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=20

January 16, 1997=20

Extended Bosnia Mission Endangers = U.S.=20 Troops

Clinton-Approved Iranian Arms Transfers Help = Turn Bosnia=20 into Militant Islamic Base

"'There is no question that the policy of getting arms into = Bosnia=20 was of great assistance in allowing the Iranians to dig in and create = good=20 relations with the Bosnian government,' a senior CIA officer told = Congress in=20 a classified deposition. 'And it is a thing we will live to regret = because=20 when they blow up some Americans, as they no doubt will before this . = . .=20 thing is over, it will be in part because the Iranians were able to = have the=20 time and contacts to establish themselves well in Bosnia.'" = ["Iran=20 Gave Bosnia Leader $500,000, CIA Alleges: Classified Report Says = Izetbegovic=20 Has Been 'Co-Opted,' Contradicting U.S. Public Assertion of Rift," = Los=20 Angeles Times, 12/31/96. Ellipses in original. Alija Izetbegovic = is the=20 Muslim president of Bosnia.]=20
"'If you read President Izetbegovic's writings, as I have, = there is=20 no doubt that he is an Islamic fundamentalist,' said a senior Western = diplomat=20 with long experience in the region. 'He is a very nice fundamentalist, = but he=20 is still a fundamentalist. This has not changed. His goal is to = establish a=20 Muslim state in Bosnia, and the Serbs and Croats understand this = better than=20 the rest of us.'" ["Bosnian Leader Hails Islam at Election = Rallies,"=20 New York Times, 9/2/96]=20
Introduction and Summary=20
In late 1995, President Bill Clinton dispatched some 20,000 U.S. = troops to=20 Bosnia-Hercegovina as part of a NATO-led "implementation force" (IFOR) = to=20 ensure that the warring Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian factions = complied with=20 provisions of the Dayton peace plan. [NOTE: This paper assumes the = reader is=20 acquainted with the basic facts of the Bosnian war leading to the IFOR = deployment. For background, see RPC's "Clinton Administration Ready to = Send=20 U.S. Troops to Bosnia, "9/28/95," and Legislative Notice No. = 60,=20 "Senate to Consider Several Resolutions on Bosnia," 12/12/95] Through=20 statements by Administration spokesmen, notably Defense Secretary = Perry and=20 Joint Chiefs Chairman General Shalikashvili, the president firmly = assured=20 Congress and the American people that U.S. personnel would be out of = Bosnia at=20 the end of one year. Predictably, as soon as the November 1996 = election was=20 safely behind him, President Clinton announced that approximately = 8,500 U.S.=20 troops would be remaining for another 18 months as part of a = restructured and=20 scaled down contingent, the "stabilization force" (SFOR), officially=20 established on December 20, 1996.=20
SFOR begins its mission in Bosnia under a serious cloud both as to = the=20 nature of its mission and the dangers it will face. While IFOR had=20 successfully accomplished its basic military task -- separating the = factions'=20 armed forces -- there has been very little progress toward other = stated goals=20 of the Dayton agreement, including political and economic = reintegration of=20 Bosnia, return of refugees to their homes, and apprehension and = prosecution of=20 accused war criminals. It is far from certain that the cease-fire that = has=20 held through the past year will continue for much longer, in light of = such=20 unresolved issues as the status of the cities of Brcko (claimed by = Muslims but=20 held by the Serbs) and Mostar (divided between nominal Muslim and = Croat=20 allies, both of which are currently being armed by the Clinton=20 Administration). Moreover, at a strength approximately one-third that = of its=20 predecessor, SFOR may not be in as strong a position to deter attacks = by one=20 or another of the Bosnian factions or to avoid attempts to involve it = in=20 renewed fighting: "IFOR forces, despite having suffered few = casualties, have=20 been vulnerable to attacks from all of the contending sides over the = year of=20 the Dayton mandate. As a second mandate [i.e., SFOR] evolves, = presumably=20 maintaining a smaller force on the ground, the deterrent effect which = has=20 existed may well become less compelling and vulnerabilities of the = troops will=20 increase." ["Military Security in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Present and = Future,"=20 Bulletin of the Atlantic Council of the United States, 12/18/96]=20
The Iranian Connection
Perhaps most threatening to the SFOR mission -- and more = importantly, to=20 the safety of the American personnel serving in Bosnia -- is the = unwillingness=20 of the Clinton Administration to come clean with the Congress and with = the=20 American people about its complicity in the delivery of weapons from = Iran to=20 the Muslim government in Sarajevo. That policy, personally approved by = Bill=20 Clinton in April 1994 at the urging of CIA Director-designate (and = then-NSC=20 chief) Anthony Lake and the U.S. ambassador to Croatia Peter = Galbraith, has,=20 according to the Los Angeles Times (citing classified = intelligence=20 community sources), "played a central role in the dramatic increase in = Iranian=20 influence in Bosnia." Further, according to the Times, in = September=20 1996 National Security Agency analysts contradicted Clinton = Administration=20 claims of declining Iranian influence, insisting instead that "Iranian = Revolutionary Guard personnel remain active throughout Bosnia." = Likewise, "CIA=20 analysts noted that the Iranian presence was expanding last fall," = with some=20 ostensible cultural and humanitarian activities "known to be fronts" = for the=20 Revolutionary Guard and Iran's intelligence service, known as VEVAK, = the=20 Islamic revolutionary successor to the Shah's SAVAK. [LAT, = 12/31/96]=20 At a time when there is evidence of increased willingness by = pro-Iranian=20 Islamic militants to target American assets abroad -- as illustrated = by the=20 June 1996 car-bombing at the Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, = that=20 killed 19 American airmen, in which the Iranian government or = pro-Iranian=20 terrorist organizations are suspected ["U.S. Focuses Bomb Probe on = Iran, Saudi=20 Dissident," Chicago Tribune, 11/4/96] -- it is irresponsible = in the=20 extreme for the Clinton Administration to gloss over the extent to = which its=20 policies have put American personnel in an increasingly vulnerable = position=20 while performing an increasingly questionable mission.=20
Three Key Issues for Examination=20
This paper will examine the Clinton policy of giving the green = light to=20 Iranian arms shipments to the Bosnian Muslims, with serious = implications for=20 the safety of U.S. troops deployed there. (In addition, RPC will = release a=20 general analysis of the SFOR mission and the Clinton Administration's = request=20 for supplemental appropriations to fund it in the near future.) = Specifically,=20 the balance of this paper will examine in detail the three issues = summarized=20 below:=20
1. The Clinton Green Light to Iranian Arms = Shipments (page=20 3): In April 1994, President Clinton gave the government of Croatia = what has=20 been described by Congressional committees as a "green light" for = shipments of=20 weapons from Iran and other Muslim countries to the Muslim-led = government of=20 Bosnia. The policy was approved at the urging of NSC chief Anthony = Lake and=20 the U.S. ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith. The CIA and the = Departments of=20 State and Defense were kept in the dark until after the decision was = made.=20
2. The Militant Islamic Network (page 5): Along = with the=20 weapons, Iranian Revolutionary Guards and VEVAK intelligence = operatives=20 entered Bosnia in large numbers, along with thousands of = mujahedin=20 ("holy warriors") from across the Muslim world. Also engaged in the = effort=20 were several other Muslim countries (including Brunei, Malaysia, = Pakistan,=20 Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Turkey) and a number of radical Muslim = organizations.=20 For example, the role of one Sudan-based "humanitarian organization," = called=20 the Third World Relief Agency, has been well-documented. The Clinton=20 Administration's "hands-on" involvement with the Islamic network's = arms=20 pipeline included inspections of missiles from Iran by U.S. government = officials.=20
3. The Radical Islamic Character of the Sarajevo = Regime=20 (page 8): Underlying the Clinton Administration's misguided green = light policy=20 is a complete misreading of its main beneficiary, the Bosnian Muslim=20 government of Alija Izetbegovic. Rather than being the tolerant, = multiethnic=20 democratic government it pretends to be, there is clear evidence that = the=20 ruling circle of Izetbegovic's party, the Party of Democratic Action = (SDA),=20 has long been guided by the principles of radical Islam. This Islamist = orientation is illustrated by profiles of three important officials, = including=20 President Izetbegovic himself; the progressive Islamization of the = Bosnian=20 army, including creation of native Bosnian mujahedin units; = credible=20 claims that major atrocities against civilians in Sarajevo were staged = for=20 propaganda purposes by operatives of the Izetbegovic government; and=20 suppression of enemies, both non-Muslim and Muslim.=20
The Clinton Green Light to Iranian Arms=20 Shipments=20
Both the Senate Intelligence Committee and the House Select = Subcommittee to=20 Investigate the United States Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to = Croatia and=20 Bosnia issued reports late last year. (The Senate report, dated = November 1996,=20 is unclassified. The House report is classified, with the exception of = the=20 final section of conclusions, which was released on October 8, 1996; a = declassified version of the full report is expected to be released = soon.) The=20 reports, consistent with numerous press accounts, confirm that on = April 27,=20 1994, President Clinton directed Ambassador Galbraith to inform the = government=20 of Croatia that he had "no instructions" regarding Croatia's decision = whether=20 or not to permit weapons, primarily from Iran, to be transshipped to = Bosnia=20 through Croatia. (The purpose was to facilitate the acquisition of = arms by the=20 Muslim-led government in Sarajevo despite the arms embargo imposed on=20 Yugoslavia by the U.N. Security Council.) Clinton Administration = officials=20 took that course despite their awareness of the source of the weapons = and=20 despite the fact that the Croats (who were themselves divided on = whether to=20 permit arms deliveries to the Muslims) would take anything short of a = U.S.=20 statement that they should not facilitate the flow of Iranian arms to = Bosnia=20 as a "green light."=20
The green light policy was decided upon and implemented with = unusual=20 secrecy, with the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense only = informed=20 after the fact. ["U.S. Had Options to Let Bosnia Get Arms, Avoid = Iran,"=20 Los Angeles Times, 7/14/96] Among the key conclusions of the = House=20 Subcommittee were the following (taken from the unclassified section = released=20 on October 8):=20
"The President and the American people were poorly served by the=20 Administration officials who rushed the green light decision without = due=20 deliberation, full information and an adequate consideration of the=20 consequences." (page 202)=20
"The Administration's efforts to keep even senior US officials from = seeing=20 its 'fingerprints' on the green light policy led to confusion and = disarray=20 within the government." (page 203)=20
"The Administration repeatedly deceived the American people about = its=20 Iranian green light policy." (page 204)=20
Clinton, Lake, and Galbraith Responsible=20
While the final go-ahead for the green light was given by President = Clinton=20 -- who is ultimately accountable for the results of his decision -- = two=20 Clinton Administration officials bear particular responsibility: = Ambassador=20 Galbraith and then-NSC Director Anthony Lake, against both of whom the = House=20 of Representatives has referred criminal charges to the Justice = Department.=20 Mr. Lake, who personally presented the proposal to Bill Clinton for = approval,=20 "played a central role in preventing the responsible congressional = committees=20 from knowing about the Administration's fateful decision to acquiesce = in=20 radical Islamic Iran's effort to penetrate the European continent = through arms=20 shipments and military cooperation with the Bosnian government." ["'In = Lake We=20 Trust'? Confirmation Make-Over Exacerbates Senate Concerns About=20 D.C.I.-Designate's Candor, Reliability," Center for Security Policy,=20 Washington, D.C., 1/8/97] His responsibility for the operation is = certain to=20 be a major hurdle in his effort to be confirmed as CIA Director: "The = fact=20 that Lake was one of the authors of the duplicitous policy in Bosnia, = which is=20 very controversial and which has probably helped strengthen the hand = of the=20 Iranians, doesn't play well," stated Senate Intelligence Chairman = Richard=20 Shelby. ["Lake to be asked about donation," Washington Times, = 1/2/97]=20
For his part, Ambassador Galbraith was the key person both in = conceiving=20 the policy and in serving as the link between the Clinton = Administration and=20 the Croatian government; he also met with Imam Sevko Omerbasic, the = top Muslim=20 cleric in Croatia, "who the CIA says was an intermediary for Iran."=20 ["Fingerprints: Arms to Bosnia, the real story," The New = Republic,=20 10/28/96; see also LAT 12/23/96] As the House Subcommittee = concluded=20 (page 206): "There is evidence that Ambassador Galbraith may have = engaged in=20 activities that could be characterized as unauthorized covert action." = The=20 Senate Committee (pages 19 and 20 of the report) was unable to agree = on the=20 specific legal issue of whether Galbraith's actions constituted a = "covert=20 action" within the definition of section 503(e) of the National = Security Act=20 of 1947 (50 U.S.C. Sec. 413(e)), as amended, defined as "an activity = or=20 activities . . . to influence political, economic, or military = conditions=20 abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States = Government=20 will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly."=20
The Militant Islamic Network=20
The House Subcommittee report also concluded (page 2): "The=20 Administration's Iranian green light policy gave Iran an unprecedented = foothold in Europe and has recklessly endangered American lives and US = strategic interests." Further --=20
" . . . The Iranian presence and influence [in Bosnia] jumped = radically in=20 the months following the green light. Iranian elements infiltrated the = Bosnian=20 government and established close ties with the current leadership in = Bosnia=20 and the next generation of leaders. Iranian Revolutionary Guards = accompanied=20 Iranian weapons into Bosnia and soon were integrated in the Bosnian = military=20 structure from top to bottom as well as operating in independent units = throughout Bosnia. The Iranian intelligence service [VEVAK] ran wild = through=20 the area developing intelligence networks, setting up terrorist = support=20 systems, recruiting terrorist 'sleeper' agents and agents of = influence, and=20 insinuating itself with the Bosnian political leadership to a = remarkable=20 degree. The Iranians effectively annexed large portions of the Bosnian = security apparatus [known as the Agency for Information and = Documentation=20 (AID)] to act as their intelligence and terrorist surrogates. This = extended to=20 the point of jointly planning terrorist activities. The Iranian = embassy became=20 the largest in Bosnia and its officers were given unparalleled = privileges and=20 access at every level of the Bosnian government." (page 201)=20
Not Just the Iranians=20
To understand how the Clinton green light would lead to this degree = of=20 Iranian influence, it is necessary to remember that the policy was = adopted in=20 the context of extensive and growing radical Islamic activity in = Bosnia. That=20 is, the Iranians and other Muslim militants had long been active in = Bosnia;=20 the American green light was an important political signal to both = Sarajevo=20 and the militants that the United States was unable or unwilling to = present an=20 obstacle to those activities -- and, to a certain extent, was willing = to=20 cooperate with them. In short, the Clinton Administration's policy of=20 facilitating the delivery of arms to the Bosnian Muslims made it the = de=20 facto partner of an ongoing international network of governments = and=20 organizations pursuing their own agenda in Bosnia: the promotion of = Islamic=20 revolution in Europe. That network involves not only Iran but Brunei,=20 Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan (a key ally of Iran), and = Turkey,=20 together with front groups supposedly pursuing humanitarian and = cultural=20 activities.=20
For example, one such group about which details have come to light = is the=20 Third World Relief Agency (TWRA), a Sudan-based, phoney humanitarian=20 organization which has been a major link in the arms pipeline to = Bosnia. ["How=20 Bosnia's Muslims Dodged Arms Embargo: Relief Agency Brokered Aid From = Nations,=20 Radical Groups," Washington Post, 9/22/96; see also "Saudis = Funded=20 Weapons For Bosnia, Official Says: $300 Million Program Had U.S. = 'Stealth=20 Cooperation'," Washington Post, 2/2/96] TWRA is believed to = be=20 connected with such fixtures of the Islamic terror network as Sheik = Omar Abdel=20 Rahman (the convicted mastermind behind the 1993 World Trade Center = bombing)=20 and Osama Binladen, a wealthy Saudi emigre believed to bankroll = numerous=20 militant groups. [WP, 9/22/96] (Sheik Rahman, a native of = Egypt, is=20 currently in prison in the United States; letter bombs addressed to = targets in=20 Washington and London, apparently from Alexandria, Egypt, are believed = connected with his case. Binladen was a resident in Khartoum, Sudan, = until=20 last year; he is now believed to be in Afghanistan, "where he has = issued=20 statements calling for attacks on U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf."=20 [WP, 9/22/96])=20
The Clinton Administration's "Hands-On" = Help=20
The extent to which Clinton Administration officials, notably = Ambassador=20 Galbraith, knowingly or negligently, cooperated with the efforts of = such front=20 organizations is unclear. For example, according to one intelligence = account=20 seen by an unnamed U.S. official in the Balkans, "Galbraith 'talked = with=20 representatives of Muslim countries on payment for arms that would be = sent to=20 Bosnia,' . . . [T]he dollar amount mentioned in the report was $500=20 million-$800 million. The U.S. official said he also saw subsequent=20 'operational reports' in 1995 on almost weekly arms shipments of = automatic=20 weapons, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, anti-armor rockets and = TOW=20 missiles." [TNR, 10/28/96] The United States played a = disturbingly=20 "hands-on" role, with, according to the Senate report (page 19), U.S.=20 government personnel twice conducting inspections in Croatia of = missiles en=20 route to Bosnia. Further --=20
"The U.S. decision to send personnel to Croatia to inspect rockets = bound=20 for Bosnia is . . . subject to varying interpretations. It may have = been=20 simply a straightforward effort to determine whether chemical weapons = were=20 being shipped into Bosnia. It was certainly, at least in part, an = opportunity=20 to examine a rocket in which the United States had some interest. But = it may=20 also have been designed to ensure that Croatia would not shut down the = pipeline." (page 21)=20
The account in The New Republic points sharply to the = latter=20 explanation: "Enraged at Iran's apparent attempt to slip super weapons = past=20 Croat monitors, the Croatian defense minister nonetheless sent the = missiles on=20 to Bosnia 'just as Peter [i.e., Ambassador Galbraith] told us to do,' = sources=20 familiar with the episode said." [TNR, 10/28/96] In short, = the=20 Clinton Administration's connection with the various players that made = up the=20 arms network seems to have been direct and intimate.=20
The Mujahedin Threat=20
In addition to (and working closely with) the Iranian Revolutionary = Guards=20 and VEVAK intelligence are members of numerous radical groups known = for their=20 anti-Western orientation, along with thousands of volunteer = mujahedin=20 ("holy warriors") from across the Islamic world. From the beginning of = the=20 NATO-led deployment, the Clinton Administration has given insufficient = weight=20 to military concerns regarding the mujahedin presence in = Bosnia as=20 well as the danger they pose to American personnel. Many of the = fighters are=20 concentrated in the so-called "green triangle" (the color green = symbolizes=20 Islam) centered on the town of Zenica in the American IFOR/SFOR zone = but are=20 also found throughout the country.=20
The Clinton Administration has been willing to accept Sarajevo's=20 transparently false assurances of the departure of the foreign = fighters based=20 on the contention that they have married Bosnian women and have = acquired=20 Bosnian citizenship -- and thus are no longer "foreign"! -- or, having = left=20 overt military units to join "humanitarian," "cultural," or = "charitable"=20 organizations, are no longer "fighters." [See "Foreign Muslims = Fighting in=20 Bosnia Considered 'Threat' to U.S. Troops," Washington Post,=20 11/30/95; "Outsiders Bring Islamic Fervor To the Balkans," New = York=20 Times, 9/23/96; "Islamic Alien Fighters Settle in Bosnia," = Pittsburgh=20 Post-Gazette, 9/23/96; "Mujahideen rule Bosnian villages: = Threaten NATO=20 forces, non-Muslims," Washington Times, 9/23/96; and Yossef = Bodansky,=20 Offensive in the Balkans (November 1995) and Some Call It = Peace (August 1996), International Media Corporation, Ltd., = London.=20 Bodansky, an analyst with the House Republican Task Force on Terrorism = and=20 Unconventional Warfare, is an internationally recognized authority on = Islamic=20 terrorism.] The methods employed to qualify for Bosnian citizenship = are=20 themselves problematic: "Islamic militants from Iran and other foreign = countries are employing techniques such as forced marriages, = kidnappings and=20 the occupation of apartments and houses to remain in Bosnia in = violation of=20 the Dayton peace accord and may be a threat to U.S. forces." = ["Mujaheddin=20 Remaining in Bosnia: Islamic Militants Strongarm Civilians, Defy = Dayton Plan,"=20 Washington Post, 7/8/96]=20
The threat presented by the mujahedin to IFOR (and now, to = SFOR)=20 -- contingent only upon the precise time their commanders in Tehran or = Sarajevo should choose to activate them -- has been evident from the = beginning=20 of the NATO-led deployment. For example, in February 1996 NATO forces = raided a=20 terrorist training camp near the town of Fojnica, taking into custody = 11 men=20 (8 Bosnian citizens -- two of whom may have been naturalized foreign=20 mujahedin -- and three Iranian instructors); also seized were = explosives "built into small children's plastic toys, including a car, = a=20 helicopter and an ice cream cone," plus other weapons such as = handguns, sniper=20 rifles, grenade launchers, etc. The Sarajevo government denounced the = raid,=20 claiming the facility was an "intelligence service school"; the = detainees were=20 released promptly after NATO turned them over to local authorities. = ["NATO=20 Captures Terrorist Training Camp, Claims Iranian Involvement," = Associated=20 Press, 2/16/96; "Bosnian government denies camp was for = terrorists,"=20 Reuters, 2/16/96; Bodansky Some Call It Peace, page = 56] In=20 May 1996, a previously unknown group called "Bosnian Islamic Jihad"=20 (jihad means "holy war") threatened attacks on NATO troops by = suicide=20 bombers, similar to those that had recently been launched in Israel. = ["Jihad=20 Threat in Bosnia Alarms NATO," The European, 5/9/96]=20
Stepping-Stone to Europe=20
The intended targets of the mujahedin network in Bosnia = are not=20 limited to that country but extend to Western Europe. For example, in = August=20 1995, the conservative Paris daily Le Figaro reported that = French=20 security services believe that "Islamic fundamentalists from Algeria = have set=20 up a security network across Europe with fighters trained in Afghan = guerrilla=20 camps and [in] southern France while some have been tested in Bosnia." = [(London) Daily Telegraph, 8/17/95] Also, in April 1996, = Belgian=20 security arrested a number of Islamic militants, including two native=20 Bosnians, smuggling weapons to Algerian guerrillas active in France.=20 [Intelligence Newsletter, Paris, 5/9/96 (No. 287)] Finally, = also in=20 April 1996, a meeting of radicals aligned with HizbAllah = ("Party of=20 God"), a pro-Iran group based in Lebanon, set plans for stepping up = attacks on=20 U.S. assets on all continents; among those participating was an = Egyptian,=20 Ayman al-Zawahiri, who "runs the Islamist terrorist operations in=20 Bosnia-Herzegovina from a special headquarters in Sofia, Bulgaria. His = forces=20 are already deployed throughout Bosnia, ready to attack US and other = I-FOR=20 (NATO Implementation Force) targets." ["State-Sponsored Terrorism and = The Rise=20 of the HizbAllah International," Defense and Foreign Affairs and = Strategic=20 Policy, London, 8/31/96] Finally, in December 1996, French and = Belgian=20 security arrested several would-be terrorists trained at Iranian-run = camps in=20 Bosnia. ["Terrorism: The Bosnian Connection," (Paris) = L'Express,=20 12/26/96]=20
The Radical Islamic Character of the = Sarajevo=20 Regime=20
Underlying the Clinton Administration's misguided policy toward = Iranian=20 influence in Bosnia is a fundamental misreading of the true nature of = the=20 Muslim regime that benefitted from the Iran/Bosnia arms policy: "The = most=20 dubious of all Bosniac [i.e., Bosnian Muslim] claims pertains to the=20 self-serving commercial that the government hopes to eventually = establish a=20 multiethnic liberal democratic society. Such ideals may appeal to a = few=20 members of Bosnia's ruling circle as well as to a generally secular = populace,=20 but President Izetbegovic and his cabal appear to harbor much = different=20 private intentions and goals." ["Selling the Bosnia Myth to America: = Buyer=20 Beware," Lieutenant Colonel John E. Sray, USA, U.S. Army Foreign = Military=20 Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS, October 1995]=20
The evidence that the leadership of the ruling Party of Democratic = Action=20 (SDA), and consequently, the Sarajevo-based government, has long been=20 motivated by the principles of radical Islam is inescapable. The = following=20 three profiles are instructive:=20
Alija Izetbegovic: Alija Izetbegovic, current = Bosnian=20 president and head of the SDA, in 1970 authored the radical "Islamic=20 Declaration," which calls for "the Islamic movement" to start to take = power as=20 soon as it can overturn "the existing non-Muslim government . . . = [and] build=20 up a new Islamic one," to destroy non-Islamic institutions ("There can = be=20 neither peace nor coexistence between the Islamic religion and = non-Islamic=20 social institutions"), and to create an international federation of = Islamic=20 states. [The Islamic Declaration: A Programme for the Islamization = of=20 Muslims and the Muslim Peoples, Sarajevo, in English, 1990] = Izetbegovic's=20 radical pro-Iran associations go back decades: "At the center of the = Iranian=20 system in Europe is Bosnia-Hercegovina's President, Alija Izetbegovic, = . . .=20 who is committed to the establishment of an Islamic Republic in=20 Bosnia-Hercegovina." ["Iran's European Springboard?", House Republican = Task=20 Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, 9/1/92] The Task Force = report=20 further describes Izetbegovic's contacts with Iran and Libya in 1991, = before=20 the Bosnian war began; he is also noted as a "fundamentalist Muslim" = and a=20 member of the "Fedayeen of Islam" organization, an Iran-based radical = group=20 dating to the 1930s and which by the late 1960s had recognized the = leadership=20 of the Ayatollah Khomeini (then in exile from the Shah). Following = Khomeini's=20 accession to power in 1979, Izetbegovic stepped-up his efforts to = establish=20 Islamic power in Bosnia and was jailed by the communists in 1983. = Today, he is=20 open and unapologetic about his links to Iran: "Perhaps the most = telling=20 detail of the [SDA's September 1, 1996] campaign rally . . . was the = presence=20 of the Iranian Ambassador and his Bosnian and Iranian bodyguards, who = sat in=20 the shadow of the huge birchwood platform. . . . As the only foreign = diplomat=20 [present], indeed the only foreigner traveling in the President's = [i.e.,=20 Izetbegovic's] heavily guarded motorcade of bulky four-wheel drive = jeeps, he=20 lent a silent Islamic imprimatur to the event, one that many American = and=20 European supporters of the Bosnian Government are trying hard to = ignore or=20 dismiss." [NYT, 9/2/96] During the summer 1996 election = campaign, the=20 Iranians delivered to him, in two suitcases, $500,000 in cash; = Izetbegovic "is=20 now 'literally on their [i.e., the Iranians'] payroll,' according to a = classified report based on the CIA's analysis of the issue." = [LAT,=20 12/31/96. See also "Iran Contributed $500,000 to Bosnian President's = Election=20 Effort, U.S. Says," New York Times, 1/1/97, and = Washington=20 Times, 1/2/97] Adil Zulfikarpasic, a Muslim co-founder of the = SDA, broke=20 with Izetbegovic in late 1990 due to the increasingly overt = fundamentalist and=20 pro-Iranian direction of the party. [See Milovan Djilas, Bosnjak: = Adil=20 Zulfikarpasic, Zurich, 1994]=20
Hassan (or Hasan) Cengic: Until recently, deputy = defense=20 minister (and now cosmetically reassigned to a potentially even more = dangerous=20 job in refugee resettlement at the behest of the Clinton = Administration),=20 Cengic, a member of a powerful clan headed by his father, Halid = Cengic, is an=20 Islamic cleric who has traveled frequently to Tehran and is deeply = involved in=20 the arms pipeline. ["Bosnian Officials Involved in Arms Trade Tied to = Radical=20 States," Washington Post, 9/22/96] Cengic was identified by = Austrian=20 police as a member of TWRA's supervisory board, "a fact confirmed by = its=20 Sudanese director, Elfatih Hassanein, in a 1994 interview with Gazi = Husrev=20 Beg, an Islamic affairs magazine. Cengic later became the key Bosnian = official=20 involved in setting up a weapons pipeline from Iran. . . . Cengic . . = . is a=20 longtime associate of Izetbegovic's. He was one of the co-defendants = in=20 Izetbegovic's 1983 trial for fomenting Muslim nationalism in what was = then=20 Yugoslavia. Cengic was given a 10-year prison term, most of which he = did not=20 serve. In trial testimony Cengic was said to have been traveling to = Iran since=20 1983. Cengic lived in Tehran and Istanbul during much of the war, = arranging=20 for weapons to be smuggled into Bosnia." [WP, 9/22/96] = According to a=20 Bosnian Croat radio profile: "Hasan's father, Halid Cengic . . . is = the main=20 logistic expert in the Muslim army. All petrodollar donations from the = Islamic=20 world and the procurement of arms and military technology for Muslim = units=20 went through him. He made so much money out of this business that he = is one of=20 the richest Muslims today. Halid Cengic and his two sons, of whom = Hasan has=20 been more in the public spotlight, also control the Islamic wing of = the=20 intelligence agency AID [Agency for Information and Documentation]. = Well=20 informed sources in Sarajevo claim that only Hasan addresses = Izetbegovic with=20 'ti' [second person singular, used as an informal form of address] = while all=20 the others address him as 'Mr. President,'" a sign of his = extraordinary degree=20 of intimacy with the president. [BBC Summary of World = Broadcasts,=20 10/28/96, "Radio elaborates on Iranian connection of Bosnian deputy = defense=20 minister," from Croat Radio Herceg-Bosna, Mostar, in = Serbo-Croatian,=20 10/25/96, bracketed text in original] In late 1996, at the insistence = of the=20 Clinton Administration, Hassan Cengic was reassigned to refugee = affairs.=20 However, in his new capacity he may present an even greater hazard to = NATO=20 forces in Bosnia, in light of past incidents such as the one that took = place=20 near the village of Celic in November 1996. At that time, in what NATO = officers called part of a pattern of "military operations in = disguise,"=20 American and Russian IFOR troops were caught between Muslims and Serbs = as the=20 Muslims, some of them armed, attempted to encroach on the cease-fire = line=20 established by Dayton; commented a NATO spokesman: "We believe this to = be a=20 deliberate, orchestrated and provocative move to circumvent = established=20 procedures for the return of refugees." ["Gunfire Erupts as Muslims = Return=20 Home," Washington Post, 11/13/96]=20
Dzemal Merdan: "The office of Brig. Gen. Dzemal = Merdan is=20 an ornate affair, equipped with an elaborately carved wooden gazebo = ringed=20 with red velvet couches and slippers for his guests. A sheepskin = prayer mat=20 lies in the corner, pointing toward Mecca. The most striking thing in = the=20 chamber is a large flag. It is not the flag of Bosnia, but of Iran. = Pinned=20 with a button of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran's late Islamic = leader,=20 the flag occupies pride of place in Merdan's digs -- displayed in the = middle=20 of the gazebo for every visitor to see. Next to it hangs another = pennant, that=20 of the Democratic Action Party, the increasingly nationalist Islamic=20 organization of President Alija Izetbegovic that dominates Bosnia's = Muslim=20 region. . . . Merdan's position highlights the American dilemma. = As=20 head of the office of training and development of the Bosnian army, he = is a=20 key liaison figure in the U.S. [arm and train] program. . . . = But=20 Merdan, Western sources say, also has another job -- as liaison with = foreign=20 Islamic fighters here since 1992 and promoter of the Islamic faith = among=20 Bosnia's recruits. Sources identified Merdan as being instrumental in = the=20 creation of a brigade of Bosnian soldiers, called the 7th Muslim = Brigade, that=20 is heavily influenced by Islam and trained by fighters from Iran's=20 Revolutionary Guards. He has also launched a program, these sources = say, to=20 build mosques on military training grounds to teach Islam to Bosnian = recruits.=20 In addition, he helped establish training camps in Bosnia where = Revolutionary=20 Guards carried out their work." ["Arming the Bosnians: U.S. Program = Would Aid=20 Force Increasingly Linked to Iran," Washington Post, 1/26/96, = emphasis added] General Merdan is a close associate of both = Izetbegovic and=20 Cengic; the central region around Zenica, which was "completely = militarized in=20 the first two years of the war" under the control of Merdan's=20 mujahedin, is "under total control of the Cengic family." = ["Who Rules=20 Bosnia and Which Way," (Sarajevo) Slobodna Bosna, 11/17/96, = FBIS=20 translation; Slobodna Bosna is one of the few publications in = Muslim-held areas that dares to criticize the policies and personal = corruption=20 of the ruling SDA clique.] Merdan's mujahedin were accused by = their=20 erstwhile Croat allies of massacring more than 100 Croats near Zenica = in late=20 1993. ["Bosnian Croats vow to probe war crimes by Moslems," Agence = France=20 Presse, 5/12/95]=20
The Islamization of the Bosnian Army=20
In cooperation with the foreign Islamic presence, the Izetbegovic = regime=20 has revamped its security and military apparatus to reflect its = Islamic=20 revolutionary outlook, including the creation of mujahedin = units=20 throughout the army; some members of these units have assumed the = guise of a=20 shaheed (a "martyr," the Arabic term commonly used to = describe=20 suicide bombers), marked by their white garb, representing a shroud. = While=20 these units include foreign fighters naturalized in Bosnia, most of = the=20 personnel are now Bosnian Muslims trained and indoctrinated by Iranian = and=20 other foreign militants -- which also makes it easier for the Clinton=20 Administration to minimize the mujahedin threat, because few = of them=20 are "foreigners."=20
Prior to 1996, there were three principal mujahedin units = in the=20 Bosnian army, the first two of which are headquartered in the American = IFOR/SFOR zone: (1) the 7th Muslim Liberation Brigade of the 3rd = Corps,=20 headquartered in Zenica; (2) the 9th Muslim Liberation Brigade of the = 2nd=20 Corps, headquartered in Travnik (the 2nd Corps is based in Tuzla); and = (3) the=20 4th Muslim Liberation Brigade of the 4th Corps, headquartered in = Konjic (in=20 the French zone). [Bodansky, Some Call It Peace, page 40]=20 Particularly ominous, many members of these units have donned the = guise of=20 martyrs, indicating their willingness to sacrifice themselves in the = cause of=20 Islam. Commenting on an appearance of soldiers from the 7th Liberation = Brigade, in Zenica in December 1995, Bodansky writes: "Many of the = fighters .=20 . . were dressed in white coveralls over their uniforms. Officially, = these=20 were 'white winter camouflage,' but the green headbands [bearing = Koranic=20 verses] these warriors were wearing left no doubt that these were = actually=20 Shaheeds' shrouds." [Some Call It Peace, page 12] The same=20 demonstration was staged before the admiring Iranian ambassador and = President=20 Izetbegovic in September 1996, when white winter garb could only be = symbolic,=20 not functional. [NYT, 9/2/96] By June 1996, ten more=20 mujahedin brigades had been established, along with numerous = smaller=20 "special units" dedicated to covert and terrorist operations; while = foreigners=20 are present in all of these units, most of the soldiers are now native = Bosnian=20 Muslims. [Some Call It Peace, pages 42-46]=20
In addition to these units, there exists another group known as the = Handzar ("dagger" or "scimitar") Division, described by = Bodansky as a=20 "praetorian guard" for President Izetbegovic. "Up to 6000-strong, the = Handzar=20 division glories in a fascist culture. They see themselves as the = heirs of the=20 SS Handzar division, formed by Bosnian Muslims in 1943 to fight for = the Nazis.=20 Their spiritual model was Mohammed Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti = of=20 Jerusalem who sided with Hitler. According to UN officers, = surprisingly few of=20 those in charge of the Handzars . . . seem to speak good = Serbo-Croatian. 'Many=20 of them are Albanian, whether from Kosovo [the Serb province where = Albanians=20 are the majority] or from Albania itself.' They are trained and led by = veterans from Afghanistan and Pakistan, say UN sources." ["Albanians = and=20 Afghans fight for the heirs to Bosnia's SS past," (London) Daily=20 Telegraph, 12/29/93, bracketed text in original]=20

Self-Inflicted Atrocities=20
Almost since the beginning of the Bosnian war in the spring of = 1992, there=20 have been persistent reports -- readily found in the European media = but little=20 reported in the United States -- that civilian deaths in Muslim-held = Sarajevo=20 attributed to the Bosnian Serb Army were in some cases actually = inflicted by=20 operatives of the Izetbegovic regime in an (ultimately successful) = effort to=20 secure American intervention on Sarajevo's behalf. These allegations = include=20 instances of sniping at civilians as well as three major explosions,=20 attributed to Serbian mortar fire, that claimed the lives of dozens of = people=20 and, in each case, resulted in the international community's taking = measures=20 against the Muslims' Serb enemies. (The three explosions were: (1) the = May 27,=20 1992, "breadline massacre," which was reported to have killed 16 = people and=20 which resulted in economic sanctions on the Bosnian Serbs and rump = Yugoslavia;=20 (2) the February 5, 1994, Markale "market massacre," killing 68 and = resulting=20 in selective NATO air strikes and an ultimatum to the Serbs to = withdraw their=20 heavy weapons from the area near Sarajevo; and (3) the August 28, 1995 = "second=20 market massacre," killing 37 and resulting in large-scale NATO air = strikes,=20 eventually leading to the Dayton agreement and the deployment of = IFOR.) When=20 she was asked about such allegations (with respect to the February = 1994=20 explosion) then-U.N. Ambassador and current Secretary of = State-designate=20 Madeleine Albright, in a stunning non sequitur, said: "It's very hard = to=20 believe any country would do this to their own people, and therefore, = although=20 we do not exactly know what the facts are, it would = seem to=20 us that the Serbs are the ones that probably have a great deal of=20 responsibility." ["Senior official admits to secret U.N. report on = Sarajevo=20 massacre," Deutsch Presse-Agentur, 6/6/96, emphasis added]=20
The fact that such a contention is difficult to believe does not = mean it is=20 not true. Not only did the incidents lead to the result desired by = Sarajevo=20 (Western action against the Bosnian Serbs), their staging by the = Muslims would=20 be entirely in keeping with the moral outlook of Islamic radicalism, = which has=20 long accepted the deaths of innocent (including Muslim) bystanders = killed in=20 terrorist actions. According to a noted analyst: "The dictum that the = end=20 justifies the means is adopted by all fundamentalist organizations in = their=20 strategies for achieving political power and imposing on society their = own=20 view of Islam. What is important in every action is its = niy'yah, its=20 motive. No means need be spared in the service of = Islam as=20 long as one takes action with a pure niy'yah." [Amir Taheri, = Holy=20 Terror, Bethesda, MD, 1987] With the evidence that the Sarajevo=20 leadership does in fact have a fundamentalist outlook, it is = unwarranted to=20 dismiss cavalierly the possibility of Muslim responsibility. Among = some of the=20 reports:=20
Sniping: "French peacekeeping troops in the United = Nations=20 unit trying to curtail Bosnian Serb sniping at civilians in Sarajevo = have=20 concluded that until mid-June some gunfire also came from Government = soldiers=20 deliberately shooting at their own civilians. After what it called a=20 'definitive' investigation, a French marine unit that patrols against = snipers=20 said it traced sniper fire to a building normally occupied by Bosnian = [i.e.,=20 Muslim] soldiers and other security forces. A senior French officer = said, 'We=20 find it almost impossible to believe, but we are sure that it is = true.'"=20 ["Investigation Concludes Bosnian Government Snipers Shot at = Civilians,"=20 New York Times, 8/1/95]=20
The 1992 "Breadline Massacre": "United Nations = officials=20 and senior Western military officers believe some of the worst = killings in=20 Sarajevo, including the massacre of at least 16 people in a bread = queue, were=20 carried out by the city's mainly Muslim defenders -- not Serb = besiegers -- as=20 a propaganda ploy to win world sympathy and military intervention. . . = .=20 Classified reports to the UN force commander, General Satish Nambiar,=20 concluded . . . that Bosnian forces loyal to President Alija = Izetbegovic may=20 have detonated a bomb. 'We believe it was a command-detonated = explosion,=20 probably in a can,' a UN official said then. 'The large impact which = is there=20 now is not necessarily similar or anywhere near as large as we came to = expect=20 with a mortar round landing on a paved surface." ["Muslims 'slaughter = their=20 own people'," (London) The Independent, 8/22/92] "Our people = tell us=20 there were a number of things that didn't fit. The street had been = blocked off=20 just before the incident. Once the crowd was let in and had lined up, = the=20 media appeared but kept their distance. The attack took place, and the = media=20 were immediately on the scene." [Major General Lewis MacKenzie,=20 Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo, Vancouver, BC, 1993, pages = 193-4; Gen.=20 MacKenzie, a Canadian, had been commander of the U.N. peacekeeping = force in=20 Sarajevo.]=20
The 1994 Markale "Market Massacre": "French = television=20 reported last night that the United Nations investigation into the=20 market-place bombing in Sarajevo two weeks ago had established beyond = doubt=20 that the mortar shell that killed 68 people was fired from inside = Bosnian=20 [Muslim] lines." ["UN tracks source of fatal shell," (London) The=20 Times, 2/19/94] "For the first time, a senior U.N. official has = admitted=20 the existence of a secret U.N. report that blames the Bosnian Moslems = for the=20 February 1994 massacre of Moslems at a Sarajevo market. . . . After = studying=20 the crater left by the mortar shell and the distribution of shrapnel, = the=20 report concluded that the shell was fired from behind Moslem lines." = The=20 report, however, was kept secret; the context of the wire story = implies that=20 U.S. Ambasador Albright may have been involved in its suppression.=20 [DPA, 6/6/96] For a fuller discussion of the conflicting = claims, see=20 "Anatomy of a massacre," Foreign Policy, 12/22/94, by David = Binder;=20 Binder, a veteran New York Times reporter in Yugoslavia, had = access=20 to the suppressed report. Bodansky categorically states that the bomb = "was=20 actually a special charge designed and built with help from = HizbAllah=20 ["Party of God," a Beirut-based pro-Iranian terror group] experts and = then=20 most likely dropped from a nearby rooftop onto the crowd of shoppers. = Video=20 cameras at the ready recorded this expertly-staged spectacle of gore, = while=20 dozens of corpses of Bosnian Muslim troops killed in action (exchanged = the day=20 before in a 'body swap' with the Serbs) were paraded in front of = cameras to=20 raise the casualty counts." [Offensive in the Balkans, page = 62]=20
The 1995 "Second Market Massacre": "British = ammunition=20 experts serving with the United Nations in Sarajevo have challenged = key=20 'evidence' of the Serbian atrocity that triggered the devastating Nato = bombing=20 campaign which turned the tide of the Bosnian war." The Britons' = analysis was=20 confirmed by French analysts but their findings were "dismissed" by "a = senior=20 American officer" at U.N. headquarters in Sarajevo. ["Serbs 'not = guilty' of=20 massacre: Experts warned US that mortar was Bosnian," (London) The = Times, 10/1/95] A "crucial U.N. report [stating Serb = responsibility for]=20 the market massacre is a classified secret, but four specialists -- a = Russian,=20 a Canadian and two Americans -- have raised serious doubts about its=20 conclusion, suggesting instead that the mortar was fired not by the = Serbs but=20 by Bosnian government forces." A Canadian officer "added that he and = fellow=20 Canadian officers in Bosnia were 'convinced that the Muslim government = dropped=20 both the February 5, 1994, and the August 28, 1995, mortar shells on = the=20 Sarajevo markets.'" An unidentified U.S. official "contends that the = available=20 evidence suggests either 'the shell was fired at a very low = trajectory, which=20 means a range of a few hundred yards -- therefore under [Sarajevo] = government=20 control,' or 'a mortar shell converted into a bomb was dropped from a = nearby=20 roof into the crowd.'" ["Bosnia's bombers," The Nation, = 10/2/95]. At=20 least some high-ranking French and perhaps other Western officials = believed=20 the Muslims responsible; after having received that account from = government=20 ministers and two generals, French magazine editor Jean Daniel put the = question directly to Prime Minister Edouard Balladur: "'They [i.e., = the=20 Muslims] have committed this carnage on their own people?' I exclaimed = in=20 consternation. 'Yes,' confirmed the Prime Minister without hesitation, = 'but at=20 least they have forced NATO to intervene.'" ["No more lies about = Bosnia,"=20 Le Nouvel Observateur, 8/31/95, translated in Chronicles: = A=20 Magazine of American Culture, January 1997]=20
Suppression of Enemies=20
As might be expected, one manifestation of the radical Islamic = orientation=20 of the Izetbegovic government is increasing curtailment of the = freedoms of the=20 remaining non-Muslims (Croats and Serbs) in the Muslim-held zone. = While there=20 are similar pressures on minorities in the Serb- and Croat-held parts = of=20 Bosnia, in the Muslim zone they have a distinct Islamic flavor. For = example,=20 during the 1996-1997 Christmas and New Year holiday season, Muslim = militants=20 attempted to intimidate not only Muslims but Christians from engaging = in what=20 had become common holiday practices, such as gift-giving, putting up = Christmas=20 or New Year's trees, and playing the local Santa Claus figure, = Grandfather=20 Frost (Deda Mraz). ["The Holiday, All Wrapped Up; Bosnian = Muslims=20 Take Sides Over Santa," Washington Post, 12/26/96] In = general:=20
"Even in Sarajevo itself, always portrayed as the most prominent=20 multi-national community in Bosnia, pressure, both psychological and = real, is=20 impelling non-Bosniaks [i.e., non-Muslims] to leave. Some measures are = indirect, such as attempts to ban the sale of pork and the growing=20 predominance of [Bosniak] street names. Other measures are deliberate = efforts=20 to apply pressure. Examples include various means to make non-Bosniaks = leave=20 the city. Similar pressures, often with more violent expression and=20 occasionally with overt official participation, are being used = throughout=20 Bosnia." ["Bosnia's Security and U.S. Policy in the Next Phase: A = Policy=20 Paper, International Research and Exchanges Board, November 1996]=20
In addition, President Izetbegovic's party, the SDA, has launched=20 politically-motivated attacks on moderate Muslims both within the SDA = and in=20 rival parties. For example, in the summer of 1996 former Prime = Minister Haris=20 Silajdzic, (a Muslim, and son of the former imam at the main Sarajevo = mosque)=20 was set upon and beaten by SDA militants. Silajdzic claimed = Izetbegovic=20 himself was behind the attacks. [NYT, 9/2/96] Irfan Mustafic, = a=20 Muslim who co-founded the SDA, is a member of the Bosnian parliament = and was=20 president of the SDA's executive council in Srebrenica when it fell to = Bosnian=20 Serb forces; he was taken prisoner but later released. Because of = several=20 policy disagreements with Izetbegovic and his close associates, = Mustafic was=20 shot and seriously wounded in Srebrenica by Izetbegovic loyalists.=20 [(Sarajevo) Slobodna Bosna, 7/14/96] Finally, one incident = sums up=20 both the ruthlessness of the Sarajevo establishment in dealing with = their=20 enemies as well as their international radical links:=20
"A special Bosnian army unit headed by Bakir Izetbegovic, the = Bosnian=20 president's son, murdered a Bosnian general found shot to death in = Belgium=20 last week, a Croatian newspaper reported . . . citing well-informed = sources.=20 The Vjesnik newspaper, controlled by the government, said the = assassination of=20 Yusuf Prazina was carried out by five members of a commando unit = called=20 'Delta' and headed by Ismet Bajramovic also known as Celo. The paper = said that=20 three members of the Syrian-backed Palestinian movement Saika had = Prazina=20 under surveillance for three weeks before one of them, acting as an = arms=20 dealer, lured him into a trap in a car park along the main highway = between=20 Liege in eastern Belgium and the German border town of Aachen. = Prazina, 30,=20 nicknamed Yuka, went missing early last month. He was found Saturday = with two=20 bullet holes to the head. 'The necessary logistical means to carry out = the=20 operation were provided by Bakir Izetbegovic, son of Alija = Izetbegovic, who=20 left Sarajevo more than six months ago,' Vjesnik said. It added that = Bakir=20 Izetbegovic 'often travels between Brussels, Paris, Frankfurt, = Baghdad, Tehran=20 and Ankara, by using Iraqi and Pakistani passports,' and was in = Belgium at the=20 time of the assassination. Hasan Cengic, head of logistics for the = army in=20 Bosnia-Hercegovina, was 'personally involved in the assassination of = Yuka=20 Prazina,' the paper said." [Agence France Presse, 1/5/94]=20
Conclusion=20
The Clinton Administration's blunder in giving the green light to = the=20 Iranian arms pipeline was based, among other errors, on a gross = misreading of=20 the true nature and goals of the Izetbegovic regime in Sarajevo. It = calls to=20 mind the similar mistake of the Carter Administration, which in 1979 = began=20 lavish aid to the new Sandinista government in Nicaragua in the hopes = that (if=20 the United States were friendly enough) the nine comandantes = would=20 turn out to be democrats, not communists, despite abundant evidence to = the=20 contrary. By the time the Reagan Administration finally cut off the = dollar=20 spigot in 1981, the comandantes -- or the "nine little = Castros," as=20 they were known locally -- had fully entrenched themselves in power.=20
To state that the Clinton Administration erred in facilitating the=20 penetration of the Iranians and other radical elements into Europe = would be a=20 breathtaking understatement. A thorough reexamination of U.S. policy = and goals=20 in the region is essential. In particular, addressing the immediate = threat to=20 U.S. troops in Bosnia, exacerbated by the extention of the IFOR/SFOR = mission,=20 should be a major priority of the 105th Congress.=20

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TOP PUBLICATIONS ISSUE=20 LIST VOTE=20 ANALYSIS SPEECHES MAIN=20 = PAGE

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