innocent victim. Their first hope was that Germany would = attack. If=20 that didn=92t work, the fallback plan was to provoke = Japan.

This policy was summarized in a memorandum to FDR by = Admiral Stark,=20 Chief of Naval Operations. He said:

It would be very desirable to enter the war under = circumstances=20 in which Germany were the aggressor and in which case Japan = might then=20 be able to remain neutral. However, on the whole, it is my = opinion that=20 the United States should enter the war against Germany as soon = as=20 possible, even if hostilities with Japan must be accepted=85. = The sooner=20 we get in the better.^[12]

In an effort to provoke an attack from Germany, FDR sent = U.S. Naval=20 ships to escort British convoys carrying war supplies, knowing = that they=20 would be targets for German submarine attack. When Germany refused = to take=20 the bait, he ordered U.S. ships to actually get into the middle of = sea=20 battles between British and German war ships. The strategy was = simple. If=20 you walk into the middle of a barroom brawl, the chances of = getting=20 slugged are pretty good.^[13]

On October 17, 1941, an American destroyer, the USS = Kearny, rushed=20 to assist a British convoy near Iceland that was under attack by = German=20 submarines. It took a torpedo hit and was badly damaged. Ten days = later,=20 FDR delivered his annual Navy Day speech in Washington and=20 said:

We have wished to avoid shooting, but the shooting has = started, and=20 history has recorded who has fired the first shot. In the long = run,=20 however, all that will matter is who fired the last shot. America = has been=20 attacked. The U.S.S. Kearny is not just a Navy ship. She belongs = to every=20 man, woman, and child in this nation=85. Hitler=92s torpedo was = directed at=20 every American.^[14]

When it became known that the Kearny had aggressively = sought=20 combat, the public lost interest, and FDR dropped the rhetoric. It = was=20 time to involve Japan, and it was clear that the drama had to = involve more=20 than one ship.

MANEUVERING THE JAPANESE INTO FIRING = THE FIRST=20 SHOT

The Secretary of War at that time was Henry Stimson, a = member of=20 the CFR. In his diaries he said:

In spite of the risk involved, however, in letting the = Japanese=20 fire the first shot, we realized that, in order to have the full = support=20 of the American people, it was desirable to make sure that the = Japanese=20 be the ones to do this so that there could be no doubt in = anyone=92s mind=20 as to who were the aggressors=85. The question was, how 9 we = should=20 maneuver them into firing the first shot without allowing too = much=20 damage to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition. ^[15]

How was it done? It was accomplished exactly as in World = War I:=20 aggravate, facilitate, insulate. Aggravate the enemy into = an=20 attack. Facilitate his attack to make it easy with no opposition. = Insulate=20 the victims from any knowledge that would allow them to escape = their=20 fate.

For many years, the government denied any knowledge of = the=20 impending Japanese attack. But, gradually, the pieces of the = puzzle began=20 to bubble up out of the mire of secrecy and, one by one, they have = been=20 assembled into a clear picture of the most monstrous coverup one = can=20 possibly imagine. The smoking gun was discovered in 1995. Author = Robert=20 Stinnett found a memo in the Navy Archives written by Lt. = Commander Arthur=20 McCollum, who was assigned to Naval Intelligence. The memo was = dated=20 October 7, 1940. It was directed to two of FDR=92s top naval = advisors:=20 Captain Dudley Knox and Capt. Walter Anderson, who was head of = Naval=20 Intelligence. This memo was approved by both men and forwarded to = FDR for=20 action. The full text is now public information, and a photo of it = appears=20 in Stinnett=92s book, Day of Deceit; The Truth about FDR and = Peal=20 Harbor.^[16]

The McCollum memorandum contained an eight-point plan of = action to=20 implement a two-point strategy. The two points were: (1) Aggravate = Japan=20 into a military strike as a matter of economic necessity and = national=20 honor on her part; and (2) Facilitate the attack by not = interfering with=20 Japan=92s preparations and by making the target as vulnerable as = possible.=20 At the conclusion of the last point of strategy, the memorandum = said: =93If=20 by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, = so much=20 the better.=94^[17]

The necessity to insulate the victims from any = foreknowledge of the=20 attack was not mentioned in the memorandum, but it was not = necessary to do=20 so. Obviously, this plan could not succeed if the targeted victims = were=20 warned in advance. So, once again, there was the familiar = strategy:=20 aggravate, facilitate, and insulate.

Was Japan aggravated into an attack? Consider these = facts. The sale=20 of critical goods from the United States to Japan was suddenly = embargoed;=20 commerce was brought to a standstill; Japan=92s access to oil from = the Dutch=20 East Indies was crippled by U.S. diplomatic pressure on the Dutch=20 government; the U.S. closed off the Panama Canal to Japanese = ships; and=20 Japan=92s major assets in the United States were seized by the = government.=20 In other words, the strategy advanced by Lt. Commander McCollum = was=20 followed in every detail. There was a deliberate assault against = Japan=92s=20 economy and an insult to her national honor. A military response = was=20 predictable. The only question was when.

This is not to suggest that the Japanese imperial = government was=20 blameless in this matter or that it was an innocent victim of=20 circumstances. It was, after all, in Asia and the Pacific it was = engaged=20 in a massive, regional war of aggression and territorial = expansion.=20

This was the logical consequence of its ideology of = barbarism in=20 which might makes right. However, we must not lose sight of the = role=20 played by American leaders embracing the ideology of collectivism. = It was=20 a case of one totalitarian ideology goading another totalitarian = ideology=20 into a war that supposedly would lead to the greater good of the = greater=20 number.

MAKING PEARL HARBOR AN EASY = TARGET

Was Japan facilitated in the attack? There is = massive=20 evidence to support that conclusion, but we have time here for = only a few=20 examples. A Japanese spy by the name of Tadashi Morimura was sent = to Pearl=20 Harbor under the cover of a phony political assignment at the = Japanese=20 embassy. The FBI knew that his real name was Takeo Yoshikawa and = that he=20 had been trained as a military officer. He had no political = experience, so=20 they knew his assignment to a political post was a cover. They=20 photographed him as he came off the ship. They tracked him = everywhere he=20 went. They bugged his telephone. They knew what he was doing every = minute=20 of the day. Often he would take a car to the top of a hill = overlooking the=20 harbor and photograph the location of ships. Then he would use a=20 clandestine radio to send coded messages to Japan giving the exact = grid=20 locations for all the ships, the times of their movements, how = many=20 soldiers and sailors were on duty, what time they reported, and = what time=20 they left the base. All of this information was clearly of = military=20 importance and pointed to the possibility of a surprise attack. = The FBI=20 wanted to arrest Yoshikawa and send him home, but the Office of = Naval=20 Intelligence intervened, with White House approval, saying: Leave = this guy=20 alone. He is our responsibility. We=92ll handle it. J. Edgar = Hoover, who was=20 head of the FBI at that time, objected strongly, and it almost = erupted=20 into a contest of inter-agency authority between the FBI and Naval = Intelligence. In the end, Naval Intelligence had its way, and = Yoshikawa=20 was allowed to continue his mission without even knowing he was = being=20 watched.^[18]

Just four days before the attack, U.S. Navy Intelligence=20 intercepted this message from Yoshikawa: =93NO CHANGE OBSERVED BY = AFTERNOON=20 OF 2 DECEMBER. SO FAR THEY DO NOT SEEM TO HAVE BEEN ALERTED. SHORE = LEAVE=20 AS USUAL.=94 On December 6, just one day before the attack, this = message was=20 intercepted: =93THERE ARE NO BARRAGE BALLOONS AT THESE PLACES =96 = AND=20 CONSIDERABLE OPPORTUNITY IS LEFT FOR A SURPRISE = ATTACK.=94^[19]

It was bizarre. Here was an enemy agent gathering = strategic=20 information in preparation for a surprise attack on American = forces, and=20 people at the highest levels of the United States government were=20 protecting him. They deliberately allowed the flow of information = to=20 continue so the Japanese would be successful in their = mission.

VACANT SEAS POLICY

Another example of facilitating the attack on Pearl = Harbor is what=20 was called the Vacant Seas Policy. For many months, the Navy had = known=20 from what direction the Japanese were likely to approach, what sea = corridor they would use to launch their attack. They even had = conducted=20 maneuvers simulating it themselves. One was called Exercise 191 = and the=20 other OPORD1. Because of weather patterns, sea currents, location = of=20 commercial ship lanes, demand on fuel supplies, and other factors, = they=20 knew that the Japanese would approach from the North Pacific Ocean = in an=20 operational area between 157 and 158 degrees west = longitude.^[20]

This presented a special challenge. If the crew of any = ship had=20 seen a Japanese armada steaming toward Hawaii, they undoubtedly = would have=20 used the radio to send word ahead. They would have said: =93Hey, = there=92s=20 something going on here. There=92s a fleet of aircraft carriers = and=20 destroyers heading your way.=94 That, of course, would have = spoiled=20 everything. Also, if the Japanese knew that their approach had = been=20 detected, they would have lost the advantage of surprise and might = have=20 aborted their plan.

American intelligence was well aware of every stage of = Japanese=20 preparations. It was already known that Admiral Nagumo was = outfitting his=20 carrier strike force at Hitokappu Bay on the Japanese island of = Etorofu.=20 His progress was monitored closely, and daily reports were sent to = Washington. His ships departed from Japan and headed for Pearl = Harbor on=20 November 25.^[21]

Within hours, Navy headquarters in Washington initiated = the Vacant=20 Seas directive that all military and commercial ships must now = stay out of=20 the North Pacific corridor. They were diverted hundreds of miles = on a=20 trans-Pacific route through the Torres Straits so there would be = no=20 encounter that might alert the intended victims or cause the = Japanese to=20 abort their mission.^[22]

The next stage in the strategy was to bring the ships of = the 7th=20 Fleet home from sea duty and bottle them up inside Pearl Harbor. = That=20 would make them easy targets because they couldn=92t maneuver. To = accomplish=20 this over the strong objection of Admiral Kimmel, who was in = charge of the=20 Fleet, his superiors in Washington cut back on deliveries of fuel. = Without=20 fuel, Kimmel had no choice. He had to curtail training exercises = at sea=20 and bring his ships back into port. In his memoirs, published in = 1955, he=20 said:

Shortly after I organized the Fleet in three major task = forces, I=20 attempted to keep two of the three forces at sea and only one at = Peal=20 Harbor. I quickly found that fuel deliveries were falling behind = consumption. The reserves were being depleted at a time when it = was=20 imperative to increase them. It was this fact, and this alone, = which=20 made it necessary to have two task forces simultaneously in = Pearl=20 Harbor.^[23]

A Congressional investigation in 1946 revealed that, just = a few=20 days before the attack, Navy headquarters in Washington ordered = twenty-one=20 of the most modern ships in the 7^th Fleet=20 to leave Pearl Harbor and deploy at Wake and Midway Islands. The = aircraft=20 carriers, Lexington and Enterprise were among those = ships.=20 This not only left the remaining Fleet with drastically reduced=20 protection, it also meant that the ships anchored in the harbor = were=20 primarily old relics from World War I, many of which were already = slated=20 to be scrapped. As Secretary of War Stimson had stated in his = diaries:=20 =93The question was, how we should maneuver them into firing the = first shot=20 without allowing too much damage to ourselves.=94 = Sacrificing only=20 the old and marginally useful ships was the solution to that=20 problem.^{[24]

INTERCEPTED CODED =
MESSAGES}

Were the victims at Pear Harbor insulated from = information=20 that might have allowed them to protect themselves? Could those = thousands=20 of Americans who lost their lives been alerted in time to take = defensive=20 action? Or were they deliberately sacrificed because their deaths = were=20 needed to create the emotional drama to justify going to war? The = answer=20 to that question is not a pleasant one.

Throughout this time, the Japanese were using a = combination of=20 military and diplomatic codes. U.S. intelligence agencies had = cracked all=20 of them.^{[25]According=20
to Homer Kisner, who was Chief of the Pacific Fleet=92s =
Radio-Intercept=20
team, his men intercepted and decoded more than a million of those =

messages.^{[26]=20
For three months prior to the allegedly surprise attack, Navy =
Intelligence=20
knew everything in minute detail. Yet, not one of those messages =
was ever=20
sent to the commanders at Pearl Harbor.^{[27]=20
In his memoirs, Admiral Kimmel said:}}}

At Pearl Harbor, General Short and I knew only a small = part of=20 the political story behind the Japanese attack. Care was taken = not to=20 send us the intercepted Japanese messages, which told in great = detail=20 each step in the Japanese program=85. For three months prior to = the attack=20 on the fleet a wealth of vital information received in = Washington was=20 withheld from the commanders in Hawaii. The information received = during=20 the ten days preceding the attack clearly pointed to the fleet = at Pearl=20 Harbor as the Japanese objective, yet not one word of warning = and none=20 of this information was given to the Hawaii = commanders.^[28]

The most important intercept of the Japanese coded = messages was=20 obtained on the night before the attack. That message made clear = even the=20 exact hour that the strike would come. It was to be 1:00 PM = Washington=20 time. The intercept was decoded 61⁄2 hours before that. It = was rushed to=20 President Roosevelt and his top military advisors for immediate = action.=20 Their response was to do absolutely nothing. They sat on it and=20 deliberately let the clock run out.^[29]

The military Chief of Staff at that time was General = George=20 Marshall, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Marshall = claimed=20 that he was on horseback that morning, riding in the park. The = reason he=20 did not take immediate action, he said, was that he didn=92t know = about the=20 intercept until he arrived at his office at 11:25 A.M. However, = even then=20 he still had 11⁄2 hours before the attack. He could have = picked up the=20 telephone and spoken to the Hawaii commanders directly. He could = have used=20 any one of several military radio systems designed for exactly = such kinds=20 of urgent communications, but he did none of those things. = According to=20 witnesses, he read and re-read the intercept and shuffled the = paper from=20 one side of his desk to the other while another half hour ticked = away.=20 Then, at 11:52, he finally sent a warning to the commanders at = Pearl=20 Harbor. The method? It was a commercial telegram sent through = Western=20 Union! It arrived six hours after the attack!^[30]

AN ACT OF STATESMANSHIP

For many years after World War II, Roosevelt=92s admirers = denied that=20 neither he nor anyone in his administration had prior knowledge; = but the=20 evidence now is so clear that he even facilitated the attack, no = one tries=20 to deny it anymore. The new line of defense is that he was = justified in=20 doing so. It was an act of great statesmanship, you see, because,=20 otherwise, Europe would have been overrun by Hitler and, = eventually, even=20 the United States might have been attacked. Furthermore, we had a = moral=20 obligation to come to the aid of our British and French=20 brethren.^{[31]=20
It took great courage and wisdom, they say, for Roosevelt to =
foresee this=20
and confront totalitarianism before it became stronger. The =
American=20
people were too stupid to realize how important it was. They were =
too=20
ignorant to understand. They were too isolationist in their =
thinking to=20
realize they must accept a leadership role in the affairs of the =
world.=20
So, what is a collectivist to do? You can=92t leave it to the =
ignorant=20
voters to decide such important matters. There was no choice but =
to lie,=20
to deceive the American people, and ruin the careers of loyal =
military=20
officers by making them scapegoats. We had to violate our =
Constitution and=20
our laws.^{[32]=20
It was statesmanship to kill thousands of Americans in order to =
bring the=20
stupid voters to the correct point of view. Don=92t you see? The =
only way to=20
stop totalitarianism in Europe was to establish =
totalitarianism in=20
America.}}

Even Robert Stinnett, the man who found the McCollum = memorandum,=20 succumbed to this insane argument. In the preface of his book, he = wrote:=20 =93As a veteran of the Pacific War, I felt a sense of outrage as I = uncovered=20 secrets that had been hidden from Americans for more than fifty = years. But=20 I understood the agonizing dilemma faced by President Roosevelt. = He was=20 forced to find circuitous means to persuade an isolationist = America to=20 join in a fight for freedom.=94^[33]

One of the men who made sure that Admiral Kimmel and = General Short=20 never knew about the decoded Japanese messages was Lieutenant = Commander=20 Joseph Rochefort, head of the Navy=92s Mid-Pacific Radio = Intelligence=20 Network. Rochefort got right to the point. He said: =93It was a = pretty cheap=20 price to pay for unifying the country.=94^[34]

Listen well, Ladies and Gentlemen. That is the voice of=20 collectivism: 2,388 people killed, another 1,178 wounded^{[35]=96=20
mostly Americans =96and it=92s a pretty cheap price to pay for =
unifying the=20
country. Anything can be justified merely by claiming that it is =
the=20
greater good for the greater number.^[36]}

As it was in WWI, the American leaders in World War II = also were=20 focused far beyond the war itself. Even before Pearl Harbor, = Fabians and=20 Leninists were drafting the structure for a world government. It = was to be=20 called the United Nations; and, at the end of the conflict, it = would be=20 offered to a war-weary world as =93our last best hope for = peace.=94 Most of=20 this work was done in the State Department Post-War Foreign Policy = Planning Division, under the direction of Alger Hiss, who actually = was in=20 both camps at the same time. Not only was he an advisor to FDR and = a=20 former President of the Carnegie Endowment Fund (which puts him = squarely=20 in the Fabian camp), he also was an undercover agent for the = Soviets. Hiss=20 was the man who personally delivered the newly drafted UN Charter = to the=20 founding meeting of the United Nations in San Francisco, and he = became the=20 first Secretary General of that organization. If you are wondering = about=20 the significance of these facts, it is this: After smashing the = world to=20 bits in world war for the second time, the UN became the = collectivist=20 blueprint for remolding it to the heart=92s desire.

OPERATION MONGOOSE

In a moment, our time machine will deliver us to the year = 2002 and=20 the War on Terrorism; but along the way, we must make a short stop = at the=20 year 1962. The exact date is August 8. It is sixteen months after = the=20 Kennedy Administration had been embarrassed by a botched invasion = of Cuba=20 at the Bay of Pigs. We find ourselves now at the Pentagon, in the = offices=20 of General Lyman Lemnitzer who is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs = of=20 Staff. We are watching as the general signs a top-secret document = destined=20 for the Secretary of Defense who, at this time is Robert McNamara, = a=20 member of the CFR. The most important part of this document is = contained=20 in the Appendix to Enclosure A, and the subject line of that = section=20 reads: Justification for US Military Intervention in = Cuba.

In the eight pages that follow, there is a detailed = proposal for a=20 covert military action called =93Operation Mongoose.=94 Its = purpose is to=20 create an acceptable justification for the United States to invade = Cuba.=20 The preferred scenario is to convince the Cuban government that it = is=20 about to be attacked and, thereby, goad it into some kind of = military=20 action, which then could be pointed to as aggression against the = U.S. It=20 is the old, familiar strategy to AGGRAVATE an opponent into a = first=20 strike. If that should fail, the secondary scenario is to stage = phony=20 attacks against the American base in Guantanamo and against = civilian=20 commercial aircraft, making it look like the work of the Cuban = military.=20 The strategy also calls for a U.S. fighter pilot to fake being = attacked by=20 Cuban MIGs and to radio that he has been hit and is going down. = Then he is=20 to fly to a secret installation where the tail number of his plane = will be=20 changed so the plane genuinely will be missing from the roster. = Meanwhile,=20 a U.S. submarine is to disperse aircraft parts and a parachute = into the=20 waters near Cuba where they will eventually be found by search and = rescue=20 teams.

In addition to these phony attacks, covert agents are to = launch=20 real terrorist attacks against civilians in Miami and Washington = DC =96 with=20 genuine casualties. The plan is to make the U.S. appear to be a = victim of=20 unprovoked attacks by a ruthless enemy, and this will prepare = world=20 opinion to accept an all-out invasion of Cuba as justified=20 retaliation.

As we stand here listening to the details of this plan, = we would=20 find it impossible to believe that such treachery is actually = being=20 contemplated by high-ranking U.S. military officers =96 were it = not for the=20 fact that we are looking at the document with our own eyes. By the = way,=20 Operation Mongoose has since been de-classified as a result of the = Freedom-of- Information Act and, if you want to read it for = yourself, it=20 can be downloaded from the National Archives web site. ^[37]=20 Here are a few excerpts taken from that document:

This plan =85 should be developed to focus all efforts = on a=20 specific ultimate objective which would provide adequate = justification=20 for US military intervention. Such a plan would enable a logical = build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly = unrelated=20 events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the = necessary=20 impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large = scale,=20 directed at other countries as well as the United States=85. The = desired=20 resultant from the execution of this plan would be to place the = United=20 States in the apparent position of suffering defensible = grievances from=20 a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an=20 international image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western=20 Hemisphere=85.

1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate = provocation as=20 the basis for US military intervention in Cuba, a cover and = deception=20 plan =85 could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban = reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the = Cubans of=20 imminent invasion would be emphasized=85.

2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be = planned to take=20 place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine appearance of = being done=20 by hostile Cuban forces.

a.=20 Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in chronological = order):

Start=20 rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.

Land=20 friendly Cubans in uniform =93over-the-fence=94 to stage = attack on=20 base.

Capture=20 Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the base.

Stage riots=20 near the base main gate (friendly Cubans).

Blow up=20 ammunition inside the base; start fires.

Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).=20
Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base. = Some damage=20 to installation.=20

Capture=20 assault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of = Guantanamo=20 City.

Capture militia group which storms the base. =
Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires =96 = napathalene.=20
Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals = for=20 mockvictims=85.

3. A=20 =93Remember the Main=94 incident could be arranged in several=20 forms:

a.=20 We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame=20 Cuba.

b.=20 We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the = Cuban=20 waters. =85 The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely = investigating=20 the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence = that the=20 ship was taken under attack=85. The US could follow up with an = air/sea=20 rescue operation covered by US fighters to =93evacuate=94 = remaining=20 members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists in US = newspapers=20 would cause a helpful wave of national=20 indignation.

4. We=20 could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami = area, in=20 other Florida cities and even in Washington. The terror campaign = could=20 be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking haven in the United States. = We=20 could sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida (real or = simulated).=20 We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the = United States=20 even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely=20 publicized=85.

5. Use=20 of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide additional = provocation.=20 Harassment of civil air, attacks on surface shipping and = destruction of=20 US military drone aircraft by MIG type planes would be useful as = complementary actions. An F- 86 properly painted would convince = air=20 passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of = the=20 transport were to announce such = fact=85.

In action item number eight, Operation Mongoose proposed = an=20 incident designed to convince the world that Cuban MIGs had shot = down a=20 civilian commercial aircraft as it flew near Cuba on its way from = the=20 United States to someplace in South America. It was to be a = chartered=20 flight utilizing one of the air services in the Miami area that = are=20 secretly operated by the CIA. An aircraft at Elgin Air Force Base = was to=20 be painted and numbered as an exact replica of the commercial = craft. The=20 duplicate would be substituted for the original and loaded with = passengers=20 who were carefully selected government operatives using false = names. The=20 original aircraft would be converted to a drone and flown by = remote=20 control. Both planes would rendezvous south of Florida. The = document=20 continues:

From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying = aircraft will=20 descend to minimum altitude and go directly into an auxiliary = field at=20 Elgin AFB where arrangements will have been made to evacuate the = passengers and return the aircraft to its original status. The = drone=20 aircraft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. = When over=20 Cuba, the drone will be transmitting on the international = distress=20 frequency a =93MAY DAY=94 message stating he is under attack by = Cuban MIG=20 aircraft. The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of = the=20 aircraft which will be triggered by radio signal. This will = allow ICAO=20 radio stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what has = happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to =93sell=94 = the=20 incident.

The blueprint for Operation MONGOOSE is much too long to = quote in=20 its entirety, but I think this gives you a pretty good idea of its = nature.=20 Even though the plan was never put into action, the fact that it = was even=20 theorized and sent to the Secretary of Defense with a = recommendation for=20 consideration is highly significant. Some will say that plans like = this=20 should be of no concern to us. They are just paper war games, and = military=20 people are expected to dream up all sorts of scenarios to cover = every=20 conceivable event so as to have a prepared response ahead of time = no=20 matter what happens. That may be true, but Operation Mongoose is = not in=20 that category. It is not a plan to react to an aggressive move by = a=20 potential enemy. It is a plan to be the aggressor, and to conceal = that=20 fact from the world. It undoubtedly was justified by the argument = that=20 Communist Cuba is a threat to the security of the American people, = and=20 whatever it takes to eliminate that threat is acceptable. It is a = classic=20 example of collectivist morality, a philosophy that declares = anything to=20 be ethical so long as it can be said to be for the greater good of = the=20 greater number.

Communism in Cuba or anywhere else should be opposed = because it is=20 the embodiment of collectivism. However, if we oppose the Cuban = brand of=20 collectivism by accepting an American brand of collectivism, we = will lose=20 the war for freedom, and we will do it to ourselves. We will not = be=20 conquered by enemies from abroad, but we will be enslaved by = enemies from=20 within.

1 Philip Dru, Administrator (New = York: Angriff=20 Press, 1912) p. 45.

2 Ibid., pp. 199, 200.

3 It must be remembered that Philip = Dru was=20 published in 1912. The U.S. income tax and Federal Reserve System = were=20 then in the drafting stages and being promoted by House, Wilson, = J.P.=20 Morgan, and other collectivists in Washington. The income tax and = Federal=20 Reserve were passed into law the following year, 1913.

4=93The Historical Significance of the = House=20 Diary,=94 by Arthur Walworth, Yale University Library, http://www.lib= rary.yale.edu/un/house/hist_sig.htm.
Also=20 =93An Internationalist Primer,=94 by Wlliam Grigg, The New = American,=20 September 16, 1996,
http://www.thenewamerican.com/tna/1996/vo12no19/vo12no19_cfr.htm.

5 Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers = of Colonel=20 House (New York: Houghton Miffflin Co., 1926), Vol. 1,=20 p.114.

6 George Sylvester Viereck, The = Strangest=20 Friendship in History: Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House (new = York:=20 Liveright Publishers, 1932), p. 4.

7 Burton J. Hendrick, The Life and = Letters of Walter=20 H. Page (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1923), p. 11=20 (Internet edition), http:/= /www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/memoir/Page/Page%2014.htm.

8 Viereck, pp. 106=96108. This matter is = discussed in=20 The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan Vol. II. pp. = 404=96406.

9 Quoted by Viereck, pp. = 112=96113.

10 Churchill wrote in his memoirs: = =93The first=20 British countermove, made on my responsibility, =85 was to deter = the Germans=20 from surface attack. The submerged U-boat had to rely increasingly = on=20 underwater attack and thus ran the greater risk of mistaking = neutral for=20 British ships and of drowning neutral crews and thus embroiling = Germany=20 with other Great Powers.=94 Winston Churchill, The World Crisis = (New York:=20 Scribner=92s Sons, 1949), p. 300. This appears on page 464 of the = Barnes=20 & Noble 1993 reprint.

11 Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and = Hopkins=20 (New York: Bantam Books, 1948, 1950), Vol.1, pp. 235, = 247.

12 Sherwood, Vol. 1, p. 461.

13T.R. Fehrenbach, F.D.R.=92s Undeclared = War 1939 to=20 1941 (New York: David McKay Company, 1967), pp. = 252=96259.

14 Charles Callan Tansill, Back Door to = War=20 (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952), p. 613

15 Hearings before the Joint Committee = on the=20 Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United = States,=20 Seventy-Ninth Congress (Washington, D.C., 1946), Part 11. p. 5421, = as=20 cited by Prang. The reference is Part 11, p. 5433, as quoted by = Kimmel, p.=20 1. Also quoted by Stinnett but with no reference, p. = 179.

16 Robert B. Stinnett, Day of Deceit; = The Truth=20 about FDR and Peal Harbor (New York: Touchstone/Simon and = Schuster, 2000).=20 The McCollum memorandum is on pp. 272=96277.

17 Stinnett, p. 275.

18 For the complete story, see Stinnett, = pp. 83=96118.=20 Also John Toland, Infamy (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1982), = pp. 59,=20 60.

19Stinnett, pp. 85, 109. Also Toland, p. = 300.

20 Stinnett, p. 146.

21 Stinnett, pp.43=9659.

22 Stinnett, pp. 44, 144, = 145.

23 Admiral Kimmel=92s Story, p. = 28.

24 Stinnett, pp. 152, 153. 12

25 John Toland, Infamy (New York: = Doubleday &=20 Co., 1982), pp. 57, 58. Also Stinnett, pp. 21=9623.

26 Stinnett, p. 58.

27 There was a serious disagreement = between Admiral=20 Richard Turner and his staff over this very issue. When Captain = Alan Kirk,=20 Chief of Naval Intelligence, objected to withholding the = intercepted=20 messages from Kimmel and Short, he was relieved of his command. = See=20 Toland, pp. 57=9660.

28 Kimmel, pp. 2,3.

29 The man who personally delivered the = final=20 message to FDR in the White House was Captain Beardall, the = President=92s=20 Naval Attach=E9. According to Beardall, FDR read the intercept = and, in spite=20 of the 1 P.M. deadline, showed no alarm. (See Hearings on Pearl = Harbor=20 Attack, Part 11, p. 5287 ff. as cited by Stinnett, p. 233.) This = was a=20 foretaste of President Bush=92s lack of alarm when he received = information=20 that the second plane had crashed into the Twin Towers on = 9-11.

30 Stinnett, pp. 225=96237. Also Toland, = pp. 10,=20 11.

31 That part is true, but it was an = individual moral=20 obligation, not a group obligation. In other words, anyone who = felt deeply=20 about this was perfectly free to go to Europe and volunteer for = the=20 British or French armies or to organize a volunteer American = brigade, but=20 no one had the right to use force of law to conscript others into = the=20 American armed services and send them into battle for that = purpose. It is=20 important to note that none of the master planners of this infamy = ever=20 felt a moral obligation to put themselves into combat. That honor = was=20 reserved for others.

32 Unfortunately, it is sometimes = necessary to=20 ignore laws in time of war, especially in the heat of battle, but = the=20 purpose of these deeds was not to win a war, it was to get into a = war. The=20 difference is as night unto day.

33 Stinnett, p. xiii. It is undoubtedly = because of=20 this message that Stinnett=92s book was accepted for publication = by Simon=20 and Schuster and given wide distribution. Readers of the = author=92s book,=20 The Creature from Jekyll Island; A Second Look at the Federal=20 Reserve, will recall a parallel situation in which Simon and = Schuster=20 published Secrets of the Temple, by William Greider. = Greider did an=20 excellent job of critiquing the Federal Reserve but, when it came = to=20 offering a solution, his message basically was to relax and forget = about=20 it. The Fed, he said, had made plenty of mistakes in the past, but = no=20 sweeping reforms are needed. All we need, he said, are wiser men = to run=20 it. It makes no difference if you expose a corrupt monetary system = if your=20 solution is to do nothing about it. And it makes no difference if = you=20 expose the infamy at Pearl Harbor if your conclusion is that it = was an act=20 of statesmanship. Collectivists do not care about how much the = public=20 knows if they have no realistic plan of action to bring about = change. That=20 is why they offer false leaders (including authors) who will point = with=20 alarm at the problems of collectivism but then lead exactly=20 nowhere.

34 The Reminiscences of Captain Joseph = J. Rochefort=20 (US Naval Institute Oral History Division, 1970), p. 163, as = quoted by=20 Stennett, p. 203.

35 Determining the Facts, Chart 1: = December 7, 1941=20 losses,=20 = http://www.cr.nps.gov/nr/twhp/wwwlps/lessons/18arizona/18charts1.htm.=20

36 A significant portion of the = financial support=20 for Nazi industry, including military production, came from Wall = Street=20 investment houses controlled by CFR members and others who shared = their=20 collectivist mindset. For this part of the history, see the = author=92s=20 World without Cancer; The Story of Vitamin B17, Part II = (available=20 from www.realityzone.com). When it is realized how those = collectivists in=20 the United States who were beating the war drums against Hitler = were also=20 heavily investing in the Nazi war machine, it becomes even more = clear that=20 the war was not about stopping Hitler. It was about smashing the = world to=20 bits so it could be remolded to the heart=92s desire. It is sad to = realize=20 that hundreds of thousands of Americans gave their lives in this = war=20 thinking they were fighting for freedom; but they were betrayed by = their=20 leaders. The purpose of the war had nothing to do with freedom. It = was a=20 contest to determine which group of collectivists would dominate = the=20 world. Soldiers were pawns on the global chessboard. Their = patriotism was=20 used against them. They eagerly rushed into battle to defeat = Nazism and=20 Fascism, never suspecting they were fighting on the side of = Fabianism and=20 Leninism, forces that are essentially the same as those they=20 fought.

37 This document can be downloaded from=20 http://www.archives.gov. Click on =93Research Room,=94 then on = =93Archival=20 Research Catalog (ARC),=94 then on the ARC SEARCH button, then = type in=20 =93Northwoods=94 in the search box, then click on =93Digital = Copy=94 on entry #1.=20 The key information will be found on images 136 through=20 142.

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