Originally published in Rolling Stone, October 20, = 1977.

How Americas Most Powerful News Media Worked = Hand in=20 Glove with the Central Intelligence Agency and Why the Church Committee = Covered=20 It Up

THE = CIA AND=20 THE MEDIA

BY = CARL=20 BERNSTEIN

In 1953,=20 Joseph Alsop, then one of America=92s = leading syndicated=20 columnists, went to the Philippines to cover an election. He did not go = because=20 he was asked to do so by his syndicate. He did not go because he was = asked to do=20 so by the newspapers that printed his column. He went at the request of = the=20 CIA.

Alsop is one of more than 400 American journalists = who in=20 the past twenty‑five years have secretly carried out assignments = for the Central=20 Intelligence Agency, according to documents on file at CIA headquarters. = Some of=20 these journalists=92 relationships with the Agency were tacit; some were = explicit.=20 There was cooperation, accommodation and overlap. Journalists provided a = full=20 range of clandestine services=97from simple intelligence gathering to = serving as=20 go‑betweens with spies in Communist countries. Reporters shared = their notebooks=20 with the CIA. Editors shared their staffs. Some of the journalists were = Pulitzer=20 Prize winners, distinguished reporters who considered themselves ambassadors without‑portfolio for their = country. Most were=20 less exalted: foreign correspondents who found that their association = with the=20 Agency helped their work; stringers and freelancers who were as = interested in=20 the derring‑do of the spy business as in filing articles; and, the = smallest=20 category, full‑time CIA employees masquerading as journalists = abroad. In many=20 instances, CIA documents show, journalists were engaged to perform tasks = for the=20 CIA with the consent of the managements of America=92s leading news=20 organizations.

The=20 history of the CIA=92s involvement with the American press continues to = be=20 shrouded by an official policy of obfuscation and deception for the = following=20 principal reasons:

■ The use of=20 journalists has been among the most productive means of = intelligence‑gathering=20 employed by the CIA. Although the Agency has cut back sharply on the use = of=20 reporters since 1973 primarily as a result of pressure from the media), = some=20 journalist‑operatives are still posted abroad.

■ Further=20 investigation into the matter, CIA officials say, would inevitably = reveal a=20 series of embarrassing relationships in the 1950s and 1960s with some of = the=20 most powerful organizations and individuals = in American=20 journalism.

Among=20 the executives who lent their cooperation to the Agency were Williarn Paley of the = Columbia=20 Broadcasting System, Henry Luce of Tirne = Inc., Arthur=20 Hays Sulzberger of the New York Times, Barry Bingham Sr. of the = LouisviIle Courier‑Journal, = and James Copley=20 of the Copley News Service. Other organizations which cooperated with = the CIA=20 include the American Broadcasting Company, the National Broadcasting = Company,=20 the Associated Press, United Press International, Reuters, Hearst = Newspapers,=20 Scripps‑Howard, Newsweek magazine, the Mutual Broadcasting = System, the=20 Miami Herald and the old Saturday Evening Post and New = York=20 Herald‑Tribune.

By=20 far the most valuable of these associations, according to CIA officials, = have=20 been with the New York Times, CBS and Time Inc.

WORKING = PRESS =97 CIA STYLE
Working Press — CIA = Style

The=20 CIA=92s use of the American news media has been much more extensive than = Agency=20 officials have acknowledged publicly or in closed sessions with members = of=20 Congress. The general outlines of what happened are indisputable; the = specifics=20 are harder to come by. CIA sources hint that a particular journalist was = trafficking all over Eastern Europe for the Agency; the journalist says = no, he=20 just had lunch with the station chief. CIA sources say flatly that a = well‑known=20 ABC correspondent worked for the Agency through 1973; they refuse to = identify=20 him. A high‑level CIA official with a prodigious memory says that = the New=20 York Times provided cover for about ten CIA operatives between 1950 = and=20 1966; he does not know who they were, or who in the newspaper=92s = management made=20 the arrangements.

The=20 Agency=92s special relationships with the so‑called =93majors=94 = in publishing and=20 broadcasting enabled the CIA to post some of its most valuable = operatives abroad=20 without exposure for more than two decades. In most instances, Agency = files=20 show, officials at the highest levels of the CIA usually director or = deputy=20 director) dealt personally with a single designated individual in the = top management of the cooperating news organization. = The aid=20 furnished often took two forms: providing jobs and credentials = =93journalistic=20 cover=94 in Agency parlance) for CIA operatives about to be posted in = foreign=20 capitals; and lending the Agency the undercover services of reporters = already on=20 staff, including some of the best‑known correspondents in the = business.

In the field, journalists were used to = help recruit=20 and handle foreigners as agents; to acquire and evaluate information, = and to=20 plant false information with officials of foreign governments. Many = signed=20 secrecy agreements, pledging never to divulge anything about their = dealings with=20 the Agency; some signed employment contracts., some=20 were assigned case officers and treated with. unusual=20 deference. Others had less structured relationships with the Agency, = even though=20 they performed similar tasks: they were briefed by CIA personnel before = trips=20 abroad, debriefed afterward, and used as intermediaries with foreign = agents.=20 Appropriately, the CIA uses the term =93reporting=94 to describe much of = what=20 cooperating journalists did for the Agency. =93We would ask them, = =91Will you do us=20 a favor?=92=94.said a senior CIA=20 official. =93=91We understand you=92re going to be in Yugoslavia. Have = they paved all=20 the streets? Where did you see planes? Were there any signs of military=20 presence? How many Soviets did you see? If you happen to meet a Soviet, = get his=20 name and spell it right .... Can you set up a = meeting=20 for is? Or relay a message?=92=94 Many CIA officials regarded these = helpful=20 journalists as operatives; the journalists tended to see themselves as = trusted=20 friends of the Agency who performed occasional favors=97usually without = pay=97in the=20 national interest.

=93I=92m proud they asked me and proud to = have done it,=94=20 said Joseph Alsop who, like his late = brother,=20 columnist Stewart Alsop, undertook = clandestine tasks=20 for the Agency. =93The notion that a newspaperman doesn=92t have a duty = to his=20 country is perfect balls.=94

From=20 the Agency=92s perspective, there is nothing untoward in such = relationships, and=20 any ethical questions are a matter for the journalistic profession to = resolve,=20 not the intelligence community. As Stuart Loory,=20 former Los Angeles Times correspondent, has written in the=20 Columbia Journalism Review: =91If even one American overseas = carrying a=20 press card is a paid informer for the CIA, then all Americans with those = credentials are suspect .... If the crisis of confidence faced by the = news=20 business=97along with the government=97is to be overcome, journalists = must be=20 willing to focus on themselves the same spotlight they so relentlessly = train on=20 others!=92 But as Loory also noted: =93When = it was=20 reported... that newsmen themselves were on the payroll of the CIA, the = story=20 caused a brief stir, and then was dropped.=94

During=20 the 1976 investigation of the CIA by the Senate Intelligence Committee, = chaired=20 by Senator Frank Church, the dimensions of the Agency=92s involvement = with the=20 press became apparent to several members of the panel, as well as to two = or=20 three investigators on the staff. But top officials of the CIA, = including former=20 directors William Colby and George Bush, persuaded the committee to = restrict its=20 inquiry into the matter and to deliberately misrepresent the actual = scope of the=20 activities in its final report. The multivolurne=20 report contains nine pages in which the use of journalists is discussed = in=20 deliberately vague and sometimes misleading terms. It makes no mention = of the=20 actual number of journalists who undertook covert tasks for the CIA. Nor = does it=20 adequately describe the role played by newspaper and broadcast = executives in=20 cooperating with the Agency.

THE = AGENCY=92S=20 DEALINGS WITH THE PRESS BEGAN during the earliest stages of the Cold = War. Allen=20 Dulles, who became director of the CIA in 1953, sought to establish a=20 recruiting‑and‑cover capability within America=92s most = prestigious journalistic=20 institutions. By operating under the guise of accredited news = correspondents,=20 Dulles believed, CIA operatives abroad would be accorded a degree of = access and=20 freedom of movement unobtainable under almost any other type of = cover.

American=20 publishers, like so many other corporate and institutional leaders at = the time,=20 were willing to commit the resources of their companies to the struggle = against=20 =93global Communism.=94 Accordingly, the traditional line separating the = American=20 press corps and government was often indistinguishable: rarely was a = news agency=20 used to provide cover for CIA operatives abroad without the knowledge = and=20 consent of either its principal owner, = publisher or=20 senior editor. Thus, contrary to the notion that the CIA insidiously = infiltrated=20 the journalistic community, there is ample evidence that America=92s = leading=20 publishers and news executives allowed themselves and their = organizations to=20 become handmaidens to the intelligence services. =93Let=92s not pick on = some poor=20 reporters, for God=92s sake,=94 William Colby exclaimed at one point to = the Church=20 committee=92s investigators. =93Let=92s go to the managements. They were = witting.=94 In all, about = twenty‑five=20 news organizations including those listed at the beginning of this = article)=20 provided cover for the Agency.

In=20 addition to cover capability, Dulles initiated a =93debriefing=94 = procedure under=20 which American correspondents returning from abroad routinely emptied = their=20 notebooks and offered their impressions to Agency personnel. Such = arrangements,=20 continued by Dulles=92 successors, to the present day, were made with = literally=20 dozens of news organizations. In the 1950s, it was not uncommon for = returning=20 reporters to be met at the ship by CIA officers. =93There would be these = guys from=20 the CIA flashing ID cards and looking like they belonged at the Yale = Club,=94 said=20 Hugh Morrow, a former Saturday Evening Post correspondent who is = now=20 press secretary to former vice‑president Nelson Rockefeller. =93It = got to be so=20 routine that you felt a little miffed if you = weren=92t=20 asked.=94

CIA=20 officials almost always refuse to divulge the names of journalists who = have=20 cooperated with the Agency. They say it would be unfair to judge these=20 individuals in a context different from the one that spawned the = relationships=20 in the first place. =93There was a time when it wasn=92t considered a = crime to serve=20 your government,=94 said one high‑level CIA official who makes no = secret of his=20 bitterness. =93This all has to be considered in the context of the = morality of the=20 times, rather than against latter‑day standards=97and hypocritical = standards at=20 that.=94

Many journalists who covered World War II = were close=20 to people in the Office of Strategic Services, the wartime predecessor = of the=20 CIA; more important, they were all on the same side. When the war ended = and many=20 OSS officials went into the CIA, it was only natural that these = relationships=20 would continue. Meanwhile, the first postwar generation of journalists = entered=20 the profession; they shared the same political and professional values = as their=20 mentors. =93You had a gang of people who worked together during World = War II and=20 never got over it,=94 said one Agency official. =93They were genuinely = motivated and=20 highly susceptible to intrigue and being on the inside. Then in the = Fifties and=20 Sixties there was a national consensus about a national threat. The = Vietnam War=20 tore everything to pieces=97shredded the consensus and threw it in the = air.=94=20 Another Agency official observed: =93Many journalists didn=92t give a = second thought=20 to associating with the Agency. But there was a point when the ethical = issues=20 which most people had submerged finally surfaced. Today, a lot of these = guys=20 vehemently deny that they had any relationship with the Agency.=94

WORDS=20 IN DISGUISE
Words of = Disguise

From the outset, the use of journalists = was among=20 the CIA=92s most sensitive undertakings, with full knowledge restricted = to the=20 Director of Central Intelligence and a few of his chosen deputies. = Dulles and=20 his successors were fearful of what would happen if a = journalist‑operative=92s=20 cover was blown, or if details of the Agency=92s dealings with the press = otherwise=20 became public. As a result, contacts with the heads of news organizations were normally = initiated by=20 Dulles and succeeding Directors of Central Intelligence; by the deputy = directors=20 and division chiefs in charge of covert operations=97Frank Wisner, Cord = Meyer Jr.,=20 Richard Bissell, Desmond FitzGerald, Tracy = Barnes,=20 Thomas Karamessines and Richard Helms = himself a former=20 UPI correspondent); and, occasionally, by others in the CIA hierarchy = known to=20 have an unusually close social relationship with a particular publisher = or=20 broadcast executive.¹

James Angleton, who was recently removed = as the=20 Agency=92s head of counterintelligence operations, ran a completely = independent=20 group of journalist‑operatives who performed sensitive and = frequently dangerous=20 assignments; little is known about this group for the simple reason that = Angleton deliberately kept only the vaguest of files.

The=20 CIA even ran a formal training program in the 1950s to teach its agents = to be=20 journalists. Intelligence officers were =93taught to make noises like = reporters,=94=20 explained a high CIA official, and were then = placed in=20 major news organizations with help from management. =93These were the = guys who=20 went through the ranks and were told =91You=92re going to he a = journalist,=92=94 the CIA=20 official said. Relatively few of the 400‑some relationships = described in Agency=20 files followed that pattern, however; most involved persons who were = already=20 bona fide journalists when they began undertaking tasks for the = Agency.

The=20 Agency=92s relationships with journalists, as described in CIA files, = include the=20 following general categories:

■ Legitimate,=20 accredited staff members of news organizations=97usually reporters. Some = were=20 paid; some worked for the Agency on a purely voluntary basis. This group = includes many of the best‑known journalists who carried out tasks = for the CIA.=20 The files show that the salaries paid to reporters by newspaper and = broadcast=20 networks were sometimes supplemented by nominal payments from the CIA, = either in=20 the form of retainers, travel expenses or outlays for specific services=20 performed. Almost all the = payments=20 were made in cash. The accredited category also includes photographers,=20 administrative personnel of foreign news bureaus and members of = broadcast=20 technical crews.)

Two=20 of the Agency=92s most valuable personal relationships in the 1960s, = according to=20 CIA officials, were with reporters who covered Latin America=97Jerry = O=92Leary of=20 the Washington Star and Hal Hendrix of the Miami News, a = Pulitzer=20 Prize winner who became a high official of the International Telephone = and=20 Telegraph Corporation. Hendrix was extremely helpful to the Agency in = providing=20 information about individuals in Miami=92s Cuban exile community. = O=92Leary was=20 considered a valued asset in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Agency = files=20 contain lengthy reports of both men=92s activities on behalf of the = CIA.

O=92Leary maintains that his dealings were = limited to=20 the normal give‑and‑take that goes on between reporters = abroad and their=20 sources. CIA officials dispute the contention: =93There=92s no question = Jerry=20 reported for us,=94 said one. =93Jerry did assessing and spotting [of = prospective=20 agents] but he was better as a reporter for us.=94 Referring to = O=92Leary=92s denials,=20 the official added: =93I don=92t know what in the world he=92s worried = about unless=20 he=92s wearing that mantle of integrity the Senate put on you = journalists.=94

O=92Leary=20 attributes the difference of opinion to semantics. =93I might call them = up and say=20 something like, =91Papa Doc has the clap, did you know that?=92 and = they=92d put it in=20 the file. I don=92t consider that reporting for them.... it=92s useful = to be=20 friendly to them and, generally, I felt friendly to them. But I think = they were=20 more helpful to me than I was to them.=94 O=92Leary took particular = exception to=20 being described in the same context as Hendrix. =93Hal was really doing = work for=20 them,=94 said O=92Leary. =93I=92m still with the Star. He ended = up at ITT.=94=20 Hendrix could not be reached for comment. According to Agency officials, = neither=20 Hendrix nor O=92Leary was paid by the CIA.

■ Stringers² and freelancers. Most were = payrolled by the Agency under standard contractual = terms.=20 Their journalistic credentials were often supplied by cooperating news=20 organizations. some filed news stories; = others reported=20 only for the CIA. On some occasions, news organizations were not = informed by the=20 CIA that their stringers were also working for the Agency.

■ Employees of so‑called CIA =93proprietaries.=94 During the past = twenty‑five years,=20 the Agency has secretly bankrolled numerous foreign press services, = periodicals=20 and newspapers=97both English and foreign language=97which provided = excellent cover=20 for CIA operatives. One such publication was the Rome Daily American, = forty percent of which was owned by the CIA until the 1970s. The = Daily=20 American went out of business this year,

■ Editors,=20 publishers and broadcast network executives. The CIAs=20 relationship with most news executives differed fundamentally from those = with=20 working reporters and stringers, who were much more subject to direction = from=20 the Agency. A few executives=97Arthur Hays Sulzberger of the New York = Times=20 among them=97signed secrecy agreements. But such formal = understandings were=20 rare: relationships between Agency officials and media executives were = usually=20 social=97=94The P and Q Street axis in Georgetown,=94 said one source. = =93You don=92t tell=20 Wilharn Paley to = sign a=20 piece of paper saying he won=92t fink.=94

■ Columnists and commentators. There are perhaps a = dozen well=20 known columnists and broadcast commentators whose relationships with the = CIA go=20 far beyond those normally maintained between reporters and their = sources. They=20 are referred to at the Agency as =93known assets=94 and can be counted = on to perform=20 a variety of undercover tasks; they are considered receptive to the = Agency=92s=20 point of view on various subjects. Three of the most widely read = columnists who=20 maintained such ties with the Agency are C.L. Sulzberger of the New = York=20 Times, Joseph Alsop, and the late = Stewart Alsop, whose column appeared in the New York=20 Herald‑Tribune, the Saturday Evening Post and = Newsweek. CIA=20 files contain reports of specific tasks all three undertook. Sulzberger = is still=20 regarded as an active asset by the Agency. According to a senior CIA = official,=20 =93Young Cy Sulzberger had some uses.... He = signed a=20 secrecy agreement because we gave him classified information.... There = was=20 sharing, give and take. We=92d say, =91Wed like to know this; if we tell = you this=20 will it help you get access to so‑and‑so?=92 Because of his = access in Europe he=20 had an Open Sesame. We=92d ask him to just report: =91What=20 did so‑and‑so say, what did he look like, is he healthy?=92 = He was very eager, he=20 loved to cooperate.=94 On one occasion, according to several CIA = officials,=20 Sulzberger was given a briefing paper by the Agency which ran almost = verbatim=20 under the columnist=92s byline in the Times. =93Cy came = out and said,=20 =91I=92m thinking of doing a piece, can you give me some = background?=92=94 a CIA officer=20 said. =93We gave it to Cy as a background = piece and Cy=20 gave it to the printers and put his name on it.=94 Sulzberger denies = that any=20 incident occurred. =93A lot of baloney,=94 he said.

Sulzberger=20 claims that he was never formally =93tasked=94 by the Agency and that he = =93would=20 never get caught near the spook business. My relations were totally = informal=97I=20 had a good many friends,=94 he said. =93I=92m sure they consider = me an asset.=20 They can ask me questions. They find out you=92re going to Slobovia and they say, =91Can we talk to you when = you get=20 back?=92 ... Or they=92ll want to know if the = head of the=20 Ruritanian government is suffering from = psoriasis. But=20 I never took an assignment from one of those guys.... I=92ve known = Wisner well,=20 and Helms and even McCone [former CIA director John McCone] I used to = play golf=20 with. But they=92d have had to he awfully = subtle to have=20 used me.

Sulzberger=20 says he was asked to sign the secrecy agreement in the 1950s. = =93A guy came=20 around and said, =91You are a responsible newsman and we need you to = sign this if=20 we are going to show you anything classified.=92 I said I didn=92t want = to get=20 entangled and told them, =91Go to my uncle [Arthur Hays Sulzberger, then = publisher=20 of the New York Times] and if he says to sign it I will.=92=94 = His uncle=20 subsequently signed such an agreement, Sulzberger said, and he thinks he = did=20 too, though he is unsure. =93I don=92t know, twenty‑some years=20 is a long time.=94 He described the whole question as =93a bubble = in a=20 bathtub.=94

Stewart=20 Alsop=92s relationship with the Agency was = much more=20 extensive than Sulzberger=92s. One official who served at the highest = levels in=20 the CIA said flatly: =93Stew Alsop was a CIA = agent.=94 An=20 equally senior official refused to define Alsop=92s=20 relationship with the Agency except to say it was a formal one. Other = sources=20 said that Alsop was particularly helpful to = the Agency=20 in discussions with, officials of foreign governments=97asking questions = to which=20 the CIA was seeking answers, planting misinformation advantageous to = American=20 policy, assessing opportunities for CIA recruitment of well‑placed = foreigners.

=93Absolute=20 nonsense,=94 said Joseph Alsop of the notion = that his=20 brother was a CIA agent. =93I was closer to the Agency than Stew was, = though Stew=20 was very close. I dare say he did perform some tasks=97he just did the = correct=20 thing as an American.... The Founding Fathers [of the CIA] were close = personal=20 friends of ours. Dick Bissell [former CIA deputy director] was my oldest = friend,=20 from childhood. It was a social thing, my dear fellow. I never received = a dollar, I never signed a secrecy agreement. I = didn=92t have=20 to.... I=92ve done things for them when I thought they were the right = thing to do.=20 I call it doing my duty as a citizen.

Alsop is willing to discuss on the record only two = of the=20 tasks he undertook: a visit to Laos in 1952 at the behest of Frank = Wisner, who=20 felt other American reporters were using anti‑American sources = about uprisings=20 there; and a visit to the Phillipines in = 1953 when the=20 CIA thought his presence there might affect the outcome of an election. = =93Des=20 FitzGerald urged me to go,=94 Alsop recalled. =93It would be less likely that = the election=20 could be stolen [by the opponents of Ramon Magsaysay]=20 if the eyes of the world were on them. I stayed with the ambassador and = wrote=20 about what happened.=94

Alsop maintains that he was never manipulated by = the Agency.=20 =93You can=92t get entangled so they have leverage on you,=94 he said. = =93But what I=20 wrote was true. My view was to get the facts. If someone in the Agency = was=20 wrong, I stopped talking to them=97they=92d given me phony goods.=94 On = one occasion,=20 Alsop said, Richard Helms authorized the = head of the=20 Agency=92s analytical branch to provide Alsop with=20 information on Soviet military presence along the Chinese border. =93The = analytical side of the Agency had been dead wrong about the war in = Vietnam=97they=20 thought it couldn=92t be won,=94 said Alsop. = =93And they=20 were wrong on the Soviet buildup. I stopped talking to them.=94 Today, = he says,=20 =93People in our business would be outraged at the kinds of suggestions = that were=20 made to me. They shouldn=92t be. The CIA did not open itself at all to = people it=20 did not trust. Stew and I were trusted, and I=92m proud of it.=94

MURKY DETAILS=20 OF CIA RELATIONSHIPS WITH INDIVIDuals and news = organizations began=20 trickling out in 1973 when it was first disclosed that the CIA had, on = occasion,=20 employed journalists. Those reports, combined with new information, = serve as=20 casebook studies of the Agency=92s use of journalists for intelligence = purposes.=20 They include:

■ The New York Times. The Agency=92s = relationship with the=20 Times was by far its most valuable among newspapers, according to = CIA=20 officials. From 1950 to 1966, about ten CIA employees were provided = Times=20 cover under arrangements approved by the newspaper=92s late = publisher, Arthur=20 Hays Sulzberger. The cover arrangements were part of a general Times=20 policy=97set by Sulzberger=97to provide assistance to the CIA = whenever=20 possible.

Sulzberger was especially close to Allen = Dulles. =93At=20 that level of contact it was the mighty talking to the mighty,=94 said a = high‑level CIA official who was present at some of the = discussions. =93There was=20 an agreement in principle that, yes indeed, we would help each other. = The=20 question of cover came up on several occasions. It was agreed that the actual=20 arrangements would be handled by subordinates.... The mighty didn=92t = want to know=20 the specifics; they wanted plausible deniability.

A=20 senior CIA official who reviewed a portion of the Agency=92s files on = journalists=20 for two hours on September 15th, 1977, said he found = documentation of=20 five instances in which the Times had provided cover for CIA = employees=20 between 1954 and 1962. In each instance he said, the arrangements were = handled=20 by executives of the Times; the documents all contained standard = Agency=20 language =93showing that this had been checked out at higher levels of = the New=20 York Times,=94 said the official. The documents did not mention = Sulzberger=92s=20 name, however=97only those of subordinates whom the official refused to=20 identify.

The=20 CIA employees who received Times credentials posed as stringers = for the=20 paper abroad and worked as members of clerical staffs in the Times=92 = foreign bureaus. Most were American; two or three were = foreigners.

CIA=20 officials cite two reasons why the Agency=92s working relationship with = the=20 Times was closer and more extensive than with any other paper: = the fact=20 that the Times maintained the largest foreign news operation in = American=20 daily journalism; and the close personal ties between the men who ran = both=20 institutions.

Sulzberger = informed a=20 number of reporters and editors of his general policy of cooperation = with the=20 Agency. =93We were in touch with them=97they=92d talk to us and some = cooperated,=94 said=20 a CIA official. The cooperation usually involved passing on information = and=20 =93spotting=94 prospective agents among foreigners.

Arthur=20 Hays Sulzberger signed a secrecy agreement with the CIA in the 1950s, = according=20 to CIA officials=97a fact confirmed by his nephew, C.L. Sulzberger. = However, there=20 are varying interpretations of the purpose of the agreement: C.L. = Sulzberger=20 says it represented nothing more than a pledge not to disclose = classified=20 information made available to the publisher. That contention is = supported by=20 some Agency officials. Others in the Agency maintain that the agreement=20 represented a pledge never to reveal any of the Times=92 dealings = with the=20 CIA, especially those involving cover. And there are those who note = that,=20 because all cover arrangements are classified, a secrecy agreement would = automatically apply to them.

Attempts=20 to find out which individuals in the Times organization made the = actual=20 arrangements for providing credentials to CIA personnel have been = unsuccessful.=20 In a letter to reporter Stuart Loory in = 1974, Turner=20 Cadedge, managing editor of the Times = from 1951=20 to 1964, wrote that approaches by the CIA had been rebuffed by the = newspaper. =93I=20 knew nothing about any involvement with the CIA... of any of our foreign = correspondents on the New York Times. I heard many times of = overtures to=20 our men by the CIA, seeking to use their privileges, contacts, = immunities and,=20 shall we say, superior intelligence in the sordid business of spying and = informing. If any one of them succumbed to the blandishments or cash = offers, I=20 was not aware of it. Repeatedly, the CIA and other hush‑hush = agencies sought to=20 make arrangements for =91cooperation=92 even with Times = management,=20 especially during or soon after World War II, but we always resisted. = Our motive=20 was to protect our credibility.=94

According=20 to Wayne Phillips, a former Times=20 reporter, the CIA invoked Arthur Hays Sulzberger=92s name when it = tried to=20 recruit him as an undercover operative in 1952 while he was studying at = Columbia=20 University=92s Russian Institute. Phillips said an Agency official told = him that=20 the CIA had =93a working arrangement=94 with the publisher in which = other reporters=20 abroad had been placed on the Agency=92s payroll. Phillips, who remained = at the=20 Times until 1961, later obtained CIA documents under the Freedom = of=20 Information Act which show that the Agency intended to develop him as a=20 clandestine =93asset=94 for use abroad.

On=20 January 31st, 1976, the Times carried a brief story describing = the ClAs attempt to recruit Phillips. It quoted Arthur = Ochs Sulzberger, the present publisher, as = follows: =93I never=20 heard of the Times being approached, either in my capacity as = publisher=20 or as the son of the late Mr. Sulzberger.=94 The Times story, = written by=20 John M. Crewdson, also reported that Arthur = Hays=20 Sulzberger told an unnamed former correspondent that he might he = approached by=20 the CIA after arriving at a new post abroad. Sulzberger told him that he = was not=20 =93under any obligation to agree,=94 the story said and that the = publisher himself=20 would be =93happier=94 if he refused to cooperate. =93But he left it = sort of up to=20 me,=94 the Times quoted its former reporter as saying. =93The = message was if=20 I really wanted to do that, okay, but he didn=92t think it appropriate = for a=20 Times correspondent=94

C.L.=20 Sulzberger, in a telephone interview, said he had no knowledge of any = CIA=20 personnel using Times cover or of reporters for the paper working = actively for the Agency. He was the paper=92s chief of foreign=20 service from 1944 to 1954 and expressed doubt that his uncle = would have=20 approved such arrangements. More typical of the late publisher, = said Sulzberger, was a promise made = to Allen=20 Dulles=92 brother, John Foster, then secretary of state, that no = Times=20 staff member would be permitted to accept an invitation to visit the = People=92s Republic of China without John Foster Dulles=92 consent. Such = an=20 invitation was extended to the publisher=92s nephew in the 1950s; Arthur = Sulzberger forbade him to accept it. =93It was seventeen years before = another=20 Times correspondent was invited,=94 C.L. Sulzberger recalled.

■ The Columbia Broadcasting System. CBS was = unquestionably the=20 CIAs most valuable broadcasting asset. CBS = President=20 William Paley and Allen Dulles enjoyed an = easy working=20 and social relationship. Over the years, the network provided cover for = CIA=20 employees, including at least one well‑known foreign correspondent = and several=20 stringers; it supplied outtakes of newsfilm = to the=20 CIA³; established a formal channel of communication between = the=20 Washington bureau chief and the Agency; gave the Agency access to the = CBS newsfilm library; and allowed reports by CBS = correspondents=20 to the Washington and New York newsrooms to be routinely monitored by = the CIA.=20 Once a year during the 1950s and early 1960s, CBS correspondents joined = the CIA=20 hierarchy for private dinners and briefings.

The=20 details of the CBS‑CIA arrangements were worked out by = subordinates of both=20 Dulles and Paley. =93The head of the company = doesn=92t=20 want to know the fine points, nor does the director,=94 said a CIA = official. =93Both=20 designate aides to work that out. It keeps them above the battle.=94 Dr. = Frank=20 Stanton, for 25 years president of the network, was aware of the general = arrangements Paley made with = Dulles=97including those=20 for cover, according to CIA officials. Stanton, in an interview last = year, said=20 he could not recall any cover arrangements.) But Paley=92s designated contact for the Agency was = Sig Mickelson, president of CBS News between 1954 = and 1961.=20 On one occasion, Mickelson has said, he complained to Stanton about = having to=20 use a pay telephone to call the CIA, and Stanton suggested he install a = private=20 line, bypassing the CBS switchboard, for the purpose. According to = Mickelson, he=20 did so. Mickelson is now president of Radio Free Europe and Radio = Liberty, both=20 of which were associated with the CIA for many years.

In=20 1976, CBS News president Richard Salant = ordered an=20 in‑house investigation of the network's dealings with the CIA. = Some of its=20 findings were first disclosed by Robert Scheer in the=20 Los Angeles Times.) But Salant's = report makes=20 no mention of some of his own dealings with the Agency, which continued = into the=20 1970s.

Many=20 details about the CBS‑CIA relationship were found in Mickelson's = files by two=20 investigators for Salant. Among the = documents they=20 found was a September 13th, 1957, memo to Mickelson fromTed Koop, CBS News bureau chief in Washington from 1948 to = 1961. It=20 describes a phone call to Koop from Colonel Stanley Grogan of the CIA: = "Grogan=20 phoned to say that Reeves [J. B. Love Reeves, another CIA official] is = going to=20 New York to be in charge of the CIA contact office there and will call = to see=20 you and some of your confreres. Grogan says normal activities will = continue to=20 channel through the Washington office of CBS News." The report to Salant also states: "Further investigation of = Mickelson's=20 files reveals some details of the relationship between the CIA and CBS = News....=20 Two key administrators of this relationship were Mickelson and Koop.... = The main=20 activity appeared to be the delivery of CBS newsfilm=20 to the CIA.... In addition there is evidence that, during 1964 to 1971, = film=20 material, including some outtakes, were supplied by the CBS Newsfilm Library to the CIA through and at the = direction of=20 Mr. Koop⁴.... Notes in Mr. Mickelson's files indicate that = the CIA=20 used CBS films for training... All of the above Mickelson activities = were=20 handled on a confidential basis without mentioning the words Central=20 Intelligence Agency. The films were sent to individuals at = post‑office box=20 numbers and were paid for by individual, nor government, checks. ..." = Mickelson=20 also regularly sent the CIA an internal CBS newsletter, according to the = report.

Salant's = investigation led=20 him to conclude that Frank Kearns, a CBS‑TV reporter from 1958 to = 1971, "was a=20 CIA guy who got on the payroll somehow through a CIA contact with = somebody at=20 CBS." Kearns and Austin Goodrich, a CBS stringer, were undercover CIA = employees,=20 hired under arrangements approved by Paley.

Last=20 year a spokesman for Paley denied a report = by former=20 CBS correspondent Daniel Schorr that = Mickelson and he=20 had discussed Goodrich's CIA status during a meeting with two Agency=20 representatives in 1954. The spokesman claimed Paley=20 had no knowledge that Goodrich had worked for the CIA. "When I moved = into the=20 job I was told by Paley that there was an = ongoing=20 relationship with the CIA," Mickelson said in a recent interview. "He = introduced=20 me to two agents who he said would keep in touch. We all discussed the = Goodrich=20 situation and film arrangements. I assumed this was a normal = relationship at the=20 time. This was at the height of the Cold War and I assumed the = communications=20 media were cooperating=97though the Goodrich matter was = compromising.

At=20 the headquarters of CBS News in New York, Paley's=20 cooperation with the CIA is taken for granted by many news executives = and=20 reporters, despite tile denials. Paley, 76, = was not=20 interviewed by Salant's investigators. "It = wouldn't do=20 any good," said one CBS executive. "It is the single subject about which = his=20 memory has failed."

Salant discussed his own contacts with the CIA, = and the fact=20 he continued many of his predecessor's practices, in an interview with = this=20 reporter last year. The contacts, he said, began in February 1961, "when = I got a=20 phone call from a CIA man who said he had a working relationship with = Sig Mickelson. The man said, 'Your bosses know all = about=20 it.'" According to Salant, the CIA representative asked that CBS = continue to=20 supply the Agency with unedited newstapes = and make its=20 correspondents available for debriefing by Agency officials. = Said Salant: "I said no on = talking to the=20 reporters, and let them see broadcast tapes, but no = outtakes. This went on for a number of = years=97into=20 the early Seventies."

In=20 1964 and 1965, Salant served on a = super-secret CIA=20 task force which explored methods of beaming American propaganda = broadcasts to=20 the People's Republic of China. The other members of the four‑man = study team=20 were Zbigniew Brzezinski,=20 then a professor at Columbia University; William Griffith, then = professor of=20 political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology., and = John Haves,=20 then vice‑president of the Washington Post Company for = radio‑TV⁵. The=20 principal government officials associated with the project were Cord = Meyer of=20 the CIA; McGeorge Bundy, then special = assistant to the=20 president for national security; Leonard Marks, then director of the = USIA; and=20 Bill Moyers, then special assistant to = President=20 Lyndon Johnson and now a CBS correspondent.

Salant's involvement in the project began with a = call from=20 Leonard Marks, "who told me the White House wanted to form a committee = of four=20 people to make a study of U.S. overseas broadcasts behind the Iron = Curtain."=20 When Salant arrived in Washington for the = first=20 meeting he was told that the project was CIA sponsored. "Its purpose," = he said,=20 "was to determine how best to set up shortwave broadcasts into Red = China."=20 Accompanied by a CIA officer named Paul Henzie, the=20 committee of four subsequently traveled around the world inspecting = facilities=20 run by Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty both CIA‑run operations = at the time),=20 the Voice of America and Armed Forces Radio. After more than a year of = study,=20 they submitted a report to Moyers = recommending that=20 the government establish a broadcast service, run by the Voice of = America, to be=20 beamed at the People's Republic of China. Salant has=20 served two tours as head of CBS News, from 1961‑64 and = 1966‑present. At the time=20 of the China project he was a CBS corporate executive.)

■ Time and Newsweek magazines. = According to CIA=20 and Senate sources, Agency files contain written agreements with former = foreign=20 correspondents and stringers for both the weekly news magazines. The same sources refused to = say whether=20 the CIA has ended all its associations with individuals who work for the = two=20 publications. Allen Dulles often interceded with his good friend, the = late Henry=20 Luce, founder of Time and Life magazines, who readily = allowed=20 certain members of his staff to work for the Agency and agreed to = provide jobs=20 and credentials for other CIA operatives who lacked journalistic = experience.

For=20 many years, Luce's personal emissary to the CIA was C.D. Jackson, a Time = Inc.,=20 vice‑president who was publisher of Life magazine from 1960 = until his=20 death in 1964.While a Time executive, Jackson coauthored a = CIA‑sponsored=20 study recommending the reorganization of the American intelligence = services in=20 the early 1950s. Jackson, whose Time‑Life service was interrupted = by a one‑year White House tour as an assistant = to President=20 Dwight Eisenhower, approved specific arrangements for providing CIA = employees=20 with Time‑Life cover. Some of these arrangements were made with = the knowledge of=20 Luce's wife, Clare Boothe. Other = arrangements for=20 Time cover, according to CIA officials including those who dealt = with=20 Luce), were made with the knowledge of Hedley Donovan, now = editor‑in‑chief of=20 Time Inc. Donovan, who took over editorial direction of all Time Inc.=20 publications in 1959, denied in a telephone interview that he knew of = any such=20 arrangements. "I was never approached and I'd be amazed if Luce approved = such=20 arrangements," Donovan said. "Luce had a very scrupulous regard for the=20 difference between journalism and government."

In=20 the 1950s and early 1960s, Time magazine's foreign correspondents = attended CIA "briefing" dinners similar to those the CIA held for CBS. = And Luce,=20 according to CIA officials, made it a regular practice to brief Dulles = or other=20 high Agency officials when he returned from his frequent trips abroad. = Luce and=20 the men who ran his magazines in the 1950s and 1960s encouraged their = foreign=20 correspondents to provide help to the CIA, particularly information that = might=20 be useful to the Agency for intelligence purposes or recruiting = foreigners.

At=20 Newsweek, Agency sources reported, the CIA engaged the services = of'=20 several foreign correspondents and stringers under arrangements approved = by=20 senior editors at the magazine. Newsweek's stringer in Rome in = the=20 mid‑Fifties made little secret of the fact that he worked for the = CIA. Malcolm=20 Muir, Newsweek's editor from its founding in 1937 until its sale = to the=20 Washington Post Company in 1961, said in a recent interview that his = dealings=20 with the CIA were limited to private briefings he gave Allen Dulles = after trips=20 abroad and arrangements he approved for regular debriefing of = Newsweek=20 correspondents by the Agency. He said that he had never provided = cover for=20 CIA operatives, but that others high in the Newsweek organization = might=20 have done so without his knowledge.

"I=20 would have thought there might have been stringers who were agents, but = I didn't=20 know who they were," said Muir. "I do think in those days the CIA kept = pretty=20 close touch with all responsible reporters. Whenever I heard something = that I=20 thought might be of interest to Allen Dulles, I'd call him up.... At one = point=20 he appointed one of his CIA men to keep in regular contact with our = reporters, a=20 chap that I knew but whose name I can't remember. I had a number of = friends in=20 Alien Dulles' organization." Muir said that Harry Kern, Newsweek's=20 foreign editor from 1945 until 1956, and Ernest K. Lindley, the = magazine's=20 Washington bureau chief during the same period "regularly checked in = with=20 various fellows in the CIA."

"To=20 the best of my knowledge." said Kern, "nobody at Newsweek worked for the = CIA...=20 The informal relationship was there. Why have = anybody=20 sign anything? What we knew we told them [the CIA] and the State = Department....=20 When I went to Washington, I would talk to Foster or Allen Dulles about = what was=20 going on. ... We thought it was admirable at the time. We were all on = the same=20 side." CIA officials say that Kern's dealings with the Agency were = extensive. In=20 1956, he left Newsweek to run Foreign Reports, a=20 Washington‑based newsletter whose subscribers Kern refuses to = identify.

Ernest=20 Lindley, who remained at Newsweek until 1961, said in a recent = interview=20 that he regularly consulted with Dulles and other high CIA officials = before=20 going abroad and briefed them upon his return. "Allen was very helpful = to me and=20 I tried to reciprocate when I could," he said. "I'd give him my = impressions of=20 people I'd met overseas. Once or twice he asked me to brief a large = group of=20 intelligence people; when I came back from the Asian‑African = conference in 1955,=20 for example; they mainly wanted to know about various people."

As=20 Washington bureau chief, Lindley said he learned from Malcolm Muir that = the=20 magazine's stringer in southeastern Europe was a CIA contract = employee=97given=20 credentials under arrangements worked out with the management. "I = remember it=20 came up=97whether it was a good idea to keep this person from the = Agency;=20 eventually it was decided to discontinue the association," Lindley = said.

When=20 Newsweek was purchased by the Washington Post = Company,=20 publisher Philip L. Graham was informed by Agency officials that the CIA = occasionally used the magazine for cover purposes, according to CIA = sources. "It=20 was widely known that Phil Graham was somebody you could get help from," = said a=20 former deputy director of the Agency. "Frank Wisner dealt with him." = Wisner,=20 deputy director of the CIA from 1950 until shortly before his suicide in = 1965,=20 was the Agency's premier orchestrator of = "black"=20 operations, including many in which journalists were involved. Wisner = liked to=20 boast of his "mighty Wurlitzer," a wondrous propaganda instrument he = built, and=20 played, with help from the press.) Phil Graham was probably Wisner's = closest=20 friend. But Graharn, who committed suicide = in 1963,=20 apparently knew little of the specifics of any cover arrangements with=20 Newsweek, CIA sources said.

In=20 1965‑66, an accredited Newsweek stringer in the Far = East was in=20 fact a CIA contract employee earning an annual salary of $10,000 from = the=20 Agency, according to Robert T. Wood, then a CIA officer in the Hong Kong = station. Some, Newsweek correspondents and stringers continued to = maintain covert ties with the Agency into the 1970s, CIA sources = said.

Information=20 about Agency dealings with the Washington Post newspaper is = extremely=20 sketchy. According to CIA officials, some Post stringers have = been CIA=20 employees, but these officials say they do not know if anyone in the = Post=20 management was aware of the arrangements.

All=20 editors‑in‑chief and managing editors of the Post = since 1950 say they=20 knew of no formal Agency relationship with either stringers or members = of the=20 Post staff. =93If anything was done it was done by Phil without = our=20 knowledge,=94 said one. Agency officials, meanwhile, make no claim that = Post=20 staff members have had covert affiliations with the Agency while = working for=20 the paper.⁶

Katharine=20 Graham, Philip Graham=92s widow and the current publisher of the = Post, says=20 she has never been informed of any CIA relationships with either Post = or=20 Newsweek personnel. In November of 1973, Mrs. Graham called = William Colby=20 and asked if any Post stringers or staff members were associated with = the CIA.=20 Colby assured her that no staff members were employed by the Agency but = refused=20 to discuss the question of stringers.

■ The Louisville Courier‑Journal. = From December=20 1964 until March 1965, a CIA undercover operative named Robert H. = Campbell=20 worked on the Courier‑Journal. According to = high‑level CIA sources,=20 Campbell was hired by the paper under arrangements the Agency made with = Norman=20 E. Isaacs, then executive editor of the Courier‑Journal. = Barry Bingham=20 Sr., then publisher of the paper, also had knowledge of the = arrangements, the=20 sources said. Both Isaacs and Bingham have denied knowing that Campbell = was an=20 intelligence agent when he was hired.

The=20 complex saga of Campbell=92s hiring was first revealed in a = Courier‑Journal=20 story written by James R Herzog on March 27th, 1976, during the = Senate=20 committee=92s investigation, Herzog=92s account began: =93When = 28‑year‑old Robert H.=20 Campbell was hired as a Courier‑Journal reporter in = December 1964, he=20 couldn=92t type and knew little about news writing.=94 The account then = quoted the=20 paper=92s former managing editor as saying that Isaacs told him that = Campbell was=20 hired as a result of a CIA request: =93Norman said, when he was in = Washington [in=20 1964], he had been called to lunch with some friend of his who was with = the CIA=20 [and that] he wanted to send this young fellow down to get him a little=20 knowledge of newspapering.=94 All aspects of = Campbell=92s=20 hiring were highly unusual. No effort had been made to check his = credentials,=20 and his employment records contained the following two notations: = =93Isaacs has=20 files of correspondence and investigation of this man=94; and, =93Hired = for=20 temporary work=97no reference checks completed or needed.=94

The=20 level of Campbell=92s journalistic abilities apparently remained = consistent during=20 his stint at the paper, =93The stuff that Campbell turned in was almost=20 unreadable,=94 said a former assistant city editor. One of Campbell=92s = major=20 reportorial projects was a feature about wooden Indians. It was never = published.=20 During his tenure at the paper, Campbell frequented a bar a few steps = from the=20 office where, on occasion, he reportedly confided to fellow drinkers = that he was=20 a CIA employee.

According=20 to CIA sources, Campbell=92s tour at the Courier‑Journal = was arranged to=20 provide him with a record of journalistic experience that would enhance = the=20 plausibility of future reportorial cover and teach him something about = the=20 newspaper business. The Courier‑Journal=92s investigation = also turned up=20 the fact that before coming to Louisville he had worked briefly for the = Hornell,=20 New York, Evening Tribune, published by Freedom News, Inc. CIA = sources=20 said the Agency had made arrangements with that paper=92s management to = employ=20 Campbell.⁷

At=20 the Courier‑Journal, Campbell was hired under arrangements = made with=20 Isaacs and approved by Bingham, said CIA and Senate sources. =93We paid = the=20 Courier‑Journal so they could pay his salary,=94 said an = Agency official=20 who was involved in the transaction. Responding by letter to these = assertions,=20 Isaacs, who left Louisville to become president and publisher of the = Wilmington=20 Delaware) News & Journal, said: =93All I can do is repeat the = simple=20 truth=97that never, under any circumstances, or at any time, have I ever = knowingly=20 hired a government agent. I=92ve also tried to dredge my memory, but = Campbell=92s=20 hiring meant so little to me that nothing emerges.... None of this is to = say=20 that I couldn=92t have been =91had.=92=94.Barry Bingham Sr.,=20 said last year in a telephone interview that he had no specific memory = of=20 Campbell=92s hiring and denied that he knew of any arrangements between = the=20 newspaper=92s management and the CIA. However, CIA officials said that = the=20 Courier‑Journal, through contacts with Bingham, provided = other=20 unspecified assistance to the Agency in the 1950s and 1960s. The=20 Courier‑Journal=92s detailed, front‑page account of = Campbell=92s hiring was=20 initiated by Barry Bingham Jr., who succeeded his father as editor and = publisher=20 of the paper in 1971. The article is the only major piece of = self‑investigation=20 by a newspaper that has appeared on this subject.⁸

■ The American Broadcasting Company and the National = Broadcasting=20 Company. According to CIA officials, ABC continued to provide = cover for=20 some CIA operatives through the 1960s. One was Sam Jaffe who CIA = officials said=20 performed clandestine tasks for the Agency. Jaffe has acknowledged only=20 providing the CIA with information. In addition, another = well‑known network=20 correspondent performed covert tasks for the Agency, said CIA sources. = At the=20 time of the Senate bearings, Agency officials serving at the highest = levels=20 refused to say whether the CIA was still maintaining active = relationships with=20 members of the ABC‑News organization. All cover arrangements were = made with the=20 knowledge off ABC executives, the sources said.

These=20 same sources professed to know few specifies about the Agency=92s = relationships=20 with NBC, except that several foreign correspondents of the network = undertook=20 some assignments for the Agency in the 1950s and 1960s. =93It was a = thing people=20 did then,=94 said Richard Wald, president of = NBC News=20 since 1973. =93I wouldn=92t be surprised if people here=97including some = of the=20 correspondents in those days=97had connections with the Agency.=94

■ The Copley Press, and its subsidiary, the Copley News=20 Service. This relationship, first disclosed publicly by reporters = Joe=20 Trento and Dave Roman in Penthouse = magazine, is=20 said by CIA officials to have been among the Agency=92s most productive = in terms=20 of getting =93outside=94 cover for its employees. Copley owns nine = newspapers in=20 California and Illinois=97among them the San Diego Union and = Evening=20 Tribune. The Trento‑Roman account, = which was=20 financed by a grant from the Fund for Investigative Journalism, asserted = that at=20 least twenty‑three Copley News Service employees performed work = for the CIA.=20 =93The Agency=92s involvement with the Copley organization is so = extensive that it=92s=20 almost impossible to sort out,=94 said a CIA official who was asked = about the=20 relationship late in 1976. Other Agency officials said then that James = S.=20 Copley, the chain=92s owner until his death in 1973, personally made = most of the=20 cover arrangements with the CIA.

According to Trento and=20 Roman, Copley personally volunteered his news service to = then‑president=20 Eisenhower to act as =93the eyes and ears=94 against =93the Communist = threat in Latin=20 and Central America=94 for =93our intelligence services.=94 James Copley was also the = guiding hand=20 behind the Inter‑American Press Association, a CIA‑funded = organization with=20 heavy membership among right‑wing Latin American newspaper = editors.

■ Other major news organizations. According to Agency = officials, CIA files document additional cover arrangements with the = following=20 news‑gathering organizations, among others: the New York = Herald‑Tribune,=20 the Saturday‑Evening Post, Scripps‑Howard Newspapers, = Hearst Newspapers=20 Seymour K. Freidin, Hearst=92s current = London bureau=20 chief and a former Herald‑Tribune editor = and=20 correspondent, has been identified as a CIA operative by Agency = sources),=20 Associated Press,⁹ United Press International, the Mutual=20 Broadcasting System, Reuters and the Miami Herald. Cover = arrangements=20 with the Herald, according to CIA officials, were unusual in that = they=20 were made =93on the ground by the CIA station in Miami, not from CIA=20 headquarters.

=93And=20 that=92s just a small part of the list,=94 in the words of one official = who served=20 in the CIA hierarchy. Like many sources, this official said that the = only way to=20 end the uncertainties about aid furnished the Agency by journalists is = to=20 disclose the contents of the CIA files=97a course opposed by almost all = of the=20 thirty‑five present and former CIA officials interviewed over the = course of a=20 year,

COLBY CUTS HIS LOSSES

THE = CIA=92S USE=20 OF JOURNALISTS CONTINUED VIRtually unabated until = 1973 when, in=20 response to public disclosure that the Agency had secretly employed = American=20 reporters, William Colby began scaling down the program. In his public=20 statements, Colby conveyed the impression that the use of journalists = had been=20 minimal and of limited importance to the Agency.

He=20 then initiated a series of moves intended to convince the press, = Congress and=20 the public that the CIA had gotten out of the news business. But = according to=20 Agency officials, Colby had in fact thrown a protective net around his = valuable=20 intelligence in the journalistic community. He ordered his deputies to = maintain=20 Agency ties with its best journalist contacts while severing formal=20 relationships with many regarded as inactive, relatively unproductive or = only=20 marginally important. In reviewing Agency files to comply with Colby=92s = directive, officials found that many journalists had not performed = useful=20 functions for the CIA in years. Such relationships, perhaps as many as a = hundred, were terminated between 1973 and 1976.

Meanwhile,=20 important CIA operatives who had been placed on the staffs of some major = newspaper and broadcast outlets were told to resign and become stringers = or=20 freelancers, thus enabling Colby to assure concerned editors that = members of=20 their staffs were not CIA employees. Colby also feared that some = valuable=20 stringer‑operatives might find their covers blown if scrutiny of = the Agency=92s=20 ties with journalists continued. Some of these individuals were = reassigned to=20 jobs on so‑called proprietary publications=97foreign periodicals = and broadcast=20 outlets secretly funded and staffed by the CIA. Other journalists who = had signed=20 formal contracts with the CIA=97making them employees of the = Agency=97were released=20 from their contracts, and asked to continue working under less formal=20 arrangements.

In=20 November 1973, after many such shifts had been made, Colby told = reporters and=20 editors from the New York Times and the Washington Star = that the=20 Agency had =93some three dozen=94 American newsmen =93on the CIA = payroll,=94 including=20 five who worked for =93general‑circulation news organizations.=94 = Yet even while the=20 Senate Intelligence Committee was holding its hearings in 1976, = according to=20 high‑level CIA sources, the CIA continued to maintain ties with = seventy‑five to=20 ninety journalists of every description=97executives, reporters, = stringers,=20 photographers, columnists, bureau clerks and members of broadcast = technical=20 crews. More than half of these had been moved off CIA contracts and = payrolls but=20 they were still bound by other secret agreements with the Agency. = According to=20 an unpublished report by the House Select Committee on Intelligence, = chaired by=20 Representative Otis Pike, at least fifteen news organizations were still = providing cover for CIA operatives as of 1976.

Colby,=20 who built a reputation as one of the most skilled undercover tacticians = in the=20 CIA=92s history, had himself run journalists in clandestine operations = before=20 becoming director in 1973. But even he was said by his closest = associates to=20 have been disturbed at how extensively and, in his view, = indiscriminately, the=20 Agency continued to use journalists at the time he took over. =93Too = prominent,=94=20 the director frequently said of some of the individuals and news = organizations=20 then working with the CIA. Others in the Agency refer to their = best‑known=20 journalistic assets as =93brand names.=94)

=93Colby=92s concern=20 was that he might lose the resource altogether unless we became a little = more=20 careful about who we used and how we got them,=94 explained one of the = former=20 director=92s deputies. The thrust of Colby=92s subsequent actions was to = move the=20 Agency=92s affiliations away from the so‑called =93majors=94 and = to concentrate them=20 instead in smaller newspaper chains, broadcasting groups and such = specialized=20 publications as trade journals and newsletters.

After=20 Colby left the Agency on January 28th, 1976, and was succeeded by George = Bush,=20 the CIA announced a new policy: =93Effective immediately, the CIA will = not enter=20 into any paid or contractual relationship with any full‑time or = part‑time news=20 correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper, = periodical, radio=20 or television network or station=94 At the time of the announcement, the = Agency=20 acknowledged that the policy would result in termination of less than = half of=20 the relationships with the 50 U.S. journalists it said were still = affiliated=20 with the Agency. The text of the announcement noted that the CIA would = continue=20 to =93welcome=94 the voluntary, unpaid cooperation of journalists. Thus, = many=20 relationships were permitted to remain intact.

The=20 Agency=92s unwillingness to end its use of journalists and its continued = relationships with some news executives is largely the product of two = basic=20 facts of the intelligence game: journalistic cover is ideal because of = the=20 inquisitive nature of a reporter=92s job; and many other sources of = institutional=20 cover have been denied the CIA in recent years by businesses, = foundations and=20 educational institutions that once cooperated with the Agency.

=93It=92s tough to run a secret agency in = this country,=94=20 explained one high‑level CIA official. =93We have a curious = ambivalence about=20 intelligence. In order to serve overseas we need cover. But we have been = fighting a rear‑guard action to try and provide cover. The Peace = Corps is=20 off‑limits, so is USIA, the foundations and voluntary = organizations have been=20 off‑limits since =9167, and there is a self‑imposed = prohibition on Fulbrights [Fulbright Scholars]. If you take the = American=20 community and line up who could work for the CIA and who couldn=92t = there is a=20 very narrow potential. Even the Foreign Service doesn=92t want us. So = where the=20 hell do you go? Business is nice, but the = press is a=20 natural. One journalist is worth twenty agents. He has access, the = ability to=20 ask questions without arousing suspicion.=94

ROLE OF THE CHURCH=20 COMMITTEE

DESPITE THE=20 EVIDENCE OF WIDESPREAD CIA USE OF journalists, the Senate = Intelligence=20 Committee and its staff decided against questioning any of the = reporters,=20 editors, publishers or broadcast executives whose relationships with the = Agency=20 are detailed in CIA files.

According=20 to sources in the Senate and the Agency, the use of journalists was one = of two=20 areas of inquiry which the CIA went to extraordinary lengths to curtail. = The=20 other was the Agency=92s continuing and extensive use of academics for = recruitment=20 and information gathering purposes.

In=20 both instances, the sources said, former directors Colby and Bush and = CIA=20 special counsel Mitchell Rogovin were able = to convince=20 key members of the committee that full inquiry or even limited public = disclosure=20 of the dimensions of the activities would do irreparable damage to the = nation=92s=20 intelligence‑gathering apparatus, as well as to the reputations of = hundreds of=20 individuals. Colby was reported to have been especially persuasive in = arguing=20 that disclosure would bring on a latter‑day =93witch hunt=94 in = which the victims=20 would be reporters, publishers and editors.

Walter=20 Elder, deputy to former CIA director McCone and the principal Agency = liaison to=20 the Church committee, argued that the committee lacked jurisdiction = because=20 there had been no misuse of journalists by the CIA; the relationships = had been=20 voluntary. Elder cited as an example the case of the Louisville=20 Courier‑Journal. =93Church and other people on the committee = were on the=20 chandelier about the Courier‑Journal,=94 one Agency = official said, =93until=20 we pointed out that we had gone to the editor to arrange cover, and that = the=20 editor had said, =91Fine.=92=94

Some=20 members of the Church committee and staff feared that Agency officials = had=20 gained control of the inquiry and that they were being hoodwinked. = =93The Agency=20 was extremely clever about it and the committee played right into its = hands,=94=20 said one congressional source familiar with all aspects of the inquiry. = =93Church=20 and some of the other members were much more interested in making = headlines than=20 in doing serious, tough investigating. The Agency pretended to be giving = up a=20 lot whenever it was asked about the flashy stuff=97assassinations and = secret=20 weapons and James Bond operations. Then, when it came to things that = they didn=92t=20 want to give away, that were much more important to the Agency, Colby in = particular called in his chits. And the committee bought it.=94

The=20 Senate committee=92s investigation into the use of journalists was = supervised by=20 William B. Bader, a former CIA intelligence officer who returned briefly = to the=20 Agency this year as deputy to CIA director Stansfield=20 Turner and is now a high‑level intelligence official at the = Defense Department.=20 Bader was assisted by David Aaron, who now serves as the deputy to Zbigniew Brzezinski, = President=20 Carter=92s national security adviser.

According=20 to colleagues on the staff of the Senate inquiry, both Bader and Aaron = were=20 disturbed by the information contained in CIA files about journalists; = they=20 urged that further investigation he undertaken by the Senate=92s new = permanent CIA=20 oversight committee. That committee, however, has spent its first year = of=20 existence writing a new charter for the CIA, and members say there has = been=20 little interest in delving further into the CIA=92s use of the = press.

Bader=92s investigation was conducted = under unusually=20 difficult conditions. His first request for specific information on the = use of=20 journalists was turned down by the CIA on grounds that there had been no = abuse=20 of authority and that current intelligence operations might he = compromised.=20 Senators Walter Huddleston, Howard Baker, Gary Hart, Walter Mondale and = Charles=20 Mathias=97who had expressed interest in the subject of the press and the = CIA=97shared Bader=92s distress at the CIA=92s reaction. In a series of = phone calls=20 and meetings with CIA director George Bush and other Agency officials, = the=20 senators insisted that the committee staff be provided information about = the=20 scope of CIA‑press activities. Finally, Bush agreed to order a = search of the=20 files and have those records pulled which deals with operations where=20 journalists had been used. But the raw files could not he made available = to=20 Bader or the committee, Bush insisted. Instead, the director decided, = his=20 deputies would condense the material into one‑paragraph = summaries=20 describing in the most general terms the activities of each individual=20 journalist. Most important, Bush decreed, the names of journalists and = of the=20 news organizations with which they were affiliated would be omitted from = the=20 summaries. However, there might be some indication of the region where = the=20 journalist had served and a general description of the type of news = organization=20 for which he worked.

Assembling=20 the summaries was difficult, according to CIA officials who supervised = the job.=20 There were no =93journalist files=94 per se and information had to be = collected from=20 divergent sources that reflect the highly compartmentalized character of = the=20 CIA. Case officers who had handled journalists supplied some names. = Files were=20 pulled on various undercover operations in which it seemed logical that=20 journalists had been used. Significantly, all work by reporters for the = Agency=20 under the category of covert operations, not foreign intelligence.) Old = station=20 records were culled. =93We really had to scramble,=94 said one = official.

After=20 several weeks, Bader began receiving the summaries, which numbered over = 400 by=20 the time the Agency said it had completed searching its files.

The Agency played an intriguing numbers = game with=20 the committee. Those who prepared the material say it was physically = impossible=20 to produce all of the Agency=92s files on the use of journalists. =93We = gave them a=20 broad, representative picture,=94 said one agency official. =93We never = pretended it=20 was a total description of the range of activities over 25 years, or of = the=20 number of journalists who have done things for us.=94 A relatively small = number of=20 the summaries described the activities of foreign = journalists=97including those=20 working as stringers for American publications. Those officials most=20 knowledgeable about the subject say that a figure of 400 American = journalists is=20 on the low side of the actual number who maintained covert relationships = and=20 undertook clandestine tasks.

Bader=20 and others to whom he described the contents of the summaries = immediately=20 reached some general conclusions: the sheer number of covert = relationships with=20 journalists was far greater than the CIA had ever hinted; and the = Agency=92s use=20 of reporters and news executives was an intelligence asset of the first=20 magnitude. Reporters had been involved in almost every conceivable kind = of=20 operation. Of the 400‑plus individuals whose activities were = summarized, between=20 200 and 250 were =93working journalists=94 in the usual sense of the = term=97reporters,=20 editors, correspondents, photographers; the rest were employed at least=20 nominally) by book publishers, trade publications and newsletters.

Still,=20 the summaries were just that: compressed, vague, sketchy, incomplete. They could be subject to ambiguous=20 interpretation. And they contained no suggestion that the CIA had abused = its=20 authority by manipulating the editorial content of American newspapers = or=20 broadcast reports.

Bader=92s unease with what he had found = led him to=20 seek advice from several experienced hands in the fields of foreign = relations=20 and intelligence. They suggested that he press for more information and = give=20 those members of the committee in whom he had the most confidence a = general idea=20 of what the summaries revealed. Bader again went to Senators Huddleston, = Baker,=20 Hart, Mondale and Mathias. Meanwhile, he told the CIA that he wanted to = see=20 more=97the full files on perhaps a hundred or so of the individuals = whose=20 activities had been summarized. The request was turned down outright. = The Agency=20 would provide no more information on the subject. Period.

The CIA=92s intransigence led to an = extraordinary=20 dinner meeting at Agency headquarters in late March 1976. Those present = included=20 Senators Frank Church who had now been briefed by Bader), and John = Tower, the=20 vice‑chairman of the committee; Bader; William Miller, director of = the committee=20 staff; CIA director Bush; Agency counsel Rogovin; and=20 Seymour Bolten, a high‑level CIA = operative who for=20 years had been a station chief in Germany and Willy Brandt=92s case = officer. Bolten had been deputized by Bush to deal with the = committee=92s requests for information on journalists and academics. At = the=20 dinner, the Agency held to its refusal to provide any full files. Nor = would it=20 give the committee the names of any individual journalists described in = the 400=20 summaries or of the news organizations with whom they were affiliated. = The=20 discussion, according to participants, grew heated. The committee=92s=20 representatives said they could not honor their mandate=97to determine = if the CIA=20 had abused its authority=97without further information. The CIA = maintained it=20 could not protect its legitimate intelligence operations or its = employees if=20 further disclosures were made to the committee. Many of the journalists = were=20 contract employees of the Agency, Bush said at one point, and the CIA = was no=20 less obligated to them than to any other agents.

Finally,=20 a highly unusual agreement was hammered out: Bader and Miller would be = permitted=20 to examine =93sanitized=94 versions of the full files of = twenty‑five journalists=20 selected from the summaries; but the names of the journalists and the = news=20 organizations which employed them would be blanked out, as would the = identities=20 of other CIA employees mentioned in the files. Church and Tower would be = permitted to examine the unsanitized=20 versions of five of the twenty‑five files=97to attest that the = CIA was not=20 hiding anything except the names. The whole deal was contingent on an = agreement=20 that neither Bader, Miner, Tower nor Church = would=20 reveal the contents of the files to other members of the committee or = staff.

Bader=20 began reviewing the 400‑some summaries again. His object was to = select=20 twenty‑five that, on the basis of the sketchy information they = contained, seemed=20 to represent a cross section. Dates of CIA activity, general = descriptions of=20 news organizations, types of journalists and undercover operations all = figured=20 in his calculations.

From the twenty‑five files he got = back, according to=20 Senate sources and CIA officials, an unavoidable conclusion emerged: = that to a=20 degree never widely suspected, the CIA in the 1950s, =9160s and even = early =9170s=20 had concentrated its relationships with journalists in the most = prominent=20 sectors of the American press corps, including four or five of the = largest=20 newspapers in the country, the broadcast networks and the two major = newsweekly=20 magazines. Despite the omission of names and affiliations from the = twenty‑five=20 detailed files each was between three and eleven inches thick), the = information=20 was usually sufficient to tentatively identify either=20 the newsman, his affiliation or both=97particularly because so = many of them=20 were prominent in the profession.

=93There=20 is quite an incredible spread of relationships,=94 Bader reported to the = senators.=20 =93You don=92t need to manipulate Time magazine, for example, = because there=20 are Agency people at the management level.=94

Ironically,=20 one major news organization that set limits on its dealings with the = CIA,=20 according to Agency officials, was the one with perhaps the greatest = editorial=20 affinity for the Agency=92s long‑range goals and policies: U.S. = News and World=20 Report. The late David Lawrence, the columnist and founding editor = of=20 U.S. News, was a close friend of Allen Dulles. But he repeatedly = refused=20 requests by the CIA director to use the magazine for cover purposes, the = sources=20 said. At one point, according to a high CIA official, Lawrence issued = orders to=20 his sub‑editors in which he threatened to fire any U.S. News = employee who=20 was found to have entered into a formal relationship with the Agency. = Former=20 editorial executives at the magazine confirmed that such orders had been = issued.=20 CIA sources declined to say, however, if the magazine remained = off‑limits to the=20 Agency after Lawrence=92s death in 1973 or if Lawrence=92s orders had = been=20 followed.)

Meanwhile, Bader attempted to get more = information=20 from the CIA, particularly about the Agency=92s current relationships = with=20 journalists. He encountered a stone wall. =93Bush has done nothing to = date,=94 Bader=20 told associates. =93None of the important operations are affected in = even a=20 marginal way.=94 The CIA also refused the staffs requests for more = information on=20 the use of academics. Bush began to urge members of the committee to = curtail its=20 inquiries in both areas and conceal its findings in the final report. = =93He kept=20 saying, =91Don=92t fuck these guys in the press and on the campuses,=92 = pleading that=20 they were the only areas of public life with any credibility left,=94 = reported a=20 Senate source. Colby, Elder and Rogovin also = implored=20 individual members of the committee to keep secret what the staff had = found.=20 =93There were a lot of representations that if this stuff got out some = of the=20 biggest names in journalism would get smeared,=94 said another source. = Exposure of=20 the CIA=92s relationships with journalists and academics, the Agency = feared, would=20 close down two of the few avenues of agent recruitment still open. = =93The danger=20 of exposure is not the other side,=94 explained one CIA expert in covert = operations. =93This is not stuff the other side doesn=92t know about. = The concern of=20 the Agency is that another area of cover will be denied.=94

A=20 senator who was the object of the Agency=92s lobbying later said: = =93From the CIA=20 point of view this was the highest, most sensitive covert program of = all.... It=20 was a much larger part of the operational system than has been = indicated.=94 He=20 added, =93I had a great compulsion to press the point but it was late = .... If we=20 had demanded, they would have gone the legal route to fight it.=94

Indeed,=20 time was running out for the committee. In the view of many staff = members, it=20 had squandered its resources in the search for CIA assassination plots = and=20 poison pen letters. It had undertaken the inquiry into journalists = almost as an=20 afterthought. The dimensions of the program and the CIA=92s sensitivity = to=20 providing information on it had caught the staff and the committee by = surprise.=20 The CIA oversight committee that would succeed the Church panel would = have the=20 inclination and the time to inquire into the subject methodically; if, = as seemed=20 likely, the CIA refused to cooperate further, the mandate of the = successor=20 committee would put it in a more advantageous position to wage a = protracted=20 fight .... Or so the reasoning went as Church = and the=20 few other senators even vaguely familiar with Bader=92s findings reached = a=20 decision not to pursue the matter further. No journalists would be = interviewed=20 about their dealings with the Agency=97either by the staff or by the = senators, in=20 secret or in open session. The specter, first raised by CIA officials, = of a=20 witch hunt in the press corps haunted some members of the staff and the=20 committee. =93We weren=92t about to bring up guys to the committee and = then have=20 everybody say they=92ve been traitors to the ideals of their = profession,=94 said a=20 senator.

Bader,=20 according to associates, was satisfied with the decision and believed = that the=20 successor committee would pick up the inquiry where he had left it. He = was=20 opposed to making public the names of individual journalists. He had = been=20 concerned all along that he had entered a =93gray area=94 in which there = were no=20 moral absolutes. Had the CIA =93manipulated=94 the press in the classic = sense of the=20 term? Probably not, he concluded; the major news organizations and their = executives had willingly lent their resources to the Agency; foreign=20 correspondents had regarded work for the CIA as a national service and a = way of=20 getting better stories and climbing to the top of their profession. Had = the CIA=20 abused its authority? It had dealt with the press almost exactly as it = had dealt=20 with other institutions from which it sought cover =97 the diplomatic = service,=20 academia, corporations. There was nothing in the CIA=92s charter which = declared=20 any of these institutions off‑limits to America=92s intelligence = service. And, in=20 the case of the press, the Agency had exercised more care in its = dealings than=20 with many other institutions; it had gone to considerable lengths to = restrict=20 its role to information‑gathering and cover.¹⁰

Bader was also said to be concerned that = his=20 knowledge was so heavily based on information furnished by the CIA; he = hadn=92t=20 gotten the other side of the story from those journalists who had = associated=20 with the Agency. He could be seeing only =93the lantern show,=94 he told = associates.=20 Still, Bader was reasonably sure that he had seen pretty much the full = panoply=20 of what was in the files. If the CIA had wanted to deceive him it would = have=20 never given away so much, he reasoned. =93It was smart of the Agency to = cooperate=20 to the extent of showing the material to Bader,=94 observed a committee = source.=20 =93That way, if one fine day a file popped up, the Agency would be = covered. They=20 could say they had already informed the Congress.=94

The=20 dependence on CIA files posed another problem. The CIA=92s perception of = a=20 relationship with a journalist might be quite different than that of the = journalist: a CIA official might think he had exercised control over a=20 journalist; the journalist might think he had simply had a few drinks = with a=20 spook. It was possible that CIA case officers had written = self‑serving memos for=20 the files about their dealings with journalists, that the CIA was just = as=20 subject to common bureaucratic =93cover‑your‑ass=94 = paperwork as any other agency of=20 government.

A CIA official who attempted to persuade = members of=20 the Senate committee that the Agency=92s use of journalists had been = innocuous=20 maintained that the files were indeed filled with =93puffing=94 by case = officers.=20 =93You can=92t establish what is puff and = what isn=92t,=94 he=20 claimed. Many reporters, he added, =93were recruited for finite = [specific]=20 undertakings and would be appalled to find that they were listed [in = Agency=20 files] as CIA operatives.=94 This same official estimated that the files = contained=20 descriptions of about half a dozen reporters and correspondents who = would be=20 considered =93famous=94=97that is, their names would be recognized by = most Americans.=20 =93The files show that the CIA goes to the press for and just as often = that the=20 press comes to the CIA,=94 he observed. =93...There is a tacit agreement = in many of=20 these cases that there is going to be a quid pro quo=94=97i.e., that the = reporter is=20 going to get good stories from the Agency and that the CIA will pick up = some=20 valuable services from the reporter.

Whatever the interpretation, the findings of the Senate = committees=20 inquiry into the use of journalists were deliberately buried=97from the = full=20 membership of the committee, from the Senate and from the public. = =93There=20 was a difference of opinion on how to treat the subject,=94 explained = one source.=20 =93Some [senators] thought these were abuses which should be exorcized = and there=20 were those who said, =91We don=92t know if = this is bad or=20 not.=92=94

Bader=92s findings on the subject were = never discussed=20 with the full committee, even in executive session. That might have led = to=20 leaks=97especially in view of the explosive nature of the facts. Since = the=20 beginning of the Church committee=92s investigation, leaks had been the = panel=92s=20 biggest collective fear, a real threat to its mission. At the slightest = sign of=20 a leak the CIA might cut off the flow of sensitive information as it = did,=20 several times in other areas), claiming that the committee could not be = trusted=20 with secrets. =93It was as if we were on trial=97not the CIA,=94 said a = member of the=20 committee staff. To describe in the committee=92s final report the true = dimensions=20 of the Agency=92s use of journalists would cause a furor in the press = and on the=20 Senate floor. And it would result in heavy pressure on the CIA to end = its use of=20 journalists altogether. =93We just weren=92t = ready to take=20 that step,=94 said a senator. A similar decision was made to conceal the = results=20 of the staff=92s inquiry into the use of academics. Bader, who = supervised both=20 areas of inquiry, concurred in the decisions and drafted those sections = of the=20 committee=92s final report. Pages 191 to 201 were entitled =93Covert = Relationships=20 with the United States Media.=94 =93It hardly reflects what we found,=94 = stated=20 Senator Gary Hart. =93There was a prolonged and elaborate negotiation = [with the=20 CIA] over what would be said.=94

Obscuring=20 the facts was relatively simple. No mention was made of the 400 = summaries or=20 what they showed. Instead the report noted blandly that some fifty = recent=20 contacts with journalists had been studied by the committee staff=97thus = conveying=20 the impression that the Agency=92s dealings with the press had been = limited to=20 those instances. The Agency files, the report noted, contained little = evidence=20 that the editorial content of American news reports had been affected by = the=20 CIA=92s dealings with journalists. Colby=92s misleading public = statements about the=20 use of journalists were repeated without serious contradiction or = elaboration.=20 The role of cooperating news executives was given short shrift. The fact = that=20 the Agency had concentrated its relationships in the most prominent = sectors of=20 the press went unmentioned. That the CIA continued to regard the press = as up for=20 grabs was not even suggested.

Former =91Washington Post=92 reporter CARL = BERNSTEIN is=20 now working on a book about the witch hunts of the Cold War.

1 John McCone, = director of=20 the Agency from 1961 to 1965, said in a recent interview that he knew = about=20 "great deal of debriefing and exchanging help" but nothing about any=20 arrangements for cover the CIA might have made with media organizations. = "I=20 wouldn't necessarily have known about it," he said. "Helms would have = handled=20 anything like that. It would be unusual for him to come to me and say, = 'We're=20 going to use journalists for cover.' He had a job to do. There was no = policy=20 during my period that would say, 'Don't go near that water,' nor was = there one=20 saying, 'Go to it!'" During the Church committee bearings, McCone = testified that=20 his subordinates failed to tell him about domestic surveillance = activities or=20 that they were working on plans to assassinate Fidel Castro. Richard = Helms was=20 deputy director of the Agency at the time; he became director in=20 1966.

2 A stringer is a = reporter=20 who works for one or several news organizations on a retainer or on a = piecework=20 basis.

3=20 From the CIA point of view, access to newsfilm=20 outtakes and photo libraries is a matter of extreme importance. The = Agency's=20 photo archive is probably the greatest on earth; its graphic sources = include=20 satellites, photoreconnaissance, planes, miniature cameras ... and the American press. = During the=20 1950s and 1960s, the Agency obtained carte‑blanche borrowing = privileges in the=20 photo libraries of literally dozens of American newspapers, magazines = and=20 television, outlets. For obvious reasons, the CIA also assigned high = priority to=20 the recruitment of photojournalists, particularly foreign‑based = members of=20 network camera crews.

4 On=20 April = 3^rd,=20 1961,=20 Koop left the Washington bureau to become = head of=20 CBS, Inc.=92s Government Relations Department =97 a position he held = until his=20 retirement on March = 31^st,=20 1972. Koop, who worked as a deputy = in the=20 Censorship Office in World War II, continued to deal with the CIA in his = new=20 position, according to CBS sources.

5 Hayes, who left = the=20 Washington Post Company in 1965 to become U.S. Ambassador to=20 Switzerland, is now=20 chairman of the board of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty =97 both of = which=20 severed their ties with the CIA in 1971. Hayes said he cleared his = participation=20 in the China project with the = late=20 Frederick S. Beebe, then chairman of the board of the Washington Post=20 Company. Katharine = Graham, the=20 Post=92s publisher, was unaware of the nature of the assignment, he = said. Participants in the project = signed=20 secrecy agreements.

6 Philip Geyelin, editor of the Post editorial page, worked = for the=20 Agency before joining the Post.

7 Louis Buisch, president=20 of the publishing company of the Hornell, = New=20 York, Evening Tribune, told the Courier‑Journal in 1976 = that he=20 remembered little about the hiring of Robert Campbell. "He wasn't there = very=20 long, and he didn't make much of an impression," said Buisch, who has since retired from active = management of the=20 newspaper.

8 Probably the most = thoughtful article on the subject of the press and the CIA was written = by Stuart=20 H. Loory and appeared in the = September‑October 1974=20 issue of Columbia Journalism=20 Review.

9=20 Wes Gallagher, general manager of the Associated Press from 1962 to = 1976, takes=20 vigorous exception to the notion that the Associated Press might have = aided the=20 Agency. "We've always stayed clear on the CIA; I would have fired = anybody who=20 worked for them. We don't even let our people debrief." At the time of = the first=20 disclosures that reporters had worked for the CIA, Gallagher went to = Colby. "We=20 tried to find out names. All he would say was that no full‑time = staff member of=20 the Associated Press was employed by the Agency. We talked to Bush. He = said the=20 same thing." If any Agency personnel were placed in Associated Press = bureaus,=20 said Gallagher, it was done without consulting the management of the = wire=20 service. But Agency officials insist that they were able to make cover=20 arrangements through someone in the upper management levels of Associated Press, whom = they refuse=20 to identify.

10 Many journalists = and some=20 CIA officials dispute the Agency's claim that it has been scrupulous in=20 respecting the editorial integrity of American publications and = broadcast=20 outlets.